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Since the early 20th century, monetary policy announcements and monetary policy actions
have attracted much attention for their internal and external macroeconomic implications.
Two important tenets of macroeconomic theory - the Keynesian and the monetarist view -
do not doubt that monetary policy actions have real short-run economic eﬀects, although
for diﬀerent reasons. Keynes (1936) emphasizes price rigidities, whereas Friedman (1968)
stresses worker misperceptions of the price level in a world of ﬂexible prices. Even though
the existence of real short-run monetary policy eﬀects is not refuted, there is no dominant
view on the channels through which monetary policy operates and on the factors which
determine monetary policy eﬀectiveness in a single region or country. However, policy makers
need to identify and understand ”[t]he process through which monetary policy decisions are
transmitted into changes in real GDP and inﬂation” (Taylor, 1995, p. 11) in order to correctly
anticipate the macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary policy, given the state of the economy.
Knowledge of monetary policy transmission is of particular importance for the European
Central Bank (ECB) which sets a common (uniform) monetary policy for 12 heterogeneous
European countries and their regions.1 An investigation of monetary policy transmission is
relevant from a policy perspective since a common monetary policy shock will have asymmet-
ric eﬀects on the real economic performance of the individual Euro zone member countries
if it is transmitted through country- or region-speciﬁc channels. Surely, pronounced asym-
metries in the real eﬀects will cast doubt on the ability of the ECB to address the economic
conditions of all Euro zone countries. In fact, persistent and pronounced diﬀerences in the
real eﬀects may even undermine the political and public support for and hence the stability of
the European economic and monetary union (EMU) in the long run by raising the net costs of
a common currency.2 A good example of decreasing political and public commitment to EMU
1We emphasize the case of the European economic and monetary union (EMU) as a well-known example
which has attracted much research. Of course, any individual country that combines a number of (het-
erogeneous) regions eﬀectively constitutes a monetary union. The subsequent arguments are therefore also
applicable in a wider context.
2Prior to the onset of the European economic and monetary union, research was largely concerned with
the feasibility of a common currency in terms of shock asymmetries. The underlying cost-beneﬁt analyses
have emphasized Mundell’s (1961) seminal work on optimal currency areas.
12 Chapter 1
is Italy. In July 2005, the then prime minister Berlusconi attributed the poor performance of
the Italian economy to the presumed failure or unwillingness of the European Central Bank
to avoid the persistent appreciation of the Euro. He openly suggested the return to the
Lira as the one and only approach to restore international competitiveness in the absence of
monetary policy sovereignty.
In view of these considerations, knowledge of the ampliﬁcation and propagation mechanisms
of monetary policy is required. Although there is a considerable amount of research on
monetary policy transmission, the European Central Bank still notes that
”despite the best eﬀorts of economists working in academia, in research institutes
and in central banks, it [the monetary policy transmission mechanism] remains im-
perfectly understood. ...Moreover, institutional and behavioral changes ...may
have changed the relationships between diﬀerent economic variables.” (European
Central Bank, 2001, p. 44)3
Many past studies emphasize structural diﬀerences between the ﬁnancial systems of the Euro
zone member countries as source of cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬃcacy of monetary
policy. A key role is hereby assigned to cross-country disparities in (i) the importance of direct
and indirect ﬁnance, (ii) the importance of bank and non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries, (iii)
the amount and composition of corporate and household ﬁnancial wealth, bank and non-bank
indebtedness, and (iv) the degree of credit market imperfections and liquidity constraints.4
These factors combined attribute the real eﬀects of monetary policy to the operation of an
interest rate channel and/or to the availability and the price of external ﬁnance.5
Besides between-country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures, cross-country asymmetries in the
real eﬀects of monetary policy are also associated with between-country and within-country
diﬀerences in economic structures. Most corresponding research deﬁnes economic structures
in terms of (i) industry composition and (ii) labor and goods market rigidities. Research
on industry composition argues that the macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary policy reﬂect
the (weighed) diﬀerential monetary policy response of individual industries. Cross-industry
diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy result from cross-industry heterogeneities
in the structure of production functions and in the monetary policy sensitivity of industry
demand. For these relationships, cross-country asymmetries in the real eﬀects of monetary
policy then reﬂect cross-country diﬀerences in the relative importance of industries. Finally,
labor and goods market rigidities inﬂuence monetary policy eﬀectiveness through their impact
on the aggregate and industry-speciﬁc supply curve. One can argue that cross-country dif-
ferences in real rigidities reﬂect diﬀerences in the contestability of markets and in the degree
of centralized wage bargaining.
3Words in brackets are added.
4See Cecchetti (1999) and Putkuri (2003) for an overview of ﬁnancial structures in European economies.
5For example, the importance of variable and ﬁxed rate debt in total debt inﬂuences monetary policy
transmission through interest rate pass through, but not through the availability of external ﬁnance.1.1 Motivation 3
In the future, the potential role of diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures as source of cross-country
asymmetries in monetary policy transmission and in the real eﬀects of monetary policy is likely
to diminish. One reason is the continuous harmonization of (EU) banking and non-banking
regulation which creates a level-playing ﬁeld for ﬁnancial intermediaries. Furthermore, rising
consolidation of the banking market in all European economies may ameliorate cross-country
diﬀerences in the speed and the extent at which bank lending rates and bank lending volume
respond to changes in the money market interest rate. In fact, market consolidation through
mergers and acquisitions will probably mitigate the monetary policy response of bank lending
and ultimately economic activity if this process fosters the ﬁnancial soundness of banks
and/or improves the access of banks to non-deposit, uninsured ﬁnance. Besides mergers
and acquisitions, Fase and De Bondt (2000) stress information and technology advances as
additional factors behind the convergence of ﬁnancial structures. These facilitate the access
of (i) ﬁrms, households, and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions to external funds of ﬁnance and
(ii) banks to non-deposit funds since they reduce the costs of direct and indirect ﬁnance by
lowering informational frictions.
While cross-country heterogeneities in ﬁnancial structures will be mitigated by the European
integration process, cross-country diﬀerences in economic structures are likely to persist or
even deepen. Krugman (1991, 1993) argues that the European integration process adds
to the regional specialization in production6 and Midelfart-Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and
Venables (2000) lend descriptive and empirical support to this view. In a study for the
European Commission, they ﬁnd that the European integration process is accompanied by
the divergence of countries’ economic structures.7 Beginning in the early 1980s, this process
is characterized by the spatial concentration of manufacturing industries, but the spatial
divergence of the service industry. The choice of industry location is hereby predominantly
determined by the need for and access to physical capital, labor, and technological resources.
Surely, the observed divergence of industry structures in Europe will aggravate between-
country and between-region diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy if industries
respond diﬀerently to a common monetary policy shock. The real eﬀects of monetary policy
on the economic performance of countries and regions then depend on the distribution of
industries.
In our view, it is of crucial importance for the ECB to understand and quantify the channels
through which industry composition inﬂuences the real eﬀects of monetary policy because they
6See the European Commission (1990) for the opposite view according to which a common monetary policy
causes the regional convergence of industry structures. Also, the Krugman (1991, 1993) view is subject to
two interrelated caveats. Firstly, regional specialization should predominantly prevail for the manufacturing
industry but not for the service industry. This is because of sectoral diﬀerences in the nature of goods: the
manufacturing sector produces tradable goods, whereas the service sector produces non-tradables. Secondly,
there might be less scope for regional specialization in manufacturing given the observed continuous decline
in the importance of the manufacturing industry in total production.
7In contrast to countries in Europe, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) ﬁnd industry structures of US states
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determine the macroeconomic implications of a common monetary policy. If countries and
regions indeed specialize in terms of production and industry structure, possible asymmetries
in the economic response of industries to a common monetary policy shock will have important
consequences for the degree of income variability and income distribution. This is even more
stringent in view of the fact that governments cannot prevent the regional specialization
in production patterns. In the absence of compensating income redistribution schemes or
adjustment mechanisms like factor mobility or wage-price ﬂexibility, countries and regions
with monetary-policy-sensitive industries will then be disproportionately more aﬀected by
monetary policy shocks.8 This, however, has important repercussions for the costs and
beneﬁts of the European economic and monetary union for each country/region. In fact,
asymmetries in the transmission of a uniform monetary policy shock ask for compensating
ﬁscal insurance schemes and for factor-mobility-promoting structural reforms so as to smooth
the diﬀerential income eﬀects of monetary policy across industries and ultimately regions.
1.2 Aim of this Study
Although there has been signiﬁcant progress in research on the role of industry eﬀects in the
last years, we believe that existing studies have not exhaustively addressed the role of industry
composition as determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness at the country and regional level.
The objective of this thesis is to add to the ongoing debate. In particular, it aims to qualify
and quantify the role of industries as determinant of the monetary policy eﬀects associated
with two prominent channels of monetary policy transmission, i.e., the interest rate and credit
channel.
We address two interrelated questions. The ﬁrst question concerns the real eﬀects of monet-
ary policy and asks whether and to what extent industries diﬀer in their economic response
to monetary policy disturbances. A discussion of this question is relevant since it shows (i)
whether the monetary policy eﬀects at the macroeconomic level are conditioned by industry
composition and (ii) whether cross-country (cross-region) diﬀerences in the relative import-
ance of industries contribute to cross-country (cross-region) asymmetries in monetary policy
eﬀects. To anticipate the answer, estimations for the United States and countries in Europe
will show that monetary policy shocks have a heterogeneous eﬀect on industry output.
This ﬁnding motivates the second question which asks: are cross-industry diﬀerences in the
monetary policy response associated with cross-industry diﬀerences in the relative strength of
the interest rate and credit channel of monetary policy transmission? Stated diﬀerently, do
the real eﬀects of monetary policy reﬂect the diﬀerential response of industry output (i) to a
8See the optimum currency area theory for a discussion of the role of factor mobility as necessary adjustment
mechanism (e.g., Mundell, 1961). Factor mobility refers to labor and capital mobility. Because capital is free
to move between Euro zone member countries, economic and political discussions predominantly emphasize
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change in the real cost of capital (interest rate channel) or (ii) to a change in the severity of
credit market imperfections and information asymmetries (credit channel)? We hypothesize
that diﬀerences in the structural properties of industries inﬂuence the interest rate and credit
channel eﬀects of monetary policy at the industry level. Closely related, we argue that the
industry composition of a country or region drives the macroeconomic evidence on monetary
policy eﬃcacy through the interest rate and credit channel.
1.3 Place in the Literature
In order to answer these questions, this thesis encompasses two broad and interrelated strands
of research. The ﬁrst strand of literature refers to studies that identify the real eﬀects
of monetary policy shocks. In the past, many empirical and theoretical discussions have
been concerned with the real eﬀects of monetary policy on the macroeconomic performance
of countries. The results from aggregate data are, however, subject to criticism since the
underlying evidence only reﬂects the smoothed response of the average industry/ﬁrm, average
banking sector/bank, and average consumer in an economy (e.g., Ganley and Salmon, 1997).
In eliminating the diﬀerential monetary policy response of each group of agents and thus the
eﬀects associated with economic structures, the evidence from aggregate studies does not
help to improve the imperfect understanding of monetary policy transmission.
With the increased availability of data for longer sample periods, recent studies adopt an
industry focus and investigate the response of industry-speciﬁc output to a monetary policy
shock. The presumption is that industries diﬀer in their response to monetary policy shocks
and that these diﬀerences cause monetary policy eﬃcacy to depend on the relative importance
of industries in an economy. This claim receives strong empirical support. Unfortunately, the
evidence is predominantly derived from single country analyses and usually does not involve
cross-country estimations. The absence of evidence from multi-country or multi-region studies
complicates the comparability of industry eﬀects across countries because of cross-study
diﬀerences in the nature of the data and/or estimation techniques. Furthermore, it precludes
sensible assessments as to the relative importance of industry and country eﬀects as source
of variation in the real eﬀects of monetary policy. It is, however, important to identify and
understand the country eﬀects because they reﬂect the impact of country-speciﬁc institutional
and/or organizational structures on monetary policy eﬀectiveness.
The second strand of literature links the real eﬀects of monetary policy to the operation of
monetary transmission channels. Again, a large part of the corresponding research identiﬁes
the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy for the macroeconomic aggre-
gate or for an aggregate of industries. Only a newer strand of research tests for and lends
support to the prevalence of interest rate and credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy trans-
mission for industries. Because the corresponding evidence is again predominantly derived
for single countries, stylized facts as to the role of industries as source of interest rate and6 Chapter 1
credit channel eﬀects cannot easily be established or maintained.
1.4 The Interest Rate and Credit Channel: A Narrow Focus?
Before concluding this chapter with an overview of the thesis structure, we motivate our re-
stricted focus on the role of industries as determinant of the interest rate and credit channel
eﬀects of monetary policy. In principle, there are many transmission channels which oﬀer
scope for industry eﬀects, such as the exchange rate or consumption-wealth channel. Unfor-
tunately, assessments of these channels at the industry level are inherently diﬃcult for their
data requirements. Research on the exchange rate channel, for example, requires informa-
tion on industry-speciﬁc import and export prices to control for the exposure of industries
to demand ﬂuctuations in the domestic as well as foreign market. Investigations of the
consumption-wealth channel ask for estimates of the share of household net wealth spent on
industry-speciﬁc goods.
In our view, the emphasis on the interest rate and credit channel is highly desirable since
these channels provide the clearest illustration of the role of industries in the transmission
of monetary policy shocks. Figure 1.1 schematically illustrates the factors through which
industries may inﬂuence the strength of the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects. The
relationships which involve industries in monetary policy transmission through the goods and
credit market and which receive attention in this thesis are printed in bold.9 The industry
eﬀect encompasses the interaction of (i) the production and consumption side of the economy
through the traditional interest rate channel and (ii) the production and credit side of the
economy through the credit channel of monetary policy transmission.
The left-hand side of Figure 1.1 illustrates the interest rate channel, which emphasizes the
monetary policy response of industry investment and industry output supply in order to
explain the real eﬀects of monetary policy changes. Here, the monetary policy response
of investment reﬂects the eﬀect of a monetary-policy-induced change in ﬁnancing costs on
capital accumulation and therefore production capacity. The monetary policy response of
output supply illustrates the impact of the monetary-policy-induced change in the demand
for industry-speciﬁc goods.10 As will be explained in chapter 2, both the investment as well
as output demand eﬀects of monetary policy are likely to diﬀer between industries producing
9Figure 1.1 is schematic and reduced to those components that are relevant for the present analysis.
Besides ignoring the exchange rate and consumption-wealth channel, we also disregard asset prices and the
role of market expectations as determinant of wage and price setting and hence industry supply. Furthermore,
we keep the discussion general and stress industries and banking groups rather than ﬁrms and banks. This
simplistic approach can be motivated by the interdependence of ﬁrms and industries and banks and banking
groups. Chapter 2 contains detailed explanations of these relationships and presents economic interpretations.
Chapter 4, 5, and 6 report new empirical evidence.
10Of course, the monetary policy response of industry output and industry investment is not mutually
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Figure 1.1: Industry and Monetary Policy Transmission8 Chapter 1
goods that diﬀer in terms of, for example, durability, capital intensity, or tradability.
The monetary-policy-induced change in investment and output also aﬀects industry-speciﬁc
internal cash ﬂows and ultimately industry demand for external ﬁnance. The broad credit
view argues that the availability of internal cash aﬀects the access of industries to external
bank and non-bank ﬁnance through its eﬀect on the balance sheet position of industries.
Given credit market imperfections, the balance sheet position in turn deﬁnes the external
ﬁnance premium through its eﬀect on the perceived riskiness of industries.
Besides industry riskiness, the access to external ﬁnance also depends on the ability of bank
and non-bank institutions to supply credit. The right-hand side of Figure 1.1 emphasizes the
role of banking groups as source of external credit. Banking groups grant loans conditional on
the amount of deposits, bank equity, and bank liquidity, with bank deposits being determined
by private savings. The narrow credit channel theory argues that the monetary policy response
of bank lending depends on the ability of banking groups to cope with monetary-policy-
induced changes in (non-reservable) bank deposits. The magnitude of the bank lending
response hereby depends on banking group eﬃciency and proﬁtability in the presence of
credit market imperfections.
For individual banking groups, the monetary policy response of aggregate credit supply can
be deﬁned as the response of lending to individual industries. Cross-industry diﬀerences
in the monetary policy response of industry-speciﬁc bank lending may reﬂect cross-industry
asymmetries in the monetary policy sensitivity of internal cash ﬂows and hence bank credit
demand. This, however, points to the potential role of the industry composition of bank
credit portfolios as determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness.
1.5 Structure
This section concludes the introductory chapter by outlining the structure of this thesis.
The thesis is composed of seven chapters. Chapter 2 is dedicated to a description of the
relationships in Figure 1.1. It presents the theories and empirical evidence on the interest
rate and credit channel of monetary policy transmission from a macroeconomic and industry
perspective. Within this framework, we emphasize methodological problems on the theoretical
and empirical side which complicate and may even bias empirical analyses. We argue that
the focus on industry structure may ameliorate some of the methodological diﬃculties. The
review of the existing literature constitutes the background for the subsequent empirical
analyses of the industry eﬀects of monetary policy transmission.
Chapter 3 attempts to theoretically explain the observation that empirical credit channel
studies lend ambiguous support to the existence of ﬁrm size eﬀects in monetary policy trans-
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diﬀerences in the sensitivity of small- and large-sized ﬁrms to changes in the money market
interest rate. In contrast to existing studies on the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy, the
importance of ﬁrms as monetary transmission channel does not originate from credit mar-
ket imperfections, but from size-related diﬀerences in the degree of investment irreversibility.
These cause large ﬁrms to change investment regimes less frequently than small ﬁrms. How-
ever, when large ﬁrms move, the investment response is more accentuated than that of small
ﬁrms. The size-related diﬀerences in investment irreversibility cause the monetary policy
response of small- and large-ﬁrm investment to crucially depend on the magnitude of the
monetary policy shock. For small interest rate shocks, the model’s predictions are in line
with the credit view in that small-ﬁrm investment is suggested to respond more to monetary
policy changes. In contrast to the credit view, however, large-ﬁrm investment is more re-
sponsive to large monetary policy changes. The model hence illustrates that empirical tests
f o rﬁ r ms i z ee ﬀ e c t so fm o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o u l da l l o wf o rs m a l la n dl a r g eﬁ r ms i z ee ﬀ e c t s .
Chapter 4 discusses the relationships on the left-hand side of Figure 1.1, with an exclusive fo-
cus on the production side of the economy. It analyzes the industry eﬀects of monetary policy
in the United States and determines the extent to which industry eﬀects aﬀect conclusions as
to the existence of a credit and interest rate channel of monetary policy. The evidence from
vector autoregressive models and cross-section estimations shows that conclusions strongly
depend on the assumptions as to the independence of industry and either ﬁrm size (a com-
monly used proxy variable of the credit channel) or capital intensity (a proxy variable of the
interest rate channel). We stress the United States as an established example for a large
economy with a centralized monetary policy and argue that monetary policy transmission in
the United States may provide useful insights for monetary policy transmission in the Euro-
pean economic and monetary union. Because the results of a similar analysis for Europe are
at most indicative rather than conclusive, we only report the EMU evidence in the annex to
chapter 4.
Chapter 5 emphasizes the relationships on the right-hand side of Figure 1.1 for the banking
sector. The analysis is motivated by the observation that existing credit channel studies on
the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy do not take into account possible industry eﬀects.
In our view, however, cross-industry diﬀerences in cyclical and structural properties and in
bank credit demand render industry sectors a potential determinant of the credit channel
eﬀects through bank lending. In order to determine the signiﬁcance of this presumption, we
use the industry dimension of microeconomic bank lending data to identify the bank lending
eﬀects of changes in bank credit demand and monetary policy in Germany. We hypothesize
that changes in bank lending are industry speciﬁc and that the industry composition of a
bank’s loan portfolio determines the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy through credit channel
eﬀects. Our evidence from dynamic panel data models supports this hypothesis.
Both chapter 4 and 5 assume that expansionary and contractionary monetary policy changes
have symmetric output growth eﬀects on industries. Chapter 6 departs from the symmetry10 Chapter 1
assumption. It investigates whether the industry output growth eﬀects of monetary expan-
sions and contractions diﬀer and whether the degree of asymmetry depends on the size of
monetary policy changes and on the industry business cycle position. These issues are ad-
dressed in country-speciﬁc dynamic panel estimations of 24 industries for Germany, Italy, and
Spain over the period 1995:1-2002:4. Within this framework, the importance of industries as
determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness through interest rate and credit channel eﬀects
is indirectly examined by stressing cross-industry diﬀerences in structural characteristics. The
analysis will show that conclusions as to asymmetries in the industry output growth eﬀects of
monetary expansions and contractions depend on the choice of country. Furthermore, there is
at best weak evidence that monetary policy asymmetries are attributable to industry eﬀects.
Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the analysis on the industry eﬀects of monetary policy.
We discuss limitations of the studies in the previous chapters and oﬀer avenues for future
research.2
Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy:
Theory and Evidence
2.1 Introduction
There is a wide consensus that monetary policy shocks have real eﬀects on output and
relative prices - at least in the short run.1 While empirical studies conﬁrm the short-run non-
neutrality of monetary policy for European economies as well as for the United States, they
also point to cross-country asymmetries in the magnitude of the output and price response
and in the time it takes for the dynamics of a monetary policy shock to fully work through
the system. These diﬀerences are of particular importance for the member countries of the
European economic and monetary union (EMU) since they cast doubt on the appropriateness
of a common monetary policy. Furthermore, cross-country heterogeneities in the real eﬀects
of monetary policy raise questions as to the relative strength of channels through which
monetary policy shocks transmit to the economy.
The literature discusses numerous demand- and supply-side factors such as relative asset
prices, wealth, exchange rates, ﬁnancial structure, and the interest rate sensitivity of indus-
tries, ﬁrms, and banks as mechanisms that propagate and amplify the eﬀects of monetary
policy shocks on economic activity.2 Surely, the real eﬀects of monetary policy are not ex-
clusively attributable to the operation of any single transmission mechanism, but reﬂect the
relative importance of multiple transmission channels. Stated diﬀerently, the various demand-
and supply-side channels are not mutually exclusive but complement and reinforce each other.
Among the various transmission mechanisms of monetary policy, the interest rate and credit
channel have attracted most attention. Discussions ask whether price rigidities and/or credit
market imperfections inﬂuence the eﬀects of monetary policy and whether one of these fac-
tors is a potentially more important monetary transmission mechanism. The answers to these
1See, for example, Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese (1999),
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Angeloni et al. (2003), Bean, Larsen, and Nikolov (2003) for
reviews of the economic eﬀects of monetary policy in the United States and Europe.
2See, among others, Mishkin (1995), Trautwein (2000), and Putkuri (2003) for details and surveys of the
diﬀerent transmission channels.
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questions show whether and to what degree monetary policy eﬀectiveness depends on eco-
nomic structures (goods and labor markets, industry composition) and/or ﬁnancial structures
(bank and non-bank ﬁnancial markets). These issues are of particular interest for the EMU
member countries since they indicate whether regional economic and ﬁnancial structures have
converged to an extent so as to ensure the sustainability of monetary policy centralization
under the auspices of the European Central Bank. The conclusions certainly have important
economic, welfare, and political implications.
In view of their economic and political relevance, the last decade has produced a consid-
erable number of theoretical and empirical studies on the interest rate and credit channel
eﬀects of monetary policy transmission. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of
the corresponding literature. We explore the theoretical and empirical studies by discussing
the importance of economic and ﬁnancial structures as determinants of the real eﬀects of
monetary policy eﬀectiveness. It will become evident that theoretical and empirical analy-
ses are complicated by methodological issues regarding the identiﬁcation of monetary policy
shocks and the identiﬁcation of individual transmission channels. Solutions to the identiﬁca-
tion problems inﬂuence the conclusions regarding the relative importance of the interest rate
and credit channel in single- and multi-country studies. The review of the existing theories
and empirical evidence provides the background for the subsequent empirical analyses of the
industry eﬀects of monetary policy transmission presented in this thesis.
The remainder of this chapter has the following structure. Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 describe
the transmission of monetary policy changes as stipulated by the traditional interest rate
channel and the credit channel, respectively. The discussion assumes that the interest rate
and credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy do not depend on the business cycle position of
an economy at the time of the monetary policy change. We will depart from this assumption
in section 2.2.3. Section 2.2.4 links monetary policy eﬀectiveness to economic structures
(e.g., industry composition) and ﬁnancial structures (e.g., bank and ﬁrm size distribution).
Section 2.3 critically emphasizes methodological and empirical issues that complicate the
analysis of monetary policy transmission mechanisms. We will stress problems related to the
identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks and to the identiﬁcation of monetary transmission
channels and review possible solutions. Section 2.4 documents the ﬁndings of existing empiri-
cal research on the interest rate and credit channel. The discussion is particularly attentive
to the data and industry dimension of the studies. Section 2.5 summarizes and illustrates
how the following chapters in this thesis are related to the existing literature.
2.2 Theories of Monetary Policy Transmission
The interest rate channel and credit channel are much debated monetary transmission mech-
anisms. The channels’ main diﬀerence concerns the question whether ﬁnancial structures
determine the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. While the interest rate channel stipulates2.2 Theories of Monetary Policy Transmission 13
the irrelevance of ﬁnancial structures and the existence of perfect capital markets, the credit
channel argues the opposite. The following sections explain the contrasting views and present
the theoretical foundations of the interest rate and credit channel for an unexpected tighten-
ing in monetary policy. Unless stated diﬀerently, the monetary contraction is approximated
with an increase in the money market interest rate. Given the focus of this thesis, we partic-
ularly emphasize the predictions of the interest rate and credit channel with respect to the
regional eﬀects and industry eﬀects of monetary policy.
2.2.1 Money View
The discussion about the role of interest rates in the monetary transmission process is also
referred to as the debate on the relevance of the money view.3 According to this approach,
money is the key ﬁnancial variable and market interest rates constitute the main avenue
through which monetary policy operates. In fact, the short-term interest rate fully accommo-
dates changes in money supply given the contemplated unavailability of money substitutes
which could mitigate the response. There are numerous formulations of the money view. We
summarize the model’s implications in terms of the Keynesian IS-LM model and the sluggish
savings and inﬂexible production model of Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995).
The traditional money view assumes the existence of two perfectly substitutable assets: money
and bonds. Money is held as a medium of exchange, while bonds do not serve a transaction
purpose. Money is issued by central banks and created by banks via demand deposits. Besides
creating money through the liability side of bank balance sheets, banks assume no special
role. At the core of the money view is the assumption that prices are slow to adjust. Price
stickiness in turn causes changes in the nominal money supply to have real short-run eﬀects.4
The real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are explained with the interest rate sensitivity of
demand components. Considering a tightening in monetary policy, the associated increase in
nominal interest rates in an environment of sluggish prices raises the short-term real interest
rate.5 This development depresses real economic activity through its eﬀect on ﬁxed capital
investment and consumption. The interest rate response of investment operates through the
cost-of-capital channel. The prediction is that higher real interest rates increase the user cost
of physical capital investment. This reduces the rate of ﬁxed investment as the higher cost of
ﬁnance reduces the number of proﬁtable investment projects and raises the required return
on investment projects.
3Also see Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Hubbard (1995), Kashyap and Stein (1994, 1995), Kakes, Sturm,
and Maier (2001), Mojon (2001), Kuttner and Mosser (2002), and Putkuri (2003) for additional details and
graphical explorations.
4The real eﬀects build on the assumption that output supply is demand determined and perfectly elastic
in the short run.
5Price stickiness causes changes in nominal money supply to be associated with changes in real money
balances. In the wake of a monetary contraction, real money balances decline and money market equilibrium
requires a higher real interest rate so as to equilibrate money demand and money supply.14 Chapter 2
In contrast to the Keynesian framework, the Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) model ex-
plains the real eﬀects of money supply shocks with aggregate supply rather than aggregate
demand.6 The non-neutrality of money reﬂects the diﬀerential monetary policy response of
ﬁrms and households that results from (i) frictions in household saving decisions and (ii)
ex-post inﬂexibility in production processes. The frictions arise because households decide on
the amount of savings and ﬁrms ﬁx production plans prior to the occurrence of a monetary
policy shock. Because production only generates returns at the end of the production period,
the pre-commitment of ﬁrms is such that they have to borrow working capital from the ﬁnan-
cial sector at the prevailing nominal interest rate to ﬁnance running production. The input
factors to production are labor and physical capital.7 Whether ﬁrms can meet their demand
for liquidity (i.e., money demand) depends on the availability of (i) predetermined household
savings and (ii) lump sum injections of cash by the monetary authority, which deﬁne the
volume of funds available from ﬁnancial intermediaries. Firms are thus heavily dependent on
external ﬁnance and this fact causes them to be most aﬀected by a money supply shock.
In the Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) model, a money supply shock induces a change in
the nominal interest rate. The magnitude of the nominal interest rate response is determined
by the ease at which ﬁrm production and accordingly ﬁrm liquidity demand adjusts. When
production is fast to adjust8, ﬁrm money demand is ﬂexible and only small changes in the
nominal interest rate are required to equilibrate the money market. The consequent response
of output and consumption is then also small.9 T h er e s p o n s eo fo u t p u ta n dc o n s u m p t i o n
is attributable to the practice of ﬁrms to equate the marginal product of labor and the real
cost of hiring labor. For this relationship, a monetary-policy-induced increase in the nominal
interest rate reduces labor demand by raising the real cost of hiring labor. In due course, ﬁrm
production and ultimately aggregate output contracts.
The traditional interest rate channel is criticized for providing an incomplete and restrictive
view of the monetary transmission process.10 It is argued to be of limited use since neither the
IS-LM framework nor the Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) model distinguishes (i) diﬀerent
types of ﬁnancial assets11, (ii) diﬀerent types of interest rates to explain money demand, bond
demand, and investment, and (iii) temporary and permanent changes in nominal and real
interest rates. Interest rate eﬀects therefore do not fully account for the response of economic
aggregates to unexpected monetary policy changes.
Besides, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) point to the existence of at least two puzzles associated
6Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) deﬁne the monetary policy shock as innovation to money supply. The
interest rate response results from adjustments in money demand.
7Note, the model treats capital as credit good that cannot respond to a monetary policy shock.
8The speed of adjustment is exogenous to the model.
9The ultimate results depend on the parameterization of the model, including the assumed ex-post ﬂexibility
of production.
10See, among others, Hubbard (1995) and Meltzer (1995).
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with the traditional interest rate view. The ﬁrst puzzle concerns the magnitude of the
monetary policy response of real aggregate output and individual spending components. Even
though there is strong support for the monetary policy response of real economic output,
the evidence does not ﬁnd strong cost-of-capital eﬀects on individual spending components.
This inconsistency is particularly striking in view of the fact that investment is considerably
more time-variant than output, which should leave investment more interest sensitive (cf.
Bean, Larsen, and Nikolov, 2003). The second puzzle exists with respect to the monetary
policy response of individual spending components. Empirical research shows that residential
investment and durable goods and capital goods consumption generally display a strong
response to a change in monetary policy even when the monetary policy response of long-term
real interest rates is insigniﬁcant. In contrast to expectations, this suggests that spending on
durable/capital goods does not depend on the long-term, but on the short-term (i.e., money
market) interest rate.12 However, not all long-lived assets respond to monetary policy shocks.
Empirical research frequently does not ﬁnd quantitatively important eﬀects of monetary policy
on other long-lived spending components like business structures investment. The two puzzles
have their origin in the assumption of perfect capital markets. Given this assumption, the
money view neglects the role of interest-bearing assets and ﬁnancial intermediation and
assumes the perfect substitutability of bank and non-bank ﬁnance. The following section
discusses the credit view which allows for credit market imperfections.
2.2.2 Credit View
In allowing for only one type of market friction, i.e., price stickiness, the money view fails to
account for the observed eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
T h ec r e d i tv i e wg o e sb e y o n dt h ec o n c e p to fs t i c k yp r i c e si nt h a ti ta l s oc o n t e m p l a t e sf r i c t i o n s
in ﬁnancial markets and the interaction between ﬁnancial intermediaries and borrowers as
mechanisms which amplify and propagate the direct eﬀects of monetary policy. Dependent
on whether capital market imperfections are modeled to be more important at the level of non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrms or banking institutions, the credit view distinguishes the balance sheet channel
(broad credit channel) and bank lending channel (narrow credit channel), respectively.13
Both types of credit channel consider ﬁnancial markets to trade three types of imperfectly
substitutable assets: money, bonds, and bank loans. As will become evident, the broad
and narrow credit view discuss the real eﬀects of monetary policy changes by directly and
indirectly emphasizing the monetary policy sensitivity of bank lending. The response of real
spending to monetary-policy-induced ﬂuctuations in bank lending is driven by the absence of
12See Goodfriend (1998) for explanations regarding the absence of a signiﬁcant short-term interest rate
response of real long-term rates.
13The balance sheet channel is also known as the broad credit channel since the underlying principles apply
to a broad range of ﬁnancing options. The bank lending channel is also designated as the narrow credit
channel because the underlying principles apply to bank ﬁnancing options only. Also see Gertler and Gilchrist
(1993b), Hubbard (1995), Kashyap and Stein (1995), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), and Trautwein (2000)
for formal and graphical illustrations of the credit channel view.16 Chapter 2
perfect substitutes for bank loans.
The broad and narrow credit view do not only consider bank loans and non-bank assets as
imperfect substitutes. Instead, both channels also stress the imperfect substitutability of in-
ternal and external funds of ﬁnance, with internal ﬁnance being relatively less expensive than
external ﬁnance. At the core of this relationship are information asymmetries between bor-
rowers and lenders in ﬁnancial markets. Associated with the costs for selection, veriﬁcation,
monitoring, and enforcement, ﬁnancial intermediaries account for asymmetric information
problems by imposing a risk premium on external funds that renders external ﬁnance more
expensive than internal ﬁnance. The size of the risk premium is negatively related to the
monetary policy stance and positively linked to the level of the interest rate. We present the
narrow and broad credit view in more detail in the remainder of this section.
(i) Narrow Credit View
The narrow credit view stipulates that monetary policy changes have real eﬀects through their
impact on bank lending. Credit channel eﬀects via bank lending exist because credit market
imperfections cause a bank’s lending decisions to depend on its ﬁnancial structure. The
bank lending channel thus stems from a failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks
(cf. Modigliani and Miller, 1958).14 Discussions of the bank lending channel distinguish
the bank reserve and bank capital channel. Common to both channels is that monetary
policy actions in the presence of ﬁnancial imperfections aﬀect the level of bank credit supply
through their eﬀect on the quantity of bank liabilities.15 While the bank reserve channel relies
on information asymmetries in the market for reservable bank liabilities, the bank capital
channel stresses frictions in the market for bank equity.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) illustrate the bank reserve channel with an extended version
of the traditional IS-LM model. The extended IS-LM model not only includes a market for
bonds, money, and goods, but also a market for bank credit.16 At the core of the bank reserve
channel is the practice of banking institutions to ﬁnance loans in part with liabilities that are
subject to reserve requirements. In order to be operative, the bank reserve channel requires
(i) monetary policy shocks to have real eﬀects17, (ii) bank credit supply schedules to shift
in response to monetary policy actions, (iii) non-bank lending (bonds) and bank lending to
14Stein (1998) develops a theoretical model on the failure of the Modigliani-Miller theorem for banks.
15In general, the interest rate response of bank credit supply is reﬂected in either price-quantity adjustments
or pure quantity rationing.
16Also see Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993), Ramey (1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Kashyap and
Stein (1995, 2000), Stein (1998), Trautwein (2000), Farinha and Robalo Marques (2003) for presentations of
the bank reserve channel.
17The interest rate response of money demand also constitutes a real eﬀect. Only when money demand is
interest elastic will bank deposits and, in due course, bank lending ﬂuctuate in response to a monetary policy
change (cf. Bean, Larsen, and Nikolov, 2003). The more interest sensitive is money demand, the larger is
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be imperfect substitutes, and (iv) household and ﬁrm expenditures to depend on bank credit
supply, with bank credit demand being sensitive to changes in the bank lending rate.
For these conditions, the interest rate response of bank credit supply depends on the ability
of banks (i) to oﬀset a monetary-policy-induced decline in bank reserves and the consequent
reduction in reservable deposits with alternative non-reservable, uninsured funds and/or (ii) to
liquidate bank assets other than bank loans. Ideally, banks are able to fully oﬀset the decline
in reservable, insured funds. A monetary contraction then does not aﬀect bank credit supply
and any change in bank lending is clearly attributable to an interest-rate induced change in
bank credit demand.18 However, ﬁnancial credit market imperfections and the underlying
information asymmetries between banks and the issuers of non-reservable, uninsured ﬁnance
generally render banks unable to completely oﬀset the fall in reserves with alternative forms
of non-reservable ﬁnance. The ability of banks to supply loans then deteriorates. Cross-bank
diﬀerences in the degree of information asymmetry concerning the value of a bank’s liquid
assets and equity cause the interest rate response of bank lending to diﬀer between banks,
being more pronounced for small, less liquid, and less capitalized banks. Because banks
cut lending, ﬁrms and households have to address alternative non-bank sources of external
ﬁnance. However, if household and ﬁrm expenditures depend on bank credit supply and
alternative funds are not available, the cutback in bank credit supply will spur competition
for bank ﬁnance among debtors and worsens the terms under which it can be obtained. This
development ultimately curtails corporate investment activity and aggregate spending and
thus has real economic eﬀects.
Romer and Romer (1990) question the role of bank reserves in determining the strength of the
bank lending channel.19 In their view, open market operations do not have a large impact on
bank credit supply through reservable deposits since banks can raise funds at the margin by
issuing managed (i.e., non-reservable and uninsured) liabilities. The underlying assumption
is that there are no information asymmetries about the value of a bank’s assets and that
uninsured bank liabilities are therefore riskless.20 This in turn suggests that the bank lending
eﬀects of monetary policy are at best weak. Romer and Romer (1990) argue that - if at
all - monetary policy actions aﬀect bank lending through bank capital and regulatory capital
requirements. They reason that in the absence of binding reserve requirements on managed
liabilities, the ability of banks to access non-reservable liabilities is only determined by the
level of bank capital. Similar to the bank reserve channel, the eﬃcacy of monetary policy
18Note, following a monetary contraction, bank credit demand may expand or contract. Credit demand
will expand if borrowers experience an unexpected shortage of liquidity or an increase in inventories due to
lower sales (cf. Bean, Larsen, and Nikolov, 2003), but will decrease if borrowers consume or invest less in
anticipation of the monetary-policy-induced economic downturn.
19Also see Van den Heuvel (2002a, 2002b), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Gambacorta (2005), and the
references therein for explanations.
20See Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for a counter-argument and counter-evidence according to which
asymmetries about the real value of a bank’s assets preclude banks from accessing non-reservable funds of
ﬁnance.18 Chapter 2
depends on the interest rate sensitivity of bank capital and on the corresponding impact on
bank credit supply. To illustrate, a restrictive monetary policy shock reduces bank proﬁts and
thus the value of bank equity capital. The squeeze in proﬁts and hence equity results from
loan defaults and from a maturity mismatch between bank loans and deposits.21 Because
banks can renegotiate a smaller fraction of loans in comparison with deposits, a monetary
contraction imposes a maturity transformation cost on banks that reﬂects the increase in
interest costs compared with interest revenue.
Bank credit supply contracts for two reasons. Firstly, the decline in the level of bank equity
capital raises the risk premium in the market for uninsured funds and constrains banks from
readily issuing new equity. This balance sheet eﬀect of monetary policy causes banks to
contract bank credit supply. Secondly, banks reduce bank lending to meet regulatory capital
requirements and to lower the risk of capital inadequacy. Kashyap and Stein (1994) and Van
den Heuvel (2002a) argue that minimum capital requirements aﬀect the strength of credit
channel eﬀects through bank lending. Bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy are only at
work when bank capital is above the risk-based minimum regulatory capital requirement. The
bank lending eﬀects are then stronger for less capitalized banks: less capitalized banks reduce
lending in order to reduce the risk of future capital inadequacy. When bank capital is at or
below the risk-based minimum regulatory capital requirement, monetary policy shocks have
a potentially small or even no eﬀect on bank lending. This is particularly striking in case
of a monetary policy expansion. Even when a monetary policy expansion causes an increase
in reservable deposits and a decline in the degree of information asymmetries, bank lending
may only expand at the margin. The reason is that banks have to accumulate bank equity
ﬁrst so as to meet bank capital requirements. The speed at which bank capital expands then
depends on the eﬀect of monetary policy on bank proﬁts. In view of these relationships, Van
den Heuvel (2002a) concludes that the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy are stronger,
the larger the share of less, but adequately capitalized banks and the smaller the share of
undercapitalized banks.
(ii) Broad Credit View
Similar to the narrow credit view, the broad credit view accounts for the role of banks
in monetary policy transmission. However, the channel emphasizes the asset rather than
liability side of bank balance sheets. Furthermore, the broad credit channel does not only
describe the eﬀect of monetary policy changes on the supply of bank ﬁnance, but examines the
role of all ﬁnancial intermediaries as source of external ﬁnance.22 A tt h ec o r eo ft h eb r o a d
credit channel are the pro-cyclicality of net worth, the counter-cyclicality of the external
21Note, loans tend to be long-term, while deposits are predominantly short-term.
22See Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Gilchrist, Hairault, and Kempf (2002) for formalizations of the balance sheet channel. Also see
Trautwein (2000) for a literature review on the balance sheet eﬀects of monetary policy and on the relationship
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ﬁnance premium, and the consequent negative relationship between the external ﬁnance
premium and the balance sheet position (net wealth) of potential borrowers (e.g., ﬁrms).
The net eﬀect of these relationships is captured by the ﬁnancial accelerator principle. In
order to be operative, the ﬁnancial accelerator principle requires monetary policy to aﬀect
the balance sheet position of ﬁrms. The balance sheet eﬀect generally presents itself as a
change in the level of internal cash ﬂows and in the value of collateral assets. It is propagated
through endogenous developments in credit markets related to information asymmetries, cost
of lending, and credit availability.
The propagation and ampliﬁcation mechanism operates as follows. A monetary-policy-
induced increase in interest rates raises interest payments and worsens the level of cash
ﬂows and the discounted value of ﬁrms’ future income streams by suppressing aggregate
demand. In addition, higher money market interest rates trigger a decline in the price of
marketable balance-sheet assets which serve as collateral. Both developments - the decline
in internal cash ﬂows and the reduction in the value of collateral - worsen the ﬁnancial status
and hence the creditworthiness of borrowers, but also increase the need for external ﬁnance.23
In order to compensate for the higher agency costs as caused by information asymmetries and
a higher probability of borrowers’ default, bank and non-bank institutions raise the premium
for external ﬁnance and engage in credit rationing. The monetary-policy-induced decline in
the balance sheet position of borrowers thus causes a contraction of bank and non-bank credit
supply to those borrowers and reduces their ability to ﬁnance investment projects.24 Because
these relationships cause some proﬁtable investment projects to be foregone, the decline in
investment spending ultimately comes at the expense of lower economic activity and lower
cash ﬂows in subsequent periods.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) argue that the deterioration in net worth also induces
a ’ﬂight to quality’ on the part of bank and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. These reshuﬄe
their credit portfolio from low net worth (high-risk) to high net worth (low-risk) borrowers
in order to reduce credit risk. Financial accelerator eﬀects are anticipated to be stronger,
the weaker the balance sheet position of potential debtors and the higher the consequent
information asymmetries and agency costs. Information asymmetries are viewed to be more
pronounced for small-sized ﬁrms. The broad credit view argues that the creditworthiness of
small ﬁrms is more sensitive to interest rate and output ﬂuctuations than that of large ﬁrms.
The larger interest and output sensitivity in turn cause small-ﬁrm bank and non-bank credit
demand to be more sensitive to monetary policy changes.
23Mishkin (2001) follows an alternative line of reasoning. Building on Tobin’s q-theory (Tobin, 1969),
an increase in interest rates raises the replacement cost of capital, while depressing the market value of
ﬁrms. Since the relative decline in Tobin’s q renders investment expensive relative to the value of the ﬁrm,
investment spending declines. This development may come at the expense of lower credit demand. Ashcraft
and Campello (2002) also stress an inverse relationship between credit demand and monetary policy. They
presume that credit demand declines in the wake of a monetary tightening because of higher debt service
burdens.
24Note, the broad credit channel may operate even when bank loans and bonds are perfect substitutes.20 Chapter 2
2.2.3 Asymmetries in Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness
Monetary policy shocks may have diﬀerent eﬀects dependent on whether the economy expe-
riences a boom or downturn. They are deemed to be more eﬀective during a downturn than
during a boom. The interest rate view attributes cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy
eﬀectiveness to cyclical diﬀerences in the degree of nominal price and wage rigidities, which
aﬀect the shape of the aggregate supply curve. For example, Caballero and Engel (1993)
and Ball and Mankiw (1994) advocate a convex aggregate supply curve that is ﬂat up to full
employment and steep at and above full employment. The shape is conditioned by upward
ﬂexibility and downward rigidity of nominal prices and the assumption of decreasing marginal
productivity of productive factors.25 Nominal price rigidities result from (i) costs associated
with nominal price adjustment (small menu costs), (ii) state-dependent (i.e., cyclical) pricing,
and (iii) an upward trend in inﬂation.26 Given these relationships, monetary policy changes
are more eﬀective during downturns when the aggregate supply curve is relatively ﬂat and
output is below its full employment level than during economic booms when the aggregate
supply curve is steep (or even vertical) and output is high.27
As regards the credit channel eﬀects through net worth, the cyclical asymmetry of the bal-
ance sheet eﬀects and thus of the ﬁnancial propagation mechanism of monetary policy is
attributable to two factors. The ﬁrst factor refers to cyclical ﬂuctuations in the dependence
of debtors on external funds. In general, ﬁrms and households are less dependent on ex-
ternal funds in periods of economic booms because their balance sheet position is strong in
comparison to episodes of economic downturns. Because the risk of debt default and non-
performing loans is comparatively low, the external ﬁnance premium does not respond much
to an unexpected monetary tightening and credit conditions do not signiﬁcantly change. In
contrast, episodes of recessions are associated with low cash ﬂows and a higher probability of
loan losses. A monetary tightening during a recession worsens information asymmetries. The
consequent increase in the external risk premium worsens credit conditions, imposes credit
constraints on ﬁrms and households, and causes a reallocation of external funds from debtors
with weak balance sheets to those with high net wealth. In due course, investment activity
declines, which further depresses economic activity.
The second factor concerns diﬀerences in the economic relationship between small- and large-
sized ﬁrms in periods of economic booms and recessions. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) attribute
these to heterogeneities in the interest rate sensitivity of small- and large-ﬁrm production, with
large-ﬁrm production being less interest sensitive than small-ﬁrm production. The mechanism
is as follows. Firms strive to shelter the level of output production from cyclical ﬂuctuations
in output demand. Production smoothing is generally more feasible for large than for small
25See Florio (2004) for an overview of additional reasons. These are related to private sector’s expectations
and the term structure of interest rates.
26In order to allow for price stickiness, models usually allow for monopolistic competition. See, for example,
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
27Chapter 6 tests for possible ’state’ eﬀects of monetary policy.2.2 Theories of Monetary Policy Transmission 21
ﬁrms. Indeed, large ﬁrms can contract out production to their smaller counterparts during
economic booms, while they meet demand internally in episodes of economic recessions. In
using small ﬁrms as a buﬀer, production smoothing on the part of large ﬁrms stabilizes their
cash ﬂows at all stages of the business cycle. This helps to cushion the probability of binding
credit constraints during recessions. Opposite relationships prevail for small ﬁrms. Given the
cyclical ﬂuctuations in cash ﬂows, their credit constraints are likely to be binding.
Overall, cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy eﬀectiveness are such that monetary policy
changes are more eﬀective during economic downturns than during booms. The cyclical
diﬀerences are attributable to real rigidities and credit market frictions. Information asymme-
tries cause ﬁnancing constraints of ﬁrms and banks to be binding, with the constraints being
more stringent in periods of economic downturns when net worth of ﬁrms and capitalization
of banks are low. As will be evident from the following section, credit market imperfections
do not only account for cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy eﬀectiveness, but also explain
cross-region and cross-industry diﬀerences.
2.2.4 Regional and Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
In a study for countries in Europe, Berben et al. (2004) forcefully argue that cross-country
diﬀerences in the timing and magnitude of monetary policy eﬀects are attributable to cross-
country heterogeneities in the structure of ﬁnancial, goods, and labor markets as well as
ﬁscal policy frameworks. Fiscal policy frameworks are important since they reﬂect social
preferences regarding the degree of intertemporal income smoothing and hence economic
stabilization via, for example, automatic stabilizers. Goods and labor market characteristics
determine monetary policy eﬀectiveness through nominal wage inertia and real price-wage
rigidity. Nominal inertia and real rigidities depend on the degree of (i) market contestability
as determined by government regulation and by barriers to market entry and trade, (ii)
trade union power and employment protection, and (iii) centralization of the wage bargaining
process. Price and wage rigidities are less pronounced in countries with contestable markets,
ﬂexible wages, and deregulated labor markets subject to low bargaining power of labor unions
and decentralized wage bargaining.
The structure and operation of goods markets cannot only be described in terms of price
rigidities, but also and more directly in terms of industry composition. Industries certainly
diﬀer with respect to the nature of goods they produce28 and in terms of production structures
and therefore input requirements. These factors, however, inﬂuence the monetary policy
response of industry output through its eﬀect on industry-speciﬁc output supply and output
demand. Both the money view and credit view of monetary policy transmission help to
explain the cross-industry diﬀerences in the monetary policy response. Common to both
28As an example, industries may produce consumption or investment goods, durable or non-durable goods,
intermediate or ﬁnal goods, tradable or non-tradable goods.22 Chapter 2
transmission channels is the conclusion that monetary policy eﬀectiveness depends on industry
composition.29
Adherents of the money view argue that the monetary policy response of industry output
depends on the interest rate elasticity and cyclicality of demand for industry-speciﬁc out-
put. The interest rate response of output is hereby higher for cyclical industries producing
investment goods and durable consumption goods. These industries tend to rely on capital-
intensive technology and host ﬁrms subject to high operating costs and high ﬁnancial leverage.
Cross-industry heterogeneities in the degree of capital intensity in turn point to the role of
industry composition as determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness at the regional level,
with monetary policy being more eﬀective in regions with a comparatively large share of
capital-intensive industries. Given these relationships, regional asymmetries in the eﬃcacy of
monetary policy are due to cross-region diﬀerences in industry mix.
The credit channel theory also allows for industry eﬀects of monetary policy. As concerns
the narrow credit view, industry eﬀects will exist if monetary policy has diﬀerential eﬀects on
bank lending to individual industries. Cross-industry diﬀerences in the bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy suggest that the industry composition of bank credit portfolios is a crucial
determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness.30 The broad credit view attributes the existence
of industry eﬀects to the possible interdependence of ﬁrm size and industry. Eichenbaum
(1994), for instance, argues that industry eﬀects are caused by the interrelationship between
the size distribution of ﬁrms and industry-speciﬁc determinants thereof. In his view, one such
determinant is the cyclical sensitivity of industry production, with small ﬁrms predominantly
operating in cyclically sensitive industries. Given that the balance sheet eﬀects of monetary
policy are deemed to be stronger for small ﬁrms, this relationship suggests that the real
eﬀects of monetary policy are more pronounced for countries or regions with a large share of
cyclically sensitive industries.
Regional diﬀerences in ﬁnancial market structure, on the other hand, refer to asymmetries in
the degree of banking sector concentration and in the size distribution of banks and ﬁrms.
These factors are related to regional heterogeneities in the degree of information asymmetries
and in the relative availability of bank and non-bank ﬁnance.31 The underlying mechanisms
are inherent to the narrow and broad credit view. The narrow credit view argues that credit
market imperfections are more pronounced for small, poorly capitalized, and illiquid banks.
These banks are not only constrained from accessing non-reservable funds of ﬁnance, but
have also less information on capital markets (Fase and De Bondt, 2000). Because of this
relationship, regions with a relatively large share of small, poorly capitalized, or illiquid banks
29See chapter 4, 5, and 6 for empirical assessments of these relationships.
30We report corresponding evidence in chapter 5.
31See Arnold and De Vries (2000) and Gilchrist, Hairault, and Kempf (2002) for factors that explain cross-
country diﬀerences in ﬁnancial structures. Note, ﬁnancial market structures are not only approximated with
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are likely to respond more strongly to changes in the monetary policy stance than regions
with a large proportion of large, well-capitalized, and liquid banks. The broad credit view
attributes regional diﬀerences in the eﬃcacy of monetary policy to regional asymmetries in
the size distribution of ﬁrms.32 Countries with a high share of small ﬁrms are deemed to be
more responsive to monetary policy changes than countries with a comparatively high share
of large ﬁrms. This reﬂects the perception that large rather than small ﬁrms face a lower
degree of credit market imperfections and a comparatively unconstrained access to ﬁnancial
markets.
2.3 Methodological and Empirical Issues
This section reviews methodological problems that complicate empirical assessments of mon-
etary policy transmission mechanisms. We keep the discussion general and stress method-
ological problems which concern the identiﬁcation of (i) monetary policy shocks and (ii)
individual transmission channels.33 We consecutively present each set of problems in the two
subsequent sections. Section 2.3.3 presents possible solutions to the identiﬁcation problems
as suggested by the use of macro-, microeconomic, and industry data.
2.3.1 Measuring Monetary Policy Shocks
In order to determine the real eﬀects of monetary policy, monetary policy shocks need to be
identiﬁed. Because of disagreement on an appropriate monetary policy measure, the empirical
literature extracts monetary policy shocks from a considerable range of variables associated
with the monetary policy stance. For example, monetary policy shocks are approximated as
shocks to total central bank reserves, non-borrowed reserves, narrow and broad monetary
aggregates, and the money market interest rate.34 Among these indicator variables, broad
monetary aggregates are considered to be very poor proxy variables of monetary policy shocks.
The reason is that the individual components of broad monetary aggregates often evolve along
diﬀerent paths, which complicates the interpretation of ﬂuctuations in the total. The money
market interest rate is considered to be a more stable indicator of the monetary policy stance
than monetary aggregates.35
Regardless of the variable, its usefulness as indicator of the monetary policy stance is ques-
32See, among others, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996).
33We provide more details on channel-speciﬁc problems in section 2.4, which reviews the existing empirical
evidence on monetary transmission mechanisms.
34See, for example, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Gordon and Leeper
(1994), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and McMillin (2001) for
overviews and examples of studies which employ one or more of these monetary policy variables. These studies
also criticize existing research.
35Also see Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).24 Chapter 2
tioned because shocks to it are not purely exogenous. Policy indicators consist of an endoge-
nous component which reﬂects (i) the eﬀect of non-policy factors such as the actions of bank
and non-bank institutions and (ii) the accommodating response of monetary authorities to
changes in money demand. Because monetary policy is determined by supply and demand
conditions and thus consists of an endogenous and exogenous component, empirical estimates
on the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are generally fraught with a simultaneity bias.36
In order to solve the identiﬁcation problem inherent in macroeconomic data, many macro-
econometric studies estimate structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models. VARs have
attracted much criticism since the identiﬁcation of the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
rests on ad hoc modeling assumptions about the causal relationship between monetary policy
and the performance of ﬁnancial markets and goods markets.37 F o re x a m p l e ,i no r d e rt o
identify monetary policy shocks, studies usually assume that actions taken by agents in
ﬁnancial and goods markets do not inﬂuence the real eﬀects of monetary policy. To this end,
research imposes extreme assumptions about the interest rate elasticity of money demand and
money supply.38 The arguments used to identify the exogenous component of monetary policy
not only contrast the predictions of theoretical monetary models, but also yield empirical
estimates which do not endorse theoretical expectations.
Given the weaknesses associated with traditional measures of monetary policy shocks, some
studies employ the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (1989). In a study for the
United States, they use information from the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) to identify dates at which monetary policy adopted a much sharper anti-inﬂationary
stance. The Romer dates have attracted considerable criticism. The dates are still subject
to the identiﬁcation bias due to simultaneity since they do not distinguish the endogenous
and exogenous component of a monetary policy shock. Furthermore, they do not represent
monetary expansions, but only refer to monetary contractions. Here, Bernanke and Mihov
(1998) show that Romer dates do not describe points at which monetary policy switched from
an expansionary to a contractionary stance, but points of maximum tightness in monetary
policy. These drawbacks are ampliﬁed by the observation that the dates do not indicate the
degree to which monetary policy changes are contractionary. Motivated by the shortcomings
of the Romer dates, Boschen and Mills (1991) expand the narrative approach of Romer
and Romer (1989) and assemble a larger set of dates that qualify changes in monetary
policy according to ﬁve categories, ranging from ’very contractionary’ to ’very expansionary’.
Unfortunately, the Boschen and Mills (1991) index still fails to control for the endogenous
and exogenous component of monetary policy shocks.
36Also see Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Angeloni et al. (2003), Kuttner and Mosser (2002), Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2004), and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) for a description of the simultaneity bias at the
macroeconomic level.
37See Gordon and Leeper (1994), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) for
criticisms.
38See Gordon and Leeper (1994) for an overview of the identifying assumptions.2.3 Methodological and Empirical Issues 25
A new branch of studies measures monetary policy shocks within the framework of event
studies. These are predominantly implemented for US data and discuss the response of equity
prices to changes in US monetary policy on days of FOMC meetings.39 While some event
studies simply deﬁne monetary policy shocks as the change in the Federal funds rate (e.g.,
Lobo, 2000), more recent event studies (e.g., Kuttner, 2001; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004;
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) identify monetary policy shocks as the unexpected change
in the monetary policy stance. The unexpected change is usually deﬁned as the directly
observable diﬀerence between observed market expectations regarding the future monetary
policy stance and the Federal funds rate target at the day of its announcement by the FOMC.40
Unfortunately, event studies are very information intensive, which conﬁnes their radius of
applicability. As stated, monetary policy shocks are identiﬁed by using information on single
meetings of monetary policy authorities (e.g., the FOMC). In order to derive estimates of
the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy for single point estimates of
monetary policy shocks, high frequency ﬁrm-level data on economic performance are required.
Corresponding data of suﬃcient quality are hard to come by, which restricts the applicability
of event studies to single rather than multiple countries.
The discussion so far shows that it is intrinsically diﬃcult to distinguish the endogenous and
exogenous component of monetary policy shocks. A diﬀerent strand of literature refutes the
need to be exclusively concerned with the real eﬀects of exogenous monetary policy shocks.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and McCallum (1999),
among others, argue that tests for monetary policy transmission should not exclusively be
concerned with the eﬀects of random exogenous shocks. The reason is that these only explain
a small part of the variability in monetary policy and that central banks do not conduct
monetary policy on purely random terms. Instead, attention should be directed towards the
aggregate eﬀect of the endogenous and exogenous component of monetary policy shocks in
order to obtain a monetary policy indicator that describes the overall behavior of monetary
policy authorities and the overall eﬀect of monetary policy. To this end, Bernanke and Mihov
(1998), for example, devise a monetary conditions index that combines information on the
money market interest rate and on non-borrowed reserves. In combining these two variables,
the measure also accommodates changes in the monetary policy stance which originate from
shifts in the target variable of monetary policy. However, this measure like previous variables
does not qualify the extent to which monetary policy is contractionary or expansionary.
Overall, the discussion suggests that empirical investigations should exercise great care in
selecting indicator variables of monetary policy shocks. This is because indicators diﬀer in
their ability to solve the endogeneity bias inherent to monetary policy shocks. Event studies
oﬀer the most promising solution for the adequate identiﬁcation of monetary policy shocks.
39See, for example, Lobo (2000), Kuttner (2001), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004), and Bernanke and
Kuttner (2005).
40Measures of market expectations are obtained from Federal funds future contracts (Kuttner, 2001;
Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) or from market surveys (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004).26 Chapter 2
As an (imperfect) alternative to event studies, monetary policy shocks can be approximated
with changes in the money market interest rate or in money supply. Money supply should
hereby be narrowly deﬁned since the individual components are more likely to capture eﬀects
associated with non-policy (endogenous) factors. The discussion suggests that the ultimate
choice of the monetary policy variable certainly depends on the aim of the study.
2.3.2 Measuring Monetary Transmission Channels
Even if the exogenous component of monetary policy shocks is adequately measured, empirical
results may still be biased because of empirical problems regarding the unique identiﬁcation
of monetary transmission channels. One identiﬁcation problem arises from the mutual de-
pendence of the traditional money view and credit view. Although the money and credit view
use diﬀerent theoretical frameworks to explain monetary policy transmission, the discussion
in section 2.2 suggests that both types of transmission channels are not mutually exclusive.
Instead, they complement and reinforce each other. Bernanke (1993) argues that the inter-
dependence results from the role of (i) bank liabilities (i.e., bank deposits) as determinant of
the interest rate channel and (ii) bank assets (i.e., bank credit) as determinant of the credit
channel.41 Because bank assets and bank liabilities are related by the accounting identity of
the bank balance sheet constraint, the interdependence of the interest rate and credit channel
gives rise to an identiﬁcation problem in empirical estimations. The problem concerns the
distinction of shifts in bank lending that are due to either bank credit supply or bank credit
demand.42
Next to this identiﬁcation problem, it is hard to distinguish the broad and narrow credit view
in empirical research although both views represent distinct monetary transmission channels.
The complication is attributable to two factors. The ﬁrst factor refers to the observation that
a monetary-policy-induced contraction in bank credit supply can be associated with (i) the
failure of banks to obtain non-reservable funds of ﬁnance (bank lending channel) and (ii) the
response of banks to higher credit risk due to lower net worth of potential borrowers (balance
sheet channel). The second factor refers to the practice of empirical research to approximate
credit market imperfections and ﬁnancial constraints at the level of ﬁrms (balance sheet
channel) and banks (bank lending channel) with, respectively, ﬁrm and bank asset size. At
the core of the identiﬁcation problem is the observation that large (small) banks tend to
concentrate their lending and deposit business with large (small) ﬁrms. For this relationship,
a monetary-policy-induced decline in bank lending can reﬂect the response of banks to a
41Recall, the money view stresses the impact of monetary policy on bank lending through the eﬀect on
bank deposits, with changes in bank deposits reﬂecting interest-rate-induced movements in liquidity demand.
The credit view links the monetary policy response of bank lending to the ability of banks to oﬀset a decline
in reservable with non-reservable funds of ﬁnance (i.e., deposits).
42See, among others, Romer and Romer (1990), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (1995,
2000) for details. Chapter 5 discusses the identiﬁcation problem in greater detail in a microeconomic study
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deterioration in the creditworthiness of ﬁrms and/or the response of banks to a change in the
level of bank reserves and bank deposits. It is thus intrinsically diﬃcult to uniquely identify
the diﬀerential response of bank credit demand across ﬁrm size from the diﬀerential response
of bank credit supply across bank size (Ashcraft, 2003; Ashcraft and Campello, 2002).
2.3.3 Solutions to the Identiﬁcation Problems
Empirical research on monetary transmission mechanisms has addressed the identiﬁcation
biases by distinguishing macroeconomic (aggregate), disaggregated (industry), or microecon-
omic data. In the remainder of this section, we stress the (dis-)advantages of each type of
data in solving the methodological problems. As will become evident, no data type consti-
tutes the ultimate cure for all problems. Considering macroeconomic data, they are usually
available for relatively long periods of time for a comprehensive set of countries. Ganley
and Salmon (1997) argue that the ease of availability renders macroeconomic data useful
instruments to discover stylized facts of monetary policy transmission. However, macroecon-
omic research cannot appropriately address identiﬁcation and simultaneity problems. One
reason is that data aggregation eliminates diﬀerences between agents and markets in terms
of behavior. However, especially these diﬀerences are crucial determinants of monetary policy
eﬀectiveness given their role as propagation and ampliﬁcation mechanism of monetary policy
changes.
In contrast to macroeconomic data, disaggregated and microeconomic data help to capture
cross-section heterogeneity, which is required for the identiﬁcation of signiﬁcant relationships
between the determinants of monetary policy eﬀectiveness. Disaggregated data assist in
explaining monetary policy eﬀects at the aggregate level by stressing structural and insti-
tutional characteristics (e.g., industry composition, banking groups, types of debtors). The
distinction of diﬀerent borrower groups, banking groups, or industries provides evidence on
the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy. These result from asymmetries in group-speciﬁc
behavioral patterns and can be captured by exploiting between-group heterogeneity.
Microeconomic data do not only stress between-group dissimilarities of agents and markets,
but also within-group heterogeneities. The corresponding panel studies exploit the informa-
tion contained in the variability of the time-series and cross-section dimension of the data
so as to emphasize diﬀerences between cross-sectional units. By taking advantage of cross-
sectional variability over time, microeconomic data are natural instruments to identify eﬀects
that are unobserved in time-series or cross-section data (Baltagi, 2005). Furthermore, they
are well-suited to discover behavioral asymmetries between diﬀerent groups of agents in the
same country and between similar groups of agents across diﬀerent countries (cf. Guiso et al.,
1999; Chatelain et al., 2003). Cross-country comparisons of the eﬀects associated with similar
groups of agents help to identify country-speciﬁc factors of monetary policy eﬀectiveness.28 Chapter 2
Because microeconomic data exploit the information contained in the cross-sectional dimen-
sion, they overcome some of the simultaneity problems mentioned above. For example, they
appropriately address the simultaneity problem at the macroeconomic level that exists because
monetary policy is endogenous to economic activity. Identiﬁcation rests on the assumption
that single cross-section units do not inﬂuence the monetary policy stance.43 Microeconomic
data are also advantageous because they tend to be less distorted by structural or institutional
changes at the macroeconomic level.
Microeconomic data and disaggregated data also have their shortcomings. Both tend to be
available for comparatively short periods of time at low frequencies only. Low frequency data
are problematic in that they do not capture much of the variability inherent in monetary policy
and macroeconomic performance.44 A short sample period may cause the variation in the
monetary policy stance to be too small in order to yield signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in aggregate
demand, bank lending, or net worth.45 Empirical estimates will then be distorted even for a
large number of cross sections (Chatelain et al., 2003). Time invariance due to short sample
periods is likely to be a particular problem for studies on the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy. Evidently, the monetary policy response of bank lending is conﬁned to new loan issues
and to the amount of bank loans outstanding. The magnitude of the response is dependent
on the maturity of bank loans outstanding. The larger the share of long-term lending is, the
fewer loans need to be rolled over and the lower is the speed at which the amount of credit
outstanding responds to monetary policy changes (De Haan, 2003). In order to capture the
interest rate response of bank lending, longer sample periods are therefore required.
Another disadvantage of microeconomic data concerns data quality. Microeconomic studies
are typically conﬁned to a single country and do not involve cross-country studies. Cross-
country comparisons of monetary transmission mechanisms are hence complicated if not
impossible. The restricted focus is due to the unavailability of (qualitatively) comparable sets
of data on industry, ﬁrm, or bank characteristics for a comprehensive set of countries. In
addition, microeconomic data are frequently biased towards a speciﬁc set of banks or ﬁrms,
banking group, or industry. For instance, ﬁrm-level data are generally fraught with a large
ﬁ r ms i z eb i a s . I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fs a m p l eb i a s e s ,t h er e s u l t so fm i c r o e c o n o m i cs t u d i e sm a y
provide an imperfect view on the macroeconomic eﬀects of monetary policy.
Besides these problems, the evidence from credit channel studies is inﬂuenced by the use of
sample splitting variables (e.g., ﬁrm and bank size). Schiantarelli (1996) emphasizes prob-
lems associated with the choice between time-variant and time-invariant sample stratiﬁcation
criteria. Time-invariant measures of ﬁnancial constraints are criticized since they consider
43See, for example, Angeloni et al. (2003), Kuttner and Mosser (2002), Chatelain et al. (2003).
44High frequency data are at the other extreme. They might be too noisy for the identiﬁcation of unam-
biguous relationships.
45On the other hand, a short sample period is advantageous since it avoids the complications associated
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agents to be either ﬁnancially constrained or unconstrained throughout the whole sample pe-
riod regardless of the business cycle position, the monetary policy stance and irrespective of
the eﬀects associated with structural changes in ﬁnancial markets.46 Agents are most often
precluded from switching between the ﬁnancial state of being constrained and unconstrained.
However, the evidence lends support to cyclical asymmetries in the severity of credit market
frictions and ﬁnancial constraints: the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy are stronger
for monetary policy shocks in economic downturns.47 In view of these results, studies on the
credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy should employ time-variant measures of ﬁnancial
constraints and credit market frictions to control for cross-period diﬀerences in the intensity
of ﬁnancial constraints and in the degree to which ﬁnancial constraints are binding. Unfor-
tunately, such data tend to be unavailable at relatively high frequencies for time periods of
suﬃcient length.
2.4 Evidence on Monetary Transmission Channels
This section asks whether the existing empirical evidence conﬁrms the theoretical predictions
of the interest rate and credit channel view. The review is conﬁned to studies for the United
States as benchmark country of monetary integration as well as for countries in Western
Europe. It will become evident that the empirical results for each transmission channel are
frequently sensitive to the choice of country and empirical modeling strategy. Furthermore,
they also tend to be very sensitive to the frequency and type of data (i.e., macroeconomic,
disaggregated, or microeconomic). The subsequent discussion presents the existing empirical
ﬁndings in general terms. Table 2A.1 to Table 2A.3 in the annex summarize the empirical
ﬁndings by study.
2.4.1 Interest Rate Channel
The existing empirical studies lend strong support to the operation of an interest rate channel
of monetary policy. Aggregate or industry-speciﬁc output contracts in response to a monetary
tightening48 regardless of (i) the time-series and cross-section dimension of the data, (ii) the
empirical methodology, and (iii) the frequency of the data. Only few studies report weak or
no interest rate eﬀects. Particular to these studies is the use of ﬁrm-level data. Chatelain
and Teurlai (2004) in a study for France suggest that the insigniﬁcance of the interest rate
(cost-of-capital) channel in estimations with ﬁrm-level data is due to an aggregation bias
between ﬁrms who invest and disinvest. They ﬁnd that the user cost of capital only aﬀects
46Note, Schiantarelli (1996) develops arguments for ﬁnancial constraints of ﬁrms. Because we consider his
arguments to be equally valid for banks, we adopt a general view and refer to banks and ﬁrms as agents.
47See, for example, Atanasova (2003) for the United Kingdom, Balke (2000) for the United States, Ehrmann
(2005) for Germany, Kaufmann (2003) for Austria.
48Note, empirical studies are predominantly realized for a monetary policy contraction.30 Chapter 2
capital accumulation of ﬁrms that invest. Firms that disinvest do not adjust the amount of
disinvestment in response to a change in the user cost of capital.
Studies which allow for industry eﬀects are predominantly implemented for the construction,
service, and manufacturing sector and for sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. The
evidence from aggregate and disaggregated data draws a homogenous picture for the United
States and for countries in Europe. In line with expectations, the interest rate response is
most pronounced for capital-intensive and durable goods producing industries. Industries,
accordingly, appear to be important propagation and ampliﬁcation mechanisms of monet-
ary policy changes for all sampled countries. The evidence from microeconomic industry
studies is less robust to the choice of country. Industry eﬀects of monetary policy are docu-
mented for Belgium (Butzen, Fuss, and Vermeulen, 2003) and the United States (Ehrmann
and Fratzscher, 2004), but not for France (Chatelain and Tiomo, 2003) and Luxembourg
(L¨ unnemann and Math¨ a, 2003). A possible source of cross-country diﬀerences in the exist-
ence of industry eﬀects is the choice and number of industries. Evidence against industry
eﬀects is particular to studies that only distinguish a small number of homogenous industry
sectors. This, however, may cause the cross-industry variation to be too small in order to
generate signiﬁcant industry eﬀects of monetary policy in microeconomic estimations.
2.4.2 Broad Credit Channel
Most credit channel studies assess the balance sheet eﬀects of monetary policy by using ﬁrms
as the unit of analysis, while households are usually not considered. The evidence for ﬁrms
lends comparatively strong support to the transmission of monetary policy through balance
sheet eﬀects. Credit market imperfections - at least at the ﬁrm level - thus appear to be
an important source of monetary policy eﬀectiveness. To this point, only few studies ask
whether the strength of credit channel eﬀects diﬀers between industries.49
Although the empirical literature points to the operation of a credit channel, the results are
sensitive to the choice of credit channel variable, country, data quality, and data dimension.
Conclusions for any single country are, for instance, inﬂuenced by the country dimension
of the study. That is, the results of single- and multi-country estimations tend to diﬀer
from each other. One possible source of heterogeneity is data quality. Multi-country studies
predominantly rely on easily accessible measures of credit market imperfections in order to
construct a comparable database for a comprehensive set of countries. For example, a credit
channel variable commonly used is ﬁrm size. Measured in terms of sales, assets, or the number
of employees, the evidence for the United States and Europe lends diﬀerent support to the
transmission of monetary policy shocks through ﬁrm size eﬀects. In studies for the United
49See the evidence in Butzen, Fuss, and Vermeulen (2003), Chatelain and Tiomo (2003), Dedola and Lippi
(2005), and Peersman and Smets (2005). The corresponding results conﬁrm the evidence for the interest rate
channel in that credit channel eﬀects are particular to cyclical industries. Also see the evidence in chapter 4.2.4 Evidence on Monetary Transmission Channels 31
States, the evidence endorses the theoretical predictions of the credit view and documents the
larger monetary policy response of small ﬁrms.50 In contrast to the US results, the empirical
evidence for European countries lends weak or no support to the existence of small ﬁrm size
eﬀects of monetary policy.51 The contrasting results for the United States and Europe can
be explained along two diﬀerent lines.
Firstly, Eichenbaum (1994) argues that the signiﬁcance of ﬁrm size eﬀects might be driven
by the potential interdependence of ﬁrm size and the cyclical sensitivity of industries. This,
however, complicates the identiﬁcation of eﬀects associated with the interest rate and broad
credit channel. If ﬁrm size correlates with the cyclical behavior of industries, signiﬁcant
ﬁrm size eﬀects may reﬂect industry eﬀects, even in perfect credit markets. Chapter 4
addresses this problem. We test whether assumptions regarding the interdependence of ﬁrm
size and industry indeed aﬀect conclusions about the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects
of monetary policy.
Secondly, the absence of signiﬁcant small ﬁrm size eﬀects in Europe can be explained with
institutional structures such as the nature of bank-customer relationships. Close relation-
ships between banks and ﬁrms attenuate information asymmetries and thus the severity of
ﬁnancing constraints and the link between cash ﬂow and investment activity. For Europe,
bank-customer relationships tend to be particularly strong for small ﬁrms.52 This, however,
suggests that small-ﬁrm investment might not be more sensitive to monetary policy changes
than large-ﬁrm investment. In addition, insigniﬁcant ﬁrm size eﬀects may also result from the
use of ﬁrm size data that are subject to a sample bias towards large ﬁrms (e.g., Chatelain et
al., 2003; Peersman and Smets, 2005). This property reduces the importance of information
asymmetries in the sample and hence the strength of the ﬁrm size eﬀect. Chapter 3 suggests
an alternative explanation for the absence of signiﬁcant small ﬁrm size eﬀects. The argument
builds on a theoretical non-linear investment model which links the interest rate response of
small and large ﬁrms to the degree of investment irreversibility and to the size of monetary
policy shocks.
In order to overcome the problems associated with ﬁrm size, single-country studies frequently
employ more detailed data such as ﬁrm credit rating, ﬁrm age, the ﬁrm coverage ratio, or
the number of bank lending relationships as proxy variables of creditworthiness and informa-
tion asymmetries. Firm age, for instance, approximates the extent to which ﬁrms have (i)
established relationships with bank and non-bank institutions, (ii) gained continuity in oper-
ation and creditworthiness, and (iii) accumulated collateral (L¨ unnemann and Math¨ a, 2003;
50See Gertler and Gilchrist (1993b, 1994), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2004) for evidence in favor of ﬁrm size eﬀects, Carlino and DeFina (1998) for evidence against ﬁrm size
eﬀects, and Thorbecke and Coppock (1996) for ambiguous ﬁndings.
51See Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen (2002), Chatelain et al. (2003), Kalckreuth (2003), and Ehrmann
(2005).
52See Berger and Udell (1998, 2002) and Harhoﬀ and K¨ orting (1998) for evidence.32 Chapter 2
Valderrama, 2003). Credit rating measures ﬁrm riskiness and illustrates the extent to which
creditworthiness determines a ﬁrm’s access to external credit. Closely related, the coverage
ratio is a proxy variable of creditworthiness since it assesses the extent to which cash ﬂow
covers ﬁnancial costs. It is evident from their deﬁnition that these variables contain more
information on information asymmetries and credit market frictions than common measures
of ﬁrm size. Unfortunately, these proxy variables tend to be available for single countries only
rather than for comprehensive sets of economies.
Credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy prevail in estimations that use credit rating (e.g.,
Chatelain and Tiomo, 2003; Breitung, Chirinko, and Kalckreuth, 2003; Kalckreuth, 2003;
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004), ﬁrm age (Valderrama, 2003; L¨ unnemann and Math¨ a, 2003),
or dividend payments (Siegfried, 2000) to discriminate the balance sheet condition of ﬁrms.
The corresponding evidence conﬁrms the belief that credit channel eﬀects are stronger for
young ﬁrms and for ﬁrms with low or no credit rating. In addition, Chatelain and Tiomo
(2003) and Valderrama (2003) demonstrate that a ﬁrm’s access to trade credit mitigates the
credit channel eﬀects through net worth. Nilsen (2002) and Mateut, Bougheas, and Mizen
(2003) show that especially small ﬁrms consider trade credit an important source of external
capital. The availability of trade credit weakens the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy
by lowering the ﬁnancing constraints imposed by the dependence on external funds from bank
and non-bank institutions.
Although credit channel variables other than ﬁrm size tend to be more detailed, they are still
less than perfect indicators of information asymmetries. Schiantarelli (1996) and Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) argue that this particularly holds for indicator variables including cash ﬂow
(e.g., coverage ratio).53 The criticism builds on the strong correlation between cash ﬂow and
ﬁrm investment and the observation that cash ﬂow contains information on (unobserved)
future expected proﬁtability. This, however, precludes the unique identiﬁcation of eﬀects
associated with the ﬁnancial accelerator principle or with information asymmetries. In fact,
a signiﬁcant response of investment to cash ﬂow may reﬂect eﬀects unrelated to ﬁnancial
constraints.54
Overall, conclusions regarding the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy are sensitive to
the choice of credit channel variable. Despite potential shortcomings regarding the deﬁnition
of credit channel variables, the existing empirical evidence lends support to the transmission
of monetary policy shocks through credit channel eﬀects. A monetary policy contraction
hence seems to be associated with a tightening of external ﬁnancing constraints as caused
by a deterioration in information asymmetries.
53The coverage ratio is measured as the ratio of cash ﬂow to interest payments (cf. Gertler and Gilchrist,
1994).
54See Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) for the role of cash ﬂow as a measure of liquidity con-
straints. They argue that internal cash ﬂow is an important determinant of investment demand for ﬁnancially
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2.4.3 Narrow Credit Channel
Given the central role of banks as source of ﬁnance, considerable empirical research is also
concerned with the role of banks and bank lending in monetary policy transmission.55 Many
studies take Germany as unit of analysis. The comparatively large number of German-oriented
empirical research is attributable to the availability of comprehensive sets of bank-level data
on bank balance sheet items and bank lending for a comparatively long period of time.
These facilitate detailed assessments regarding the determinants of the credit channel eﬀects
through bank lending. Besides data availability, Germany is an interesting case study since the
private sector heavily relies on banks as source of external ﬁnance. Known as the housebank
principle, the private sector hereby maintains close relationships with very few selected banks.
Because both factors - the degree of bank dependence and the housebank principle - have
opposite implications for the strength of the credit channel, conclusions as to the importance
of credit channel eﬀects in a bank-based system such as Germany cannot be drawn a priori,
but require empirical analyses.56
Regardless of the country, the amount of detail in each study depends on the level of data
aggregation. Studies using aggregate data typically provide imperfect views as to the role
of credit market imperfections as determinant of bank lending eﬀects. The reason is that
aggregate data do not contain much information on the diﬀerential behavior of agents and
on the degree of credit market imperfections. Disaggregated analyses are more informative
because they distinguish banks by market orientation in order to control for diﬀerences in the
behavior of banks and in the degree of credit market imperfections. This involves the cate-
gorization of banks by banking group (i.e., market segment) and/or group of bank borrower
(e.g., ﬁrms and households).
Microeconomic studies provide most details on the credit channel eﬀects through bank lend-
ing. They do not stop at identifying the credit channel eﬀects, but also test for cross-bank
diﬀerences in the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy changes. The distributional
bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy are explained with bank characteristics related to
bank ﬁnancial health, i.e., bank asset size, bank liquidity, and/or bank capitalization. Bank
size approximates the degree of information asymmetries, which is deemed to be more pro-
nounced for small than for large banks (see Kashyap and Stein, 1995, 2000). Bank liquidity
determines the ability of banks to cushion the bank lending eﬀects of restrictive monetary
policy shocks (see Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Liquid banks are argued to be better able to
insulate their loan portfolio since they can draw on their buﬀer stock of assets. Bank capi-
55In order to be operative, the credit channel through bank lending requires monetary policy to aﬀect the
availability of insured bank deposits. Motivated by this relationship, some credit channel studies investigate
the monetary policy response of insured bank deposits (cf. Gambacorta, 2003; Hernando and Martinez-Pag´ es,
2003). In order to focus the present analysis, we only discuss the empirical literature with respect to the
monetary policy response of bank lending rather than bank deposits.
56Chapter 5 also takes Germany as unit of analysis and discusses the role of banks in monetary policy
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talization reﬂects the ability of banks to obtain non-reservable funds of ﬁnance in the wake
of monetary policy contractions (see Kishan and Opiela, 2000) so as to maintain bank credit
supply. Lending by well-capitalized banks is contemplated to be less responsive to monetary
policy shocks since these banks are better able to cushion the monetary policy eﬀect on the
lending portfolio.
The diﬀerences in the amount of detail contained in aggregate, disaggregated, and micro-
economic data aﬀect the conclusions regarding the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy.
Considering macroeconomic studies, they document bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy
for France, Germany, and Italy, but not for the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United King-
dom. The evidence for a particular country compares well across macroeconomic studies and
is therefore robust to cross-study diﬀerences in sample periods and data frequency. Empirical
research with disaggregated data suggests that the evidence from aggregate studies is inﬂu-
enced by the structure of banking sectors and by the distribution of bank credit among types
of bank borrowers. This is particularly evident for Germany and the United Kingdom.
For Germany, disaggregated studies illustrate that credit channel eﬀects through bank lending
crucially depend on the distinction of banking groups and borrower groups. Kakes and
Sturm (2002) report bank lending eﬀects for the cooperative banking group and K¨ uppers
(2001) documents bank lending eﬀects for the banking group with big commercial banks
and for aggregate bank lending to the corporate sector. The diﬀerential response of lending
between banking groups or borrower types suggests that the eﬀects associated with the
group of cooperative and big commercial banks and the corporate sector drive the evidence
from aggregate data. For the United Kingdom, Dale and Haldane (1995) compile evidence
according to which empirical results from aggregate data appear to be inﬂuenced by the
relative importance of households and ﬁrms as bank borrowers: credit channel eﬀects exist
for lending to the household sector, but not for lending to the corporate sector. In fact, lending
to the corporate sector rises in the immediate periods following a monetary contraction. In
view of this ﬁnding, the absence of bank lending eﬀects in aggregate studies may reﬂect the
greater importance of the corporate to the household sector in bank lending over the sampled
period.57
The empirical results of microeconomic studies lend strong support to monetary policy trans-
mission through bank lending in estimations with quarterly and monthly data and weaker
support in studies with annual data. One possible reason for the sensitivity of the results
to the choice of data frequency is the failure of annual data to capture monetary policy
changes and changes in bank lending. The failure manifests itself in the smooth time-series
57The sample period was 1974-1992. Lending to the corporate sector accounted for a larger share of GDP
than lending to the household sector during the period 1975-1983. The opposite relationship emerged as
of 1983. While the diﬀerential between corporate and household lending was very pronounced in the period
before 1983, it was quite small thereafter (cf. Arestis and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal, 1995). These patterns
suggest that the empirical results in Dale and Haldane (1995) are driven by the bank lending behavior before
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behavior of low frequency data, which is caused by limited sample variability. Furthermore,
the microeconomic evidence points to the role of bank asset size, liquidity, and capitalization
as determinants of the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy. Endorsing the predictions
of the credit channel theory, the monetary policy response of bank lending is generally more
pronounced for small, less liquid, and less capitalized banks.58 Compared with bank asset
size and bank capitalization, bank liquidity appears to be the more important determinant of
cross-bank diﬀerences in the monetary policy response of bank lending in panel investigations.
Microeconomic studies do not only emphasize cross-bank heterogeneities in asset size, liq-
uidity, or capitalization as explanatory variables of monetary policy eﬀectiveness. Instead,
they also show that evidence from single bank characteristics could be misleading if any bank
characteristic is dominated by or interdependent with alternative bank characteristics. For
example, empirical research attributes insigniﬁcant bank asset size eﬀects in monetary pol-
icy transmission to the interdependence of bank asset size with either bank liquidity (e.g.,
Kashyap and Stein, 2000, for the US; Loupias, Savignac, and Sevestre, 2003, for France)
or bank capitalization (e.g., Kishan and Opiela, 2000, for the US; Loupias, Savignac, and
Sevestre, 2003, for France): small banks are on average more liquid and better capitalized
than large banks. Bank liquidity and capitalization are presumed to oﬀset the eﬀects associ-
ated with bank size.
Besides the correlation of bank liquidity and capitalization with bank asset size, there are
alternative factors that contribute to the statistical insigniﬁcance of bank asset size as indica-
tor of the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy and the degree of information asymmetry.
Angeloni et al. (2003) and Ehrmann et al. (2003) stress institutional and structural prop-
erties of banking markets as explanatory factors. For instance, deposit insurance guarantees
and government regulation of bank credit supply reduce the risk of holding deposits at small
banks since these measures support banks and reduce the probability of bank failure. The
role of bank asset size as indicator variable is also diminished by interbank markets and
bank networks. These structural characteristics facilitate the internal liquidity management
of banks in need of liquidity by providing easy access to funds of banks with excess liquidity.
In this function, bank networks reduce the importance of bank asset size as indicator variable
of information asymmetries and enable small banks to avoid discontinuous and accelerated
shifts in bank lending. Worms (2003) and Ehrmann and Worms (2004) report empirical
evidence which supports the importance of interbank relationships as determinant of small
bank lending in Germany. Motivated by these ﬁndings, the discussion of the determinants
of industry bank lending in chapter 5 also controls for the potential importance of interbank
lending as factor that may mitigate the bank asset size eﬀects of monetary policy.
The extent to which small banks are committed to maintaining lending relationships with ﬁrms
58As to bank asset size, Altunba¸ s, Fazylov, and Molyneux (2002) and Ehrmann et al. (2003) ﬁnd diﬀerent
relationships. The corresponding results emphasize the greater sensitivity of lending by medium-sized banks
for EMU member countries and large-sized banks for Spain.36 Chapter 2
and households also aﬀects the bank size eﬀects of monetary policy. Relationship banking is an
important determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness because it lowers ﬁnancing constraints
by reducing informational problems in credit markets. That is, close bank-customer ties induce
banks not to constrain the access to bank ﬁnance in the wake of a monetary contraction.
Because relationship banking tends to be particular to small banks, lending by small banks
may not be more responsive to monetary policy shocks than lending by large banks.59
Summarizing, the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy are inﬂuenced by the structure of
the banking system, the distribution of banks, and the distribution of bank credit among
types of bank borrowers. Cross-country diﬀerences in the relative importance of these fac-
tors account for cross-country asymmetries in the strength of the credit channel and in the
distributional eﬀects of monetary policy. Unfortunately, cross-country comparisons are hardly
feasible because of cross-study diﬀerences in the results for any individual country. A good
case in point is the evidence for France, Germany, and Spain. For these countries, conclusions
regarding the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy through bank lending are sensitive to
the level of data aggregation, data frequency, empirical methodology, and the choice of bank
characteristic. In order to resolve some of the ambiguity in the empirical results, future
research is required to provide additional insights as to the factors which determine bank
lending. To this end, chapter 5 explicitly addresses the industry composition of bank credit
portfolios as possible determinant of the distributional bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy.
2.4.4 Asymmetries in Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness
Empirical research on cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy eﬀectiveness is rather scarce.
Although the number of studies is comparatively small, the empirical evidence lends strong
support to cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy transmission through interest rate and
credit channel eﬀects. In line with theoretical predictions, interest rate and credit channel
eﬀects are particularly strong or only arise in periods of economic downturns.60 This, however,
suggests that decisions regarding the direction and magnitude of monetary policy changes
should control for the business cycle position.
Common to most studies on cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy eﬀectiveness is that
59See, among others, the references in Gambacorta (2003) on the importance of bank-customer relationships
for bank lending.
60Evidence on the cyclical asymmetries of monetary policy through (i) the interest rate channel is provided
by Atanasova (2003) and Peersman and Smets (2005), (ii) the broad credit channel is documented by Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), Balke (2000), and Atanasova (2003), and (iii)
the narrow credit channel is reported by Kaufmann (2003). Kakes (1998, 2000b), Dolado and Dolores (2001),
and Garcia and Schaller (2002) also lend support to cyclical asymmetries of monetary policy eﬀectiveness,
with the output eﬀects of monetary policy shocks being stronger in economic downturns. Because these
studies do not distinguish eﬀects that are due to the interest rate or credit channel, they are not further
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they do not allow for industry eﬀects of monetary policy.61 Chapter 6 is motivated by the
lack of evidence on the role of industries as determinant of asymmetries in monetary policy
eﬀectiveness. The analysis does not only focus on business cycle asymmetries, but also
distinguishes the industry eﬀects of monetary policy expansions and contractions.
2.4.5 The Relative Strength of the Interest Rate and Credit Channel
The survey of the existing literature points to the signiﬁcance of credit channel eﬀects and
hence to the importance of credit market imperfections as determinant of monetary policy
eﬀectiveness. In view of this ﬁnding, the assumption of perfect capital markets as imposed by
the interest rate channel appears to be overly restrictive. This also suggests that the interest
rate channel is unlikely to fully explain the real eﬀects of monetary policy. Assuming that
this is true, the question is: are interest rate or credit channel eﬀects the stronger source of
monetary policy eﬀectiveness? Unfortunately, there are only few studies which address this
question.
Macroeconomic studies indirectly test for the possible dominance of the interest rate channel
relative to the credit channel. They ask whether the interest rate response of aggregate
output is explained by the interest rate response of interest sensitive spending components of
aggregate output (e.g., aggregate investment, durable consumption, inventory investment).
Angeloni et al. (2003) summarize the evidence for countries in Europe. Although the con-
clusions vary with the choice of country, it appears that the interest rate (or cost-of-capital)
channel frequently cannot fully explain the empirical response of economic activity to monet-
ary policy shocks. This ﬁnding builds on the observation that the monetary policy response
of output exceeds that of the interest sensitive spending components.
Disaggregated industry analyses cannot compare the monetary policy response of industry
output with that of industry spending components to determine the relative strength of
the interest rate channel. This is because of data availability constraints that preclude the
decomposition of industry output into its spending components for a suﬃcient period of time.
If at all, industry spending components are only used to explain the monetary policy response
of industry output, mainly within the framework of cross-section estimations. Although an
imperfect measure, the evidence ﬁnds variables associated with the interest rate channel to
be as important in explaining the monetary policy response of industry output as variables
associated with the credit channel.62
Most detail is contained in microeconomic studies. Because many of them simultaneously
identify the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy, they are natural means
to assess the relative importance of the interest rate and credit channel in monetary policy
61The exception is the industry study by Peersman and Smets (2005). Chapter 6 summarizes the corre-
sponding methodology and empirical ﬁndings.
62See the evidence in Dedola and Lippi (2005) and Peersman and Smets (2005).38 Chapter 2
transmission. The empirical results are mixed. Butzen, Fuss, and Vermeulen (2003) for
Belgium, Valderrama (2003) for Austria, and Siegfried (2000) for Germany report evidence
according to which the interest rate eﬀects of monetary policy are weaker than the credit
channel eﬀects.63 Opposite conclusions are drawn by Kalckreuth (2003) for Germany and
Gaiotti and Generale (2003) for Italy. The results regarding the role of the interest rate and
credit channel as ampliﬁcation and propagation mechanism hence appear to be sensitive to the
choice of country. In view of this ﬁnding, country eﬀects related to ﬁnancial and institutional
structures are thus potentially important determinants of monetary policy eﬀectiveness.
2.5 Conclusion
There is a considerable number of studies which stress the transmission of monetary pol-
icy shocks through an interest rate and/or credit channel. This chapter has provided an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on each monetary transmission channel.
Even though the review is not exhaustive despite its wide coverage, some general conclu-
sions can be drawn. Existing research lends support to the propagation and ampliﬁcation
of monetary policy shocks through an interest rate channel, but ambiguous support to the
operation of a credit channel. The conclusions regarding the credit channel eﬀects of monet-
ary policy tend to be sensitive to the choice of estimation methodology, the choice of credit
channel variable, and the level of data aggregation. When signiﬁcant, the existing empirical
studies emphasize cross-country heterogeneities (i) in economic structures related to industry
composition and (ii) in ﬁnancial structures related to the distribution of bank and non-bank
ﬁnancial institutions as source of cross-country heterogeneities in the strength of the interest
rate and credit channel, respectively. Here, ﬁnancial structures approximate the extent to
which credit market imperfections and information asymmetries introduce uncertainty as to
the timing and the magnitude of the real eﬀects of monetary policy.
The remainder of this section summarizes how the subsequent chapters in this thesis are
related to the existing empirical and theoretical literature on monetary policy transmission.
Chapter 3 is motivated by the ambiguous results regarding the existence of signiﬁcant ﬁrm
size eﬀects of monetary policy for the United States and Europe (cf. section 2.4.2). The
aim is to identify conditions for which small ﬁrms do not respond more to monetary policy
shocks than large ﬁrms. To this end, a non-linear investment model is speciﬁed that links
the interest rate response of small and large ﬁrms to the degree of investment irreversibility
and to the size of monetary policy shocks.
Section 2.3.2 has argued that a number of methodological problems inﬂuence the evidence
on the interest rate and credit channel. These primarily relate to problems with respect to
63Tests of the relative strength of transmission channels tend to determine the response of the cash ﬂow-
capital ratio and the user cost of capital to changes in the oﬃcial interest rate. The corresponding evidence
is then linked to the response of ﬁrm sales to changes in the user cost and cash ﬂow-capital ratio.2.5 Conclusion 39
the unique identiﬁcation of the individual transmission channels. The review of empirical
studies in section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 has shown that some studies on the interest rate and credit
channel address the identiﬁcation problem by emphasizing the industry composition of coun-
tries/regions as an important determinant of the strength of monetary transmission channels
and monetary policy eﬀectiveness. The corresponding studies stress cross-industry diﬀerences
in economic performance and in structural characteristics such as ﬁrm size distribution as pos-
sible source of diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy. Unfortunately, most studies
fail to control for the potential interdependence between industry and ﬁrm size. Chapter 4 is
motivated by this observation and asks whether the assumed independence of ﬁrm size and
industry aﬀects conclusions regarding the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects of monetary
policy.
It became evident from section 2.4.3 that there are comparatively few studies which allow
for diﬀerences in bank credit demand between borrower groups. In particular, there does
not appear to be a single study that (i) controls for cross-industry diﬀerences in bank credit
demand and (ii) assesses the sensitivity of industry bank lending to changes in industry
bank credit demand. Chapter 5 broadens the scope for industry eﬀects of bank lending.
Using microeconomic data on German bank lending, the study asks whether cross-industry
heterogeneities in cyclical and structural characteristics aﬀect the industry-speciﬁc demand
for bank credit. Furthermore, the analysis investigates whether industry-speciﬁc bank lending
growth is predominantly determined by changes in industry bank credit demand or in monetary
policy. The answer to this question is relevant from an economic and policy perspective since
it indicates whether the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy depends on the industry structure
of bank credit portfolios.
Finally, section 2.4.4 illustrates that the interest rate and credit channel eﬀects of monetary
policy are particularly pronounced or only arise in periods of economic downturns. Most
studies on the cyclical asymmetries in the eﬀects of monetary policy do not ask whether
the degree of asymmetry (i) depends on industry structure and (ii) diﬀers between monetary
policy expansions and contractions. The analysis in chapter 6 extends the existing literature
on cyclical eﬀects along two lines. Firstly, it uses industry data and emphasizes the role
of industries as propagation mechanism of monetary policy changes. Secondly, the study
determines whether monetary expansions and contractions have asymmetric industry output
growth eﬀects and whether the degree of asymmetry varies over the business cycle or depends
on the size of monetary policy changes.40 Chapter 2
Annex 2A Overview of Empirical Studies
Table 2A.1 to Table 2A.3 summarize the main ﬁndings of the literature on the interest rate,
broad, and narrow credit channel, respectively.64 Each table is divided into three panels that
control for diﬀerences in the level of data aggregation. For all tables, panel A reports studies
which use performance indicators of the aggregate economy (e.g., aggregate output and
price). For Table 2A.1 and 2A.2, Panel B summarizes those studies that adopt an industry
focus and employ industry-level data on economic activity in order to assess the importance
of industry mix as determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness. Panel C discusses the
microeconomic evidence from ﬁrm-level data. For Table 2A.3, panel B reports disaggregated
studies which distinguish bank credit by banking group, borrower group, and/or the maturity
of loans. Panel C presents the evidence from microeconomic bank-level data. In Table 2A.3,
credit type refers to aggregate, short-, and/or long-term bank credit and borrower group
denotes lending to the household, (non-ﬁnancial) corporate, or mortgage sector.
Considering the structure of Table 2A.1, column 2 identiﬁes the country and/or region for
which the analysis is carried out. Column 3 provides information on the sample period and
frequency of the data and column 4 describes the industry dimension of the data. Column 5
reports the empirical method used to identify the interest rate eﬀects of monetary policy. The
last two columns summarize the studies’ conclusions regarding monetary policy transmission
through interest rate eﬀects (column 6) and industry eﬀects (column 7). Although a dis-
tinction is made between the interest rate and industry eﬀects, we do not assume that these
eﬀects are independent or mutually exclusive: both eﬀects are inherent to the money view.
We only separate the eﬀects for illustrative purposes in order to identify those industries for
which the interest rate eﬀects are particularly strong.
Columns 1 to 5 in Table 2A.2 are deﬁned as in Table 2A.1. Column 6 reports the sample
splitting criterion used to identify the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy and column
7 documents the studies’ conclusions regarding the operation of a credit channel through
balance sheet eﬀects. In contrast to Table 2A.1, we do not deﬁne a column that contains
conclusions as to the industry eﬀects of monetary policy. This is because only few industry
studies explore the extent to which cross-industry diﬀerences in the interest rate response of
industry output can be explained with credit channel relationships.65
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 2A.3 are deﬁned as in the previous tables. Column 4 describes
the empirical estimation methodology and column 5 documents whether empirical research
supports the existence of a credit channel through bank lending. The remaining columns
64Many studies on the interest rate channel also investigate the broad credit view. Because empirical
estimations of the interest rate and credit channel occasionally rely on diﬀerent empirical models and diﬀerent
sample periods, we summarize the evidence for both transmission channels in separate tables.
65See the evidence in Butzen, Fuss, and Vermeulen (2003), Chatelain and Tiomo (2003), Dedola and Lippi
(2005), and Peersman and Smets (2005). The corresponding results conﬁrm the evidence for the interest
rate channel in that credit channel eﬀects are particular to cyclical industries.2A Overview of Empirical Studies 41
illustrate whether bank characteristics related to proﬁtability and the degree of information
asymmetries (i.e., bank ﬁnancial health) help to explain the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy. We distinguish the eﬀects associated with bank asset size (column 6), bank liquidity
(column 7), and/or bank capitalization (column 8).
The summary of the evidence on monetary transmission channels in Table 2A.1 to Table 2A.3
relies on the abbreviations listed below.
1. Industry Mnemonics
Ind: Industry/industries; Mfg: Manufacturing; Ser: Services; Con: Construction; Agr: Agri-
culture; Mng: Mining or extractive industry; Equip: Equipment; Dtb: Distribution; Utl:
Utilities; Comm: (Tele-)communication; CI: Capital-intensive industry; DGP: Durable goods
producing industry.
2. Abbreviations of Empirical Methods
SEM: Single equation model; MSR: Markov-switching regime; SVAR: Structural vector au-
toregressive model; OLS: Ordinary least squares estimator; FE: Fixed eﬀects estimator; RE:
Random eﬀects estimator; GMM: Generalized methods of moments estimator; IV: Instru-
mental variable estimator; FPOLS: Fixed eﬀects pooled ordinary least squares estimator; ML:
Maximum-likelihood estimator; WLS: Weighted least squares estimator; AB91: Arellano and
Bond (1991); AB95: Arellano and Bover (1995); AH82: Anderson and Hsiao (1982); HNR88:
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988); RC: Rank correlation.
3. Abbreviations of Bank Variables
Size: Bank asset size; Liq: Bank liquidity; Cap: Bank capitalization; Cap’d: Capitalized; BG:
Banking group; Bks: Banks.
4. Other Abbreviations
Ctr, Ctr’s: Country, countries; A, Q, M, D: Annual, quarterly, monthly, daily data; MP:































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Firm Size and Monetary Policy Transmission:
A Theoretical Model on the Role of Capital
Investment Expenditures
3.1 Introduction
The review in chapter 2 shows that existing theoretical and empirical work links the eﬀective-
ness of monetary policy actions to the size distribution of ﬁrms.1 Common to these studies
is that they view ﬁrm size as a proxy variable of the credit channel. According to the credit
channel theory, credit market imperfections and ﬁnancing constraints arising from informa-
tion asymmetries amplify the eﬀects of monetary policy. Because asymmetric information
p r o b l e m sa r ev i e w e dt ob em o r es e v e r ef o rs m a l lt h a nf o rl a r g eﬁ r m s ,s m a l lﬁ r m sa r eu s u a l l y
considered to be more aﬀected by monetary policy actions. Monetary policy eﬀectiveness
is thus assumed to increase with the proportion of small ﬁrms in an economy. However,
empirical evidence on the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy provides ambiguous support
for this relationship. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), Ganley and
Salmon (1997), De Bondt (2000), Dedola and Lippi (2000), and Ehrmann (2005), among
others, ﬁnd small ﬁrms to be relatively more sensitive to interest rate shocks than large ﬁrms.
Evidence against ﬁrm size eﬀects is reported by, for example, Carlino and DeFina (1998,
1999a, 1999b, 2000), Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen (2002), and Arnold and Vrugt (2004).
The ambiguity of the empirical results suggests that ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy are
not exclusively driven by information asymmetries and credit constraints. Motivated by this
ﬁnding, the present analysis does not attribute possible ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy
to credit market imperfections. Instead, we stress diﬀerences in the investment behavior of
small and large ﬁrms as an alternative channel through which ﬁrm size may transmit monet-
ary policy actions. At the core of this ’investment’ channel are size-related diﬀerences in the
degree of investment irreversibility.2
1See section 2.4.2 and Table 2A.2 in chapter 2 for a summary of the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy.
2Note, there is theoretical and empirical research on ﬁrm investment patterns for explicit adjustment cost
functions or credit constraints (see, e.g., Bond and Meghir, 1994; Chatelain and Teurlai, 2004; Whited,
1992). However, the underlying evidence does not distinguish investment by ﬁrm size. Moreover, there is
a large body of empirical evidence on the dynamic relations that describe the investment behavior of small
5556 Chapter 3
Investment irreversibility not only helps to explain the response of small and large ﬁrms to
monetary policy actions, but also the size distribution of ﬁrms. Industries typically host a
combination of small- and large-sized ﬁrms, with the size distribution being skewed within an
industry and being diﬀerent across industries. In order to explain the skewness in ﬁrm size
distribution, we need to stress an industry structure that allows for the coexistence of small
and large ﬁrms. Following Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1999) and Boone, Br¨ ocheler, and
Carroll (2000), industries can assume a dual, concentrated, fragmented, or uniform market
structure, with the diﬀerences pertaining to the degree of market concentration and density.3
Table 3.1 summarizes the properties of the diﬀerent market structures in terms of market
concentration and density.
Table 3.1: Classiﬁcation of Market Structures
High Density Low Density
High Concentration Dual market structure Concentrated market structure
Low Concentration Fragmented market structure Uniform market structure
Source: Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1999).
Among the dual, concentrated, fragmented, and uniform market structure, only the dual
market structure features the coexistence of small- and large-sized ﬁrms, operating in quasi-
independent sub-markets. Industries with this structure are characterized by a high degree of
market concentration and market density. Besides, the dual market structure also allows for
diﬀerences in the optimal investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms and directly links these
to structural properties of the market segment in which either small or large ﬁrms operate.
This study assumes the existence of dual market structures to show that diﬀerences in the
optimal investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms account for size-related diﬀerences in
the sensitivity of ﬁrms to monetary policy actions. To this end, we present a theoretical
investment model that links the investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms to the level
of sunk investment expenditures and hence to the degree of investment irreversibility. One
may argue that the assumption of a dual market structure is overly restrictive, limiting the
and large ﬁrms (see, e.g., Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon, and Terlizzese, 2003, for a compilation of studies).
However, investment patterns are not linked to sunk costs and typically assume the absence of irreversibility,
uncertainty, delivery lags, and costs of capital adjustment.
3Market concentration refers to the size distribution of ﬁrms in a market and market density describes the
absolute number of ﬁrms in a market. See the paper industry, dental laboratories, professional consultancy
services, furniture and related product manufacturing as examples for the dual market structure; guided missile
and space vehicle manufacturing as examples for the concentrated market structure; construction, agriculture,
wholesale and retail trade as examples for the fragmented market structure; basic chemical manufacturing,
pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing as examples for the uniform market structure. The examples
a r ec h o s e nf o rt h eU n i t e dS t a t e s ,u s i n gi n f o r m a t i o no nt h es i z ed i s t r i b u t i o no fﬁ r m sf r o mt h eU SB u r e a uo f
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applicability of the theoretical model. We will refute this concern and show that market
dualization emphasizes and generalizes the main conclusions of the model because it stresses
multiple sources of investment irreversibility as cause of size-related diﬀerences in optimal
investment behavior. It will become evident that other types of market structure also feature
diﬀerences in the optimal investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms and hence size-related
asymmetries in the monetary policy response of investment. However, the size-related diﬀer-
ences are less pronounced since alternative market structures only allow for single sources of
investment irreversibility.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the process of market dualization and
the characteristics of dual markets in terms of ﬁrm size distribution and investment behavior.
We also review the existing literature on investment behavior in the presence of adjustment
costs and investment irreversibility. Section 3.3 develops the theoretical investment model
that we use to discuss the ’investment’ channel of monetary policy. We will show that
size-related diﬀerences in sunk capital investment expenditures are an important source of
diﬀerences in small- and large-ﬁrm investment behavior. Section 3.4 builds on the theoretical
model and illustrates that size-related dissimilarities in sunk capital investment expenditures
account for diﬀerences in the sensitivity of small- and large-ﬁrm investment to monetary
policy shocks. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Existing Literature
The discussion of the interest rate behavior of small- and large-ﬁrm investment assumes the
coexistence of small and large ﬁrms in a dual market structure. This section starts out by
reviewing theories of market dualization. In a next step, we discuss the principles of static
and dynamic investment patterns and present studies which link ﬁrm size and investment
behavior.
3.2.1 The Process of Market Dualization
The literature views dual market structures as the outcome of two diﬀerent processes: scale
economies and scope economies. Scale economies are at the core of Carroll’s (1985) re-
source partitioning theory. He argues that dual market structures can evolve in industries
characterized by scale economies and environmental resource heterogeneity. In this view, the
market center is occupied by large ﬁrms that try to survive competitive pressures through
scale economies. These ﬁrms produce generalized goods by exploiting a wide range of envi-
ronmental resources. The market periphery is characterized by small specialized ﬁrms. These
survive by using a narrow spectrum of environmental resources which diﬀers from that ex-
ploited by large ﬁrms. In that sense, small ﬁrms search for viable market niches through local58 Chapter 3
product diﬀerentiation.4
Scope economies are at the core of Sutton’s (1991, 1998) sunk cost theory. Since this
theory underlies the subsequent theoretical model, we will assume that dual market structures
are exclusively driven by scope rather than scale economies. Sutton (1991, 1998) explains
the existence of dual market structures by stressing endogenous sunk costs resulting from
irreversible investment in the ﬁeld of, e.g., research and development (R&D).5 Endogenous
sunk costs diﬀer from exogenous sunk costs in that production is augmented by but not
dependent on the associated investment. Closely related, endogenous sunk costs are not
necessarily paid by all ﬁrms in a market, while exogenous sunk costs are.6 Firms incur
endogenous sunk costs to gain a competitive lead through scope economies, which are realized
through sunk investment in product diﬀerentiation. In being irreversible and driven by product
diﬀerentiation rather than by cost and price advantages, Sutton (1991, 1998) argues that
endogenous sunk costs may result in investment escalation. Since investment escalation is
only sustainable by a small number of large ﬁrms, endogenous sunk costs split the market
into two quasi-independent sub-markets. At the center of the dual market are those ﬁrms
that sustain the competitive escalation of endogenous sunk costs, oﬀering largely generalized
(standardized) products. These ﬁrms are large. The market periphery hosts small ﬁrms
which cannot sustain the endogenous sunk cost expenses, but continue to serve small-scale
market niches by oﬀering customized goods. Because small and large ﬁrms produce diﬀerent
goods (customized vs. standardized), the degree of inter-segment competition is low. This
suggests that the relative importance of endogenous sunk costs determines the structure of
the underlying market and the presence of small and large ﬁrms across market segments.
3.2.2 Investment Behavior and Firm Size
This chapter argues that diﬀerences in the sensitivity of small- and large-sized ﬁrms to mon-
etary policy actions arise from the presence of sunk investment expenditures which inﬂuence
the investment and, correspondingly, capacity choice of ﬁrms.7 The literature views invest-
ment decisions as being the outcome of static or dynamic optimization problems. These
diﬀer in that they describe either the demand for the stock of capital or the demand for the
ﬂow of capital (investment). Jorgenson (1963) speciﬁes a static model that describes the
demand for the stock of capital as a function of the user cost of capital. The model generates
4See also Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1999) for a detailed description of the underlying theory and
related criticism.
5Sutton (1991, 1998) also uses advertising outlays as an example of endogenous sunk costs. For reason
of tractability, we do not analyze the role of these expenses as a force behind market dualization.
6An example of exogenous sunk costs are those costs that are associated with the acquisition of production
facilities of minimum eﬃcient scale.
7Note, sunk investment costs can also be seen as determinant of a ﬁrm’s industry entry/exit decision. In
contrast to sunk costs associated with capacity choice, sunk entry/exit costs are independent of ﬁrm size and
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a straightforward rule of optimal investment behavior which requires investment up to the
point where the marginal revenue product of the stock of capital is equal to the real user
cost. Empirical studies cast doubt on the reasonability of this neoclassical investment model.
In assuming costless reversibility of investment and the absence of capital adjustment costs,
it cannot account for the observed gradual response of investment to changes in economic
conditions. Dynamic models describe the demand for the ﬂow of investment. The dynamics
arise from market distortions related to investment irreversibility, capital adjustment costs,
and uncertainty.8 These factors are interdependent and inﬂuence investment behavior by cre-
ating an option value of delaying investment until new information arrives. The underlying
market frictions preclude the instantaneous adjustment of the capital stock to changes in
economic conditions and may give rise to threshold investment behavior.9
Most studies on the investment eﬀects of irreversibility abstain from establishing a direct link
between ﬁrm size and investment behavior. An exception is Cabral (1995) who develops a
game-theoretic model that stresses the relationship between sunk capacity costs (i.e., cost
incurred in building production capacity), ﬁrm size, and ﬁrm growth. The model builds on
the empirical regularity that small ﬁrms are more likely to exit an industry than large ﬁrms.
Investment patterns of large and small ﬁrms are modeled in a two-period framework. In
each period, optimal investment behavior is determined by the probability at which small and
large ﬁrms exit the industry. Large ﬁrms are assumed to exit with low (or zero) probability
in all periods. Their optimal choice therefore involves investment to the optimum long-run
capacity level in all investment periods. Small ﬁrms, in contrast, exit with positive probability
in period one, but stay with positive probability in period two. The relative ease at which
small ﬁrms quit production in the presence of sunk capacity costs causes them to invest
less than the optimal long-run capacity level in period one. When small ﬁrms still operate
in period two, they adjust capacity to the long-run level. The gradual investment in turn
predicts small ﬁrms to grow faster than large ﬁrms. Although the theoretical model explains
the negative relationship between ﬁrm size and ﬁrm growth, it does not allow for inferences
as to the interest rate sensitivity of small- and large-sized ﬁrms.
On the empirical side, only Lensink, Van Steen, and Sterken (2000) and Ghosal and Loungani
(2000) control for the possible relationship between ﬁrm size and ﬁrm investment and the
role of ﬁrm size as determinant of the relationship between ﬁrm investment behavior and
investment uncertainty. While Lensink, Van Steen, and Sterken (2000) explicitly distinguish
the investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms, Ghosal and Loungani (2000) make a distinc-
tion between industries dominated by either small or large ﬁrms. Both studies assume that
sunk investment expenditures and hence investment irreversibility increase with ﬁrm size.10
8See, for example, Carruth, Dickerson, and Henley (2000), Lensink, Van Steen and Sterken (2005), Ninh,
Hermes, and Lanjouw (2004) for surveys of theoretical and empirical investment models.
9See Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996, 1997), Barnett and Sakellaris (1998), Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen
(2001) for theoretical and empirical threshold investment studies.
10Ghosal and Loungani (2000) derive the positive relationship between ﬁrm size and sunk costs indirectly60 Chapter 3
Because sunk costs are an option value of waiting to invest, Lensink, Van Steen, and Sterken
(2000) and Ghosal and Loungani (2000) expect the probability of a negative investment-
uncertainty relationship to be higher for large than for small ﬁrms. A diﬀerent relationship
exists for ﬁnancing constraints. Both studies argue that ﬁnancing constraints increase the
probability of a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty. Since ﬁnancing
constraints tend to be more pronounced for small rather than large ﬁrms, both studies expect
the probability of a negative investment-uncertainty relationship to be higher for small than
for large ﬁrms.
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) determine the investment-uncertainty relationship for a sample
of Italian ﬁrms. Conﬁrming theoretical predictions, the evidence from a panel analysis points
to a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty. This relationship is stronger
for industries that are dominated by small ﬁrms. Ghosal and Loungani (2000) conclude that
the larger eﬀect of uncertainty on investment for industries dominated by small ﬁrms points
to the importance of ﬁnancing constraints for small-ﬁrm investment, but not to the role of
sunk costs. Lensink, Van Steen, and Sterken (2000) provide contrasting evidence. They
employ survey data of Dutch ﬁrms to identify the investment-uncertainty relationship using
a cross-section approach. The corresponding empirical results point to the existence of a
positive investment-uncertainty relationship for small ﬁrms and to a negative relationship for
large ﬁrms.
According to theoretical predictions, the observation that large ﬁrms reduce investment
in response to higher uncertainty, whereas small ﬁrms increase investment points to the
role of sunk costs as determinant of investment under uncertainty. In order to determine
whether sunk costs are indeed a signiﬁcant source of size-related diﬀerences in the investment-
uncertainty relationship, Lensink, Van Steen, and Sterken (2000) test whether sunk costs and
hence the degree of investment irreversibility increase with ﬁrm size. Descriptive evidence
supports the positive link. Measured as the share of investment in construction to total in-
vestment, sunk costs are larger for large than for small ﬁrms. Sunk costs therefore seem to
increase the probability of a negative investment-uncertainty relationship. In order to assess
the robustness of their results, Lensink, Van Steen, and Sterken (2000) also introduce ﬁnanc-
ing constraints as mechanism which may inﬂuence the nature of the investment-uncertainty
relationship for small and large ﬁrms. In contrast to Ghosal and Loungani (2000), descriptive
statistics suggest that neither small nor large ﬁrms face a restricted capital market access and
that ﬁnancing constraints therefore do not explain the observed investment-uncertainty rela-
tionship. Obviously, the evidence on the importance of sunk costs and ﬁnancing constraints
is indirect and needs to be interpreted with some caution.
Summarizing the literature on capital investment, capital adjustment is subject to real rigidi-
from the observed negative impact of sunk costs on the degree of market entry (see Baumol, Panzer, and
Willig, 1982; Tirole, 1989). Because sunk costs are a barrier to entry, they are concluded to lead to concen-
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ties which result from investment irreversibility, where investment irreversibility is due to
sunk investment costs. Even though sunk costs are argued to be positively related to ﬁrm
size, existing studies do not explicitly model the relationship between sunk costs and ﬁrm
size and the corresponding size-related eﬀect of sunk costs on optimal investment behav-
ior. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical studies are silent as to the eﬀect of sunk costs
on the sensitivity of small- and large-ﬁrm investment to changes in monetary policy. The
remainder of this chapter discusses these issues and asks whether size-related diﬀerences in
sunk investment costs cause diﬀerences (i) in the optimal investment behavior of small and
large ﬁrms and (ii) in the sensitivity of small- and large-ﬁrm investment to monetary policy
changes? The following section presents the investment model which is used to answer these
questions. Throughout this chapter, we use the money market interest rate as proxy variable
of the monetary policy stance.
3.3 A Model of Firm Investment
Dynamic investment models frequently specify investment behavior by following the q-approach
(Tobin, 1969), which views optimal investment behavior as a function of the shadow value of
installed capital. The q-approach is criticized on theoretical and empirical grounds (cf. Bond
and Van Reenen, 2003, chapter 3). At the theoretical level, the most apparent weakness con-
cerns the restrictive structure that needs to be imposed to equate unobservable marginal q
with observable average q. In that respect, it is typically questioned whether the assumptions
of constant returns to scale in production and perfect competition yield adequate descrip-
tions of actual investment decisions. At the empirical level, the weakness of the q-approach
originates both in the assumed equality of marginal and average q and in the estimation of
average q as a function of a ﬁrm’s stock market valuation. Given the focus on stock-exchange
listed companies, empirical investigations are subject to a large ﬁrm bias and to measurement
errors in share prices.11 The general interest in the q-model is attributable to its strengths.
These predominantly arise at the theoretical level and involve the speciﬁcation of expecta-
tions, the formulation of explicit investment decision rules and the identiﬁcation of threshold
levels of optimal investment. The speciﬁcation of investment decision rules is unique to the
q-approach and cannot be found in alternative investment models such as the Euler equation
approach (Abel, 1980) or the Abel and Blanchard (1986) approach.12 It is for this reason
that we employ the q-approach.
The present analysis is carried out for a discrete inﬁnite time framework that allows for the
partial irreversibility of investment. The discrete-time model builds on the continuous-time
work by Abel and Eberly (1994, 1997).13 We extend the investment models by explicitly
11The weaknesses are to some extent refuted by Erickson and Whited (2000).
12See Kalckreuth (2003) and Bond and Van Reenen (2003, chapter 3) for a description of these investment
models.
13Theoretical explanations regarding discrete as well as continuous models are also provided by Dixit and62 Chapter 3
linking the investment decision of ﬁrms to the level of sunk costs associated with R&D. As
we will show, the solutions to the optimal investment path allow for inferences regarding the
interest rate sensitivity of small- and large-sized ﬁrms. A limitation of the study is that it does
not discuss the options that ﬁrms have to ﬁnance investment projects, although these also
aﬀect the costs of ﬁnance. Instead, we assume that ﬁrms raise external funds at no other costs
than the required interest rate. In assuming perfect credit markets, no attention is paid to the
inﬂuence of ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrm investment, ﬁrm size, and ﬁrm size distribution.14
Furthermore, the model does not specify the eﬀect of taxation on investment and optimal
investment behavior. Finally, in order to compare the investment decisions of small- and
large-sized ﬁrms, the present analysis assumes that the structure of the optimization problem
is the same for small and large businesses. The following sections deﬁne the production and
investment cost function and develop the intertemporal value maximization problem of ﬁrms
and the optimal solution.
3.3.1 Production Function
Our model assumes the existence of j=1, ..., M ﬁrms in a dual industry i. The assumption
of a dual market structure is imposed to explicitly allow for the co-existence of small- and
large-sized ﬁrms in an industry. Furthermore, it sets the stage for the discussion of the
investment decision of large- and small-sized ﬁrms across the quasi-independent sub-markets.
Firms in each industry i=1, ..., N are assumed to be risk-neutral and to produce a good that
is characterized by a degree of product heterogeneity. The inclusion of product heterogeneity
is necessary for the discussion of endogenous sunk costs. If ﬁrms were to produce completely
homogenous goods, endogenous sunk costs on R&D would not help to diﬀerentiate products
from each other.15
Market dualization implies that small and large ﬁrms produce, respectively, customized and
standardized goods. The present model assumes that large ﬁrms produce standardized goods
with customized capital, where the use of customized capital raises productive eﬃciency.
Labor is non-specialized and only needed for the operation of customized capital. Small
ﬁrms employ standardized capital in the production of specialized goods. The customization
of products is achieved through craftsmanship which requires the use of specialized labor.
Given these speciﬁcations, the two market segments are assumed to draw labor from two
independent pools: the market center uses non-specialized (unskilled) labor and the market
periphery employs specialized (skilled) labor.16 Table 3.2 summarizes the characteristics of
the dual market.
Pindyck (1994) and Bond and Van Reenen (2003, chapter 3).
14The model can be extended to the case of credit market imperfections, where ﬁrms diﬀer in their access
to external funds. See Bond and Van Reenen (2003, chapter 2) for details.
15See Sutton (1991, 1998) and Boone and Van Witteloostuijn (1999) for details.
16Alternatively, the market center and market periphery can also be said to employ low- and high-skilled
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Table 3.2: Dual Market Structure
Market Segment Firm Size Input Output
Market center Large • Customized capital Range of generalized goods
• Unskilled labor
Market periphery Small • Standardized capital Single customized good
• Skilled labor
Despite these diﬀerences, small and large ﬁrms operate the same production function. In each
period, the output level of ﬁrm j in industry i (Yji) depends on ﬁrm-speciﬁc Hicks-neutral
technology (Aji),l a b o r(Nji), physical capital (Kji),a n dh u m a nc a p i t a l(Hji) according to the





The production function displays constant returns to scale in capital and labor, but increasing
returns to scale when taking into account labor-augmenting (Harrod-neutral) human capital.
Furthermore, the production function is characterized by the unit elasticity of substitution of
the input factors.
The technology parameter of ﬁrm j in industry i (Aji) follows a random walk with drift speciﬁed
as
Aji,t = αAi + Aji,t−1 + βAji (ΔRDji,t)+ Aji,t. (3.2)
The parameter αAi is a time-invariant industry-speciﬁc positive drift that reﬂects the import-
ance of technical progress in production at the industry level. ΔRDji,t reﬂects the periodic
improvement in technology resulting from ﬁrm-speciﬁc R&D. The variable is included to
account for cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in R&D-related productive eﬃciency and accordingly for
cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in output and size.  Aji is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and




Human capital is included to control for diﬀerences in the level of skills of specialized and
non-specialized labor and hence for diﬀerences in the nominal wage paid in the market center
and market periphery. Human capital evolves as a deterministic process deﬁned as
Hji,t = αHi + Hji,t−1 + βHjiSji,t.17 (3.3)
17Human capital is modeled as a deterministic process to allow for a clear relationship between technology
and prices. This assumption does not aﬀect the conclusions of the model.64 Chapter 3
Again, the parameter αHi is a time-invariant industry-speciﬁc positive drift, reﬂecting the
eﬀects of, e.g., learning by doing. The variable Sji,t is a binary positive dummy that controls
for the positive diﬀerential between the level of human capital in the market periphery and
market center. The dummy equals one if the ﬁrm operates in the market periphery and hence
employs specialized labor and zero otherwise.
Labor and capital are assumed to become immediately productive in period t.18 Throughout
the model, labor adjustment is assumed to be instantaneous and costless.19 The capital stock
Kji,t of ﬁrm j in industry i at time t, however, changes according to
Kji,t =( 1 − δ)Kji,t−1 + Iji,t. (3.4)
The parameter δ denotes the rate of capital depreciation which is assumed to be constant
across ﬁrms and industries, with 0 <δ<1.T h ev a r i a b l eI t describes gross capital investment
per unit of time and hence the capacity choice of ﬁrm j. Dependent on its focus, the ﬁrm
may direct investment towards the accumulation of physical capital that functions on the
basis of old established or new innovative technologies.20 Investment is assumed to add to
t h ec a p i t a ls t o c ki m m e d i a t e l yr a t h e rt h a nw i t hao n ep e r i o dd e l a y .
Summarizing, ﬁrm-speciﬁc production crucially depends on technology and the stock of hu-
man and physical capital. Motivated by the importance of physical capital as determinant
of ﬁrm output, the capital stock in period t is used as a proxy variable of ﬁrm size. We
assume that small ﬁrms employ less capital than large ﬁrms.21 As will be shown below, the
size-related diﬀerences in the stock of capital are associated with size-related dissimilarities
in investment behavior which feed back into the interest rate sensitivity of small and large
ﬁrms. Although the predictions of the model do not depend on assumptions regarding the
relationship between ﬁrm size and labor input, one may also assume that capital-intensive
ﬁrms employ more labor.22 This relationship is in line with the credit channel literature that
frequently approximates ﬁrm size with employment.
3.3.2 Investment Cost Function
According to equation (3.4), changes in the stock of capital require costly investment. In order
to capture the eﬀect of investment costs on capital accumulation, we specify an ’augmented’
18One can argue that capital only becomes productive at a lag. Since the introduction of a lag confounds
the readability of the model, none is included. This does not aﬀect the conclusions.
19See Hall (2004) for evidence of low labor adjustment costs.
20Section 3.3.2 provides details on the investment options of ﬁrms.
21Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) show that ﬁrms in capital-intensive industries are larger compared
with ﬁrms in capital-extensive industries.
22This assumption is consistent with the ﬁnding of Adams (1999) who shows that capital-intensive ﬁrms
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investment cost function C(It,Kt).23 In line with Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996, 1997), Dixit
and Pindyck (1994), and Letterie and Pfann (2003), the augmented investment cost function








, a capital purchase/sale cost function (pItIt), and a cost function related
to the existing stock of capital (pKtKt). Following convention (e.g., Abel and Eberly, 1994;
Caballero and Leahy, 1996; Bond and Van Reenen, 2003), the function pKtKt will be referred
to as ﬁxed cost function. As will be shown, the ﬁxed cost function helps to explain the partial
irreversibility of investment and accounts for infrequent and lumpy capital adjustment.
Interpreting the variables of the augmented investment cost function, γ is a price parameter
that is assumed to be size-independent and constant for positive and negative investment.
T h ev a r i a b l ep It denotes the price of one unit of capital investment It and pKt describes the
ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed capital Kt at time t. We assume throughout this
study that the unit price of investment pI, the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed
capital pK,a n dγ exceed zero. That is, pI,pK,γ > 0. The parameter m determines the
functional form of the augmented investment cost function, which is speciﬁed to be non-
negative for all parameters m24 and hence for positive and negative investment values.
Combining the three cost components and suppressing subscripts j and i for ﬁrm and industry
for ease of notation, the augmented investment cost function of ﬁrm j is deﬁned as





ν depicts a dummy variable that equals one for non-zero investment and zero otherwise. The
dummy variable is included to ensure that the ﬁxed costs of capital adjustment only arise
for non-zero investment. The ﬁxed adjustment costs can be viewed as exogenous sunk costs
which small- as well as large-sized ﬁrms incur in the process of capital accumulation. For
example, small and large ﬁrms incur managerial and administrative costs when they decide on
the acquisition of new capital. Once a new machine is purchased, its installation may require
existing machines to be temporarily turned oﬀ, which results in costs of lost production.
These costs are exogenous to each ﬁrm.
Reﬂecting managerial and administrative costs and expenses related to lost production, the
ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of existing capital pK is identical for positive and negative
investment. The ﬁxed cost parameter pK is assumed to increase with the existing stock of
capital K and therefore with the size of ﬁrms. That is, pK is a positive function of K. This
relationship rests on organizational and informational ineﬃciencies at the level of the ﬁrm.
These arise from complex hierarchical and governance structures and are more severe for
23In the existing literature, the augmented investment cost function is also referred to as augmented
adjustment cost function (e.g., Abel and Eberly, 1994; Bond and Van Reenen, 2003, chapter 3).
24In more detail, m is deﬁned as m=2k with k ∈ Z. Also see Bond and Van Reenen (2003, chapter 3) for
additional explanations regarding the properties of a convex capital adjustment cost function.66 Chapter 3
large than for small ﬁrms. The ineﬃciencies result in conﬂicts of interests and moral hazard,
which impede the coordination of tasks and the exchange of information.25
Considering the purchase/sale cost per unit of capital pI, this price variable consists of an
industry-speciﬁc component  i and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component  j a c c o r d i n gt op It =  it +υ jt.
The structure of the capital purchase/sale cost function reﬂects two options that ﬁrms are
left with to achieve a chosen capacity. The ﬁrst option involves the use of standardized
capital in the production process, which is available at the industry-speciﬁc price  i.26 The
second option speciﬁes the use of customized capital, which requires the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price
 j.  j is an endogenous sunk cost on technical progress that represents the price of R&D and
the cost of capital customization.27 This variable is included to approximate the endogenous
sunk cost argument by Sutton (1991, 1998) and the underlying objective of large-sized ﬁrms
to realize economies of scope and scale.28 υ is a zero-one dummy variable that captures
these two choices. The variable equals unity if a ﬁrm pays the ﬁrm-speciﬁc price  j and zero
otherwise. In including only a dummy on investment in customized capital, ﬁrms which invest
in customized capital at cost  j are also required to invest in industry-speciﬁc capital at price
 i. Customized capital therefore supplements rather than replaces standardized capital.
In order to introduce partial irreversibility of investment, positive investment I > 0a n d
negative investment I < 0 take place at the purchase price p
+
I and sale price p
−
I per unit of
capital, respectively. Given the prevalence of asymmetric information problems in the market
for used physical capital, the sale cost per unit of capital is contemplated to be lower than the




I > 0. The diﬀerence between the purchase
and sale price measures the extent to which expenses are sunk. Considering the components
of the capital purchase price, the model assumes that the purchase price of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital equals the purchase price of industry-speciﬁc capital, with  
+
j =  
+
i > 0.29 As regards
the sale price of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital, it satisﬁes  
−
j = 0 because the costs of R&D and capital
customization are sunk. This implies that the endogenous sunk cost on technical progress
is only deﬁned for positive investment levels. Industry-speciﬁc capital can be sold at price
25See Ram´ ırez and Espitia (2002) for a survey of the literature that discusses these issues.
26Alternatively stated, the industry-speciﬁc component reﬂects the cost of operating capital of average
technological quality.
27The model does not control for the possibility that ﬁrm-speciﬁc technological innovations are used at
the industry level. The reason is that the adoption of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc innovation at the industry level requires
adjustment that needs to be captured by another cost variable. The inclusion of another cost measure
confounds the readability of the model without providing additional details.
28The realization of scope economies gives rise to market dualization through a ﬁrst-order inter-segment
eﬀect. A second-order intra-segment eﬀect of market dualization results from large ﬁrms incurring endogenous
sunk costs to gain a competitive lead in the market center via scale economies (cf. Boone and Van Wit-
teloostuijn, 1999). The present model neglects this second-order scale eﬀect and assumes that endogenous
sunk costs aﬀect output only through technology rather than scale economies.
29Note, the conclusions of the model are not sensitive to the more restrictive assumption that diﬀerences
in the degree of capital customization and sophistication cause the purchase price of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital to
exceed that of industry-speciﬁc capital.3.3 A Model of Firm Investment 67
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i > 0 due to asymmetric information problems in the market for used
capital.
As stated, the capital cost variable pI reﬂects the price that accompanies the acquisition and
disposal of one unit of either standardized or customized capital. Because  
+







j , the expenses associated with the purchase and sale of ﬁrm-speciﬁc customized
capital are higher than those that result from positive and negative investment in industry-
speciﬁc standardized capital. The present analysis assumes that the willingness of ﬁrms
to incur the cost  j per unit of customized capital depends positively on the underlying
capital stock and consequently on ﬁrm size. This relationship reﬂects the dependence of
large-ﬁrm production on customized capital and suggests a positive link between the stock
of capital used in production and the need for customized physical capital.30 Summarizing
these relationships, large ﬁrms base their investment decisions on  i and  j, whereas small
ﬁrms only view  i as the relevant investment decision parameter. Cross-ﬁrm diﬀerences in
technologies are hence attributable to cross-ﬁrm dissimilarities in the decision to invest in
either industry- or ﬁrm-speciﬁc technologies.
Except for zero investment I = 0, the augmented investment cost function (3.5) is continuous
and twice diﬀerentiable with respect to investment at all investment levels, with
∂C(It,Kt)
∂It > 0.
The discontinuity at I = 0 results from the discrepancy between the purchase and sale cost
per unit of capital, i.e., p
+
I  = p
−
I . Attributable to the diﬀerence between the purchase and

















and negative investment, respectively.
3.3.3 Short-Run Proﬁt Optimization
The production and augmented investment cost function in section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, respect-
ively, determine small- and large-ﬁrm investment behavior. As will be illustrated in section
3.3.4 and 3.3.5, investment is optimal when it maximizes the fundamental value of a ﬁrm.
The underlying intertemporal maximization problem takes into account the level of instan-
taneous operating proﬁts and the evolution of technology, human capital, and output prices.
So far, we only discussed the periodic development of technology and human capital as sto-
chastic and deterministic process, respectively (see section 3.3.1). This section presents the
short-run proﬁt function of ﬁrms and the process that describes the evolution of the output
price. The underlying discussion highlights the short-run proﬁt optimization problem of ﬁrms.
The short-run proﬁt maximization problem of the ﬁrm is deﬁned as
π (Pt,At,Kt,Nt,Ht)=max[Ptf (At,Kt,Nt,Ht) − C(Nt)], (3.6)
30This claim does not interfere with the assumption that large and small ﬁrms produce generalized and
standardized goods, respectively (cf. section 3.3.1).68 Chapter 3
where Pt is the output price, f (·) denotes the production function, and C(Nt) describes the
costs of production. The function C(Nt) equals C(Nt)=wtNt and summarizes the costs of
employing N units of labor at wage w at time t. In the short run, the physical and human
capital stock is quasi-ﬁxed and ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by varying the input factor labor.
Labor adjustment is assumed to be costless, i.e., costs related to retraining do not arise. An
additional unit of labor is therefore instantaneously available at cost wt.
The model features cross-segment diﬀerences in the price of labor. Because small ﬁrms
produce customized goods with specialized labor, while large ﬁrms produce generalized goods
with non-specialized labor, small ﬁrms are assumed to pay higher wages than large ﬁrms.
The higher wage in the market periphery is needed to compensate workers for the costs
associated with acquiring the necessary skill.31 Given that small-ﬁrm production depends
on the availability of specialized labor, small ﬁrms may also pay higher wages to discourage
workers from turning over to competitors in the same market segment or from moving to the
market center.
Although the conclusions of the model do not depend on this assumption, the cross-segment
diﬀerences in wages are assumed to result in cross-segment diﬀerences in the output price.
Given the use of skilled labor and the consequent higher wage, the output price of ﬁrms in the
market periphery is likely to exceed that of ﬁrms in the market center. Besides cross-segment
diﬀerences in the price of labor, the diﬀerential between prices in the market periphery and
market center is also attributable to cross-segment diﬀerences in technology. Again, small
ﬁrms are assumed to impose larger prices compared with large ﬁrms. This relationship reﬂects
the R&D-related technology advantage of ﬁrms in the market center and the negative eﬀect
of technological advances on the costs of production through higher factor productivity.32
Because technology is assumed to evolve as a stochastic process, the interdependence of
output price and technology causes prices to follow a stochastic process as well. In particular,
we assume that the price level of ﬁrm j in industry i evolves as an AR(1) process with positive
drift according to
Pji,t = αPi + Pji,t−1 +  Pji,t, (3.7)
where  Pji is an i.i.d. random variable. The error term is included to control for unexpected
price disturbances, resulting from technology shocks or from supply shocks. Equation (3.7)
can be criticized in that it describes the development of a ﬁrm’s output price on the basis of
ad hoc arguments rather than explicit pricing rules. Two reasons justify this approach. Firstly,
31This in turn implies that the value of product customization accrues to the worker and not as mark up
to the ﬁrm.
32See, for example, Rochelle, Laubach, and Williams (2003) for empirical evidence of the negative eﬀect of
technology on prices. Note, ﬁrms in the market center may also charge lower prices in response to technological
advances in order to sustain intra-segment competition. This relationship describes the second-order intra-
segment eﬀect of market dualization through scale economies.3.3 A Model of Firm Investment 69
the derivation of explicit pricing rules for ﬁrms in the market center and market periphery is
beyond scope of the present study since it requires additional (ad hoc) assumptions about
the curvature of the demand and cost functions in each market segment. Secondly, complex
pricing structures are not derived since neither the periodic development of prices nor the
predictions of the investment model depend on the underlying pricing rule.
Having speciﬁed the process that describes a ﬁrm’s output price, technology, and human
capital and given the investment cost and short-run proﬁt function, we have introduced all
variables which deﬁne the intertemporal investment problem of ﬁrms. The next two sections
discuss the intertemporal investment problem and accordingly optimal investment behavior.
We will show that optimal investment behavior maximizes the fundamental value of a ﬁrm. To
facilitate the readability, subscript j and i for ﬁrm and industry are subsequently suppressed.
3.3.4 Fundamental Firm Value
In the long run, ﬁrm j is free to adjust the stock of productive capital. Since capital adjustment
is costly, the ﬁrm decides on the optimal degree of investment activity by maximizing the
expected present value of net operating proﬁts in each period. Net operating proﬁts are
deﬁned as the diﬀerence between instantaneous operating proﬁts and the costs of capital
investment. In each period, the ﬁrm faces an intertemporal investment problem that arises
from the periodic depreciation of capital and the costly adjustment thereof. In order to solve
the optimization problem, the ﬁrm maximizes the expected present value of net proﬁts with






βt+s [π (Pt+s,At+s,Kt+s,Nt+s,Ht+s) − C(It+s,Kt+s)] . (3.8)
Here, β is the ﬁrm’s discount factor deﬁned as 1
1+rt, where rt is the money market interest rate
rM,t at time t adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk rFP,t.T h a ti s ,r t is deﬁned as rt = rM,t + rFP,t.33
Et is an expectations operator conditional on information available at time t. Equation (3.8)
illustrates that the fundamental value of a ﬁrm is the present value of current and future net
operating proﬁts. Following the Bellman principle of optimality, the fundamental value of a
ﬁrm equals the expected capital gain from future investment decisions and the level of net
operating proﬁts at time t (see equation 3.9).34
V(Pt,At,Kt,Nt,Ht)=m a x
It
{π (Pt,At,Kt,Nt,Ht) − C(It,Kt)+βt+1Et [Vt+1]}. (3.9)
33The discount factor may also include an industry-speciﬁc premium. Because the analysis is only interested
in the investment patterns of ﬁrms in the market center and market periphery of a particular industry, the
discussion ignores industry-speciﬁc eﬀects. This does not aﬀect the conclusions of the model.
34Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapter 4) deﬁne the expected capital gain as the continuation value of oper-
ation.70 Chapter 3
Net operating proﬁts are inﬂuenced by two sources of uncertainty, i.e., by the stochastic
behavior of output prices and ﬁrm-speciﬁc technology.
The optimization problem in equation (3.9) is constrained by the process of capital accu-
mulation (3.4) and by the evolution of technology (3.2), human capital (3.3), and output
price (3.7). For these constraints, the intertemporal maximization problem at time t is put
in terms of the Lagrangian expression
Lt = π (Pt,At,Kt,Nt,Ht) − C(It,Kt)+βt+1Et [Vt+1]+λt [(1 − δ)Kt−1 − Kt + It]+
VPt (αP + Pt−1 − Pt +  Pt)+VAt (αA + At−1 − At + βA (ΔRDt)+ At)+
VHt (αH + Ht−1 − Ht + βHSt). (3.10)
VA,V P,a n dV H represent the shadow value of technology, output price, and human capital,
respectively, and  A and  P denote random shocks to technology and output price, respectively.
λt denotes the shadow value of an extra unit of capital at time t. That is, it reﬂects the
contribution of one additional unit of capital to the fundamental value of a ﬁrm and thus
measures the desirability of ﬁrm-speciﬁc investment.
Because the shadow value of capital λt is a crucial determinant of optimal investment be-
havior, the remainder of this section summarizes the variable’s properties in more detail. A
theoretical expression for the shadow value of capital at time t is obtained by diﬀerentiating

































∂Kt is the contribution
of one additional unit of physical capital today to the expected fundamental ﬁrm value at
time t+1. This component can be written as the expected shadow value of inheriting one
additional unit of capital from period t in period t+1:
∂Et{Vt+1}
∂Kt =( 1 − δ)Et {λt+1}.35







+( 1 − δ)βt+1Et {λt+1}. (3.12)
This equation indicates that the shadow value of capital λt at time t combines the marginal
operating proﬁt of capital at time t, the marginal contribution of capital to capital installation
costs at time t, and the expected shadow value of capital at time t+1. The expectations
operator is solved by forward iteration. The corresponding result indicates that the shadow
value of installed capital at time t equals the discounted expected present value of the
35See Bond and Van Reenen (2003, chapter 3) for additional details.3.3 A Model of Firm Investment 71

















∂Kt > 0a n d∂Ct
∂Kt < 0, the shadow value of one unit of installed capital is positive.36
The property of the ﬁrst-order condition of the instantaneous proﬁt function results from the
evolution of output price and technology as random walk with positive drift.
3.3.5 Intertemporal Value Maximization
This section identiﬁes the value maximizing investment level of small and large ﬁrms. Because
λtIt and C(It,Kt) are the only components in equation (3.10) that contain investment, we




{λtIt − C(It,Kt)}, (3.14)
where Φt describes the net value of investment at time t. The solution to this optimization
problem is subject to two distortions, which give rise to lumpy and infrequent capital ad-
justment. The ﬁrst distortion arises from the purchase and sale cost per unit of capital pI
and is subsequently referred to as unconstrained case. It is unconstrained because it deﬁnes
optimal investment behavior to depend on the shadow value of capital and on the price of
capital, while it disregards the investment eﬀect of the ﬁxed capital adjustment cost pK.T h e
second distortion results from the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed capital pK.W e
will illustrate that this cost component constrains investment behavior beyond the eﬀect of
the purchase/sale price of capital pI. We introduce the corresponding investment behavior
as constrained case. In order to facilitate the readability of the derivations, the proﬁt, value,
investment, net value, and augmented investment cost function are subsequently reported
without arguments. That is, they are abbreviated as πt,V t,I t,Φ t,a n dC t.
In order to derive an expression of the value maximizing unconstrained investment level,
equation (3.14) is solved for the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to investment. The ﬁrst-
order condition
36Note, the ﬁrst-order condition of the investment cost function might also be positive. Since γ is assumed
to be the same for small and large ﬁrms, while pK increases with ﬁrm size, this might be particularly true
for large ﬁrms. To exclude this possibility, the present analysis assumes that technology raises the marginal
operating proﬁt of capital above the marginal contribution of capital to lower installation costs such that the















shows that optimal investment is determined by the relationship between the marginal beneﬁts
(i.e., the contribution of one additional unit of capital to the fundamental ﬁrm value) and
the marginal costs of investment. Solving equation (3.15) and using the information on the









In line with Hayashi (1982), current and future expected output demand, output supply, and
ultimately operating proﬁts do not appear to have a direct impact on optimal investment,
while it positively depends on the existing stock of capital. Equation (3.16) indicates that
optimal investment is strictly increasing in the shadow value of installed capital λ.F u r t h e r -
more, it shows that gross capital investment is only positive (negative) if the value of an
additional unit of capital is larger (less) than the purchase (sale) price of capital. No invest-
ment arises if the shadow valuation of capital is in-between the sale and purchase price of
capital. Summarizing these relationships between gross capital investment and the shadow
value of capital, it holds that
I∗ (λt,Kt) < 0f o rλt < p
−
It,
I∗ (λt,Kt)=0f o rp
−
It ≤ λt ≤ p
+
It,
I∗ (λt,Kt) > 0f o rλt > p
+
It. (3.17)
The shadow value of one unit of installed capital λ is closely related to Tobin’s marginal value
of installed capital deﬁned as qt = λt
pIt. For ease of exposition, we predominantly present the
optimization problem in terms of the shadow rather than marginal value of capital.37
Section 3.3.2 modeled the purchase price of capital as p
+




jt. Given this speciﬁcation
of the price, the expression for positive investment in equation (3.17) shows that the decision
process of ﬁrms involves two possible outcomes. Firms invest in standardized capital if
 
+
it <λ t ≤  
+
it +  
+
jt. By assumption, these ﬁrms are small. Investment in customized capital
only arises if λt > 
+
it +  
+
jt. Again by assumption, only large ﬁrms incur the endogenous
sunk costs to purchase innovative capital which is needed for the realization of product
diﬀerentiation advantages.
The relationships in equation (3.17) describe the value maximizing investment level for the
unconstrained case, but do not represent the solution for constrained optimal investment. The
37For details regarding the relationship between the shadow and marginal value of capital see Hayashi
(1982) and Bond and Van Reenen (2003, chapter 3).3.3 A Model of Firm Investment 73
diﬀerence originates from the nonnegative ﬁxed costs of investment that have been ignored
so far. Arising for non-zero investment, these costs aﬀect the payoﬀ function Φ(λt,Kt)
and widen the range of inaction for which non-zero investment is costly. In order to be
proﬁtable, the shadow value of capital λ must be such that the underlying payoﬀ function
Φ(λt,Kt) assumes positive values for non-zero investment. In order to determine this value,
the expression for optimal investment I∗
t from expression (3.16) is substituted into equation
(3.14) according to



















Rewriting and summarizing terms yields













m−1. In order to identify optimal investment behavior, expression
(3.19) is solved for the threshold levels of λ for which optimal investment behavior asks
for positive, negative, or zero investment. The thresholds are identiﬁed by imposing the




It, alternatively. For this condition, positive and negative
investment describe optimal investment behavior if















Ω . Evidently, the relationship between the purchase/sale price
per unit of capital pI a n dt h eﬁ x e dp r i c ep e ru n i to fe x i s t i n gc a p i t a lp K is inﬂuenced by the
interpretation of the price variables. The purchase price of capital p
+
I is a cost to the ﬁrm,
w h i l et h es a l ep r i c ep
−
I needs to be interpreted as a gain. Notably, the capital stock does
not inﬂuence the range of zero and non-zero activity if investment and capital are linearly
homogenous (i.e., m = 2).38
Using equation (3.20), the regime of zero investment reﬂects the optimal investment decision
for values of λ in the interval λt ≤ λt ≤ λt, where λ and λ denote the upper and lower
threshold of λ below and above which zero investment is undertaken. Given these relations,
optimal investment behavior ˆ I(λt,Kt) can be summarized as





















I∗ (λt,Kt) < 0i f λt <λ t
I∗ (λt,Kt)=0i f λt ≤ λt ≤ λt
I∗ (λt,Kt) > 0i f λt > λt.
(3.21)
The region of inactivity is positively related to the cost components of the augmented invest-
ment cost function C(It,Kt), i.e., pIt,p Kt,a n dγ. The higher these costs are, the larger the
region of inactivity where investment is zero between the lower and upper threshold value of
λ.39
Considering the threshold level of λ at which positive investment guarantees a positive payoﬀ,
the assumed positive relationship between the stock of capital and the purchase price per unit
of capital p
+
I suggests a threshold value that is higher for large than for small ﬁrms. Following
the same argumentation as before, small ﬁrms invest in standardized capital if λt > λt for
p
+
It =  
+
it , while large ﬁrms invest in new innovate capital if λt > λt for p
+
It =  
+
it +  
+
jt.T h e
size-related diﬀerence in the use of ﬁrm- and industry-speciﬁc capital becomes irrelevant in
the case of negative investment. With the costs on ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital being sunk, large
and small ﬁrms obtain the same per unit price for the sale of capital, i.e.,  
−
i . On the basis
of this price measure, large and small ﬁrms disinvest at the same threshold level of λ.
Size-related diﬀerences in the thresholds of negative investment arise from the ﬁxed price per
unit of existing capital pK. For disinvestment, the variable pK has to be interpreted as a price
that ﬁrms pay rather than receive. Because large ﬁrms pay a higher ﬁxed cost per unit of
installed capital than small ﬁrms, the threshold level of disinvestment is negatively related
to the size of ﬁrms. Along the same line, the positive relationship between the ﬁxed cost
per unit of installed capital pK and the size of ﬁrms causes the threshold level of positive
investment to be higher for large than for small ﬁrms.40 Given the properties of the price
variables pI and pK, the range of zero investment is a positive function of ﬁrm size. Figure
3.1 summarizes the relationships for the case when the purchase price per unit of capital p
+
I
diﬀers between small and large ﬁrms, while the sale price per unit of capital p
−
I is the same.
The relationships so far attribute diﬀerences in the threshold levels of zero and non-zero
investment between small and large ﬁrms to size-related asymmetries (i) in the type and
hence per unit price of capital pI and (ii) in the degree of organizational and informational
ineﬃciencies and hence in the ﬁxed price per unit of installed capital pK. While the type of
capital aﬀects the cost per unit of investment pI, ineﬃciencies determine the ﬁxed adjustment
39Given the assumption that λ is nonnegative, λ can also be nonnegative. If these conditions are met,
negative investment can constitute an optimal investment decision.
40Recall, the ﬁxed cost per unit of installed capital is assumed to be larger for large than for small ﬁrms.
This relationship rests on organizational and informational ineﬃciencies at the ﬁrm level which are assumed
to be more pronounced for large ﬁrms.3.3 A Model of Firm Investment 75
Figure 3.1: Small- and Large-Firm Investment Behavior with Size-Dependent Capital
λS and λL denote the lower investment threshold levels for small and large ﬁrms, respectively and λS and λL
represent the corresponding upper threshold levels. The variables p−
I and p+
I describe the sale and purchase
price per unit of capital, respectively. The variable pK denotes the ﬁxed cost of capital adjustment per unit
of existing capital.
cost per unit of installed capital pK. One may argue, however, that the assumed dependence
of small- and large-ﬁrm production on diﬀerent types of capital is overly restrictive and that
t h ec o s tp e ru n i to fc a p i t a li n v e s t m e n tp I does not diﬀer between small and large ﬁrms.
Alternatively, one may question the dual market assumption. Disregarding this assumption
and assuming that small and large ﬁrms employ similar types of capital, we still ﬁnd the
range of investment inactivity to increase with ﬁrm size. The size-related asymmetries in
the threshold levels of zero and non-zero investment are due to diﬀerences in the ﬁxed
adjustment cost per unit of installed capital pK. This price variable is thus the stronger
source of asymmetry in the investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms. Diﬀerences in the
type of capital only amplify asymmetries in the optimal investment behavior of small and
large ﬁrms. Figure 3.2 illustrates the corresponding relationships.
Summarizing the results, the discussion shows that the solution to the intertemporal invest-
ment problem depends on two factors. The ﬁrst factor is the actual ﬁrm-speciﬁc shadow
value of installed capital λ. The second factor refers to the components of the augmented
investment cost function which determine the threshold levels of λ above and below which
positive and negative investment is undertaken. Because these boundaries do not coincide,
they also deﬁne the region in which ﬁrms do not invest. Diﬀerences in the investment deci-
sions of small and large ﬁrms in a dual market structure arise from size-related dissimilarities76 Chapter 3
Figure 3.2: Small- and Large-Firm Investment Behavior with Size-Independent Capital
See the notes to Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2 has the same dimension as Figure 3.1. The sale and purchase price
p e ru n i to fc a p i t a lp −
I and p+
I is the same for small and large ﬁrms, which reﬂects the size independence of
the type of capital. Size-related diﬀerences only prevail with respect to the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of
existing capital pK.
in the ﬁxed (exogenous) adjustment cost per unit of installed capital pK a n di nt h ee n d o g e -
nous sunk cost per unit of capital pI. We ﬁnd the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed
capital to be the more important source of asymmetries in the investment behavior of small
and large ﬁrms.
The present model also allows for inferences regarding the degree of gradualism at which
small and large ﬁrms adjust investment. In line with Cabral (1995), we predict small ﬁrms
to invest more gradually in comparison to large ﬁrms given a smaller range of inaction.
However, the size-related diﬀerences in investment behavior do not result from size-related
asymmetries in the probability of industry exit as in Cabral (1995), but from dissimilarities
in the capital purchase/sale cost per unit of capital pI. In addition, we propose that discrete
jumps in investment due to the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed capital pK are
less accentuated for small than for large ﬁrms. The following section uses the results of
the theoretical model to answer the question whether size-related diﬀerences in the relative
importance of ﬁxed capital adjustment costs and endogenous sunk costs explain diﬀerences
in the sensitivity of small- and large-ﬁrm investment to changes in monetary policy.3.4 Firm Size and Interest Rate Sensitivity 77
3.4 Firm Size and Interest Rate Sensitivity
Equation (3.10) in combination with equation (3.13) illustrates that ﬂuctuations in the fun-
damental value of a ﬁrm do not only stem from changes in technology and capital. Instead,
changes in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc interest rate r - deﬁned as the money market interest rate rM
adjusted for ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk rFP - also inﬂuence the fundamental ﬁrm value and accordingly
optimal investment behavior. This section discusses the response of small- and large-ﬁrm
investment to an increase in the money market interest rate, i.e., to a tightening in monetary
policy. We will show that the interest rate response of small- and large-ﬁrm investment diﬀers
and that size-related diﬀerences are due to size-related dissimilarities (i) in the range of zero
and non-zero investment activity and (ii) in the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed
capital pK.
In reality, investment decisions do not depend on the money market (i.e., short-term) interest
rate, but on long-term rates. We approximate monetary policy changes with the money
market interest rate for illustrative purposes, noting that long-term rates are a function of
short-term rates. Motivated by the expectations theory of the term structure (Hicks, 1939)
and the observation of upward sloping yield curves, we assume that a money market interest
rate shock changes the long-term interest rate in the same direction given that long-term
rates reﬂect the average expected level of short-term interest rates over the relevant horizon.41
Because of these relationships, we discuss the interest rate response of small- and large-ﬁrm
investment in terms of the money market interest rate.
In order to focus the analysis, we impose the following simplifying assumptions. Firstly,
small and large ﬁrms do not diﬀer in terms of ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk rFP a n dw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h e
interest rate sensitivity of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk premium. These assumptions ensure that the
theoretical results are attributable to size-related diﬀerences in the investment expenditures
per unit of capital and not to size-related asymmetries in the degree of riskiness which may
result in credit constraints due to credit market imperfections. The main conclusions are
robust to these assumptions. In fact, the results would even strengthen when we would
f o l l o wt h ec o m m o nl i t e r a t u r ea n da s s u m et h a ts m a l lﬁ r m sa r er i s k i e rt h a nl a r g eﬁ r m s . 42
41We ignore any perverse eﬀects of expected inﬂation on the long-term interest rate and assume that
term and risk premiums are time-invariant. Term and risk premiums are therefore not allowed to oﬀset
the eﬀect of changes in the short-term interest rate on long-term rates. Evans and Marshall (1998) and
Diebold, Rudebusch, and Arouba (2003), among others, provide empirical evidence in favor of the expectations
hypothesis. Ellingsen and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001, 2003) develop a theoretical model and report evidence according
to which endogenous (exogenous) monetary policy changes cause long-term interest rates to be positively
(negatively) related to short-term interest rates. Endogenous changes are related to the state of the economy,
while exogenous changes are due to changes in the monetary policy preferences of central bankers.
42See Baas and Schrooten (2005) for a theoretical model that reports higher loan interest rates for small
than for large ﬁrms even in relationship banking. Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Harhoﬀ and K¨ orting (1998),
and Gambacorta (2005), among others, report empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between ﬁrm size
and credit spreads in Germany and Italy.78 Chapter 3
Secondly, we contemplate that small and large ﬁrms operate in the region of investment
inactivity prior to the interest rate shock. The position of all ﬁrms within the range of zero
investment is determined by the shadow value of capital in equation (3.13) which is assumed
to be the same for small and large ﬁrms, i.e., λsmall ∼ = λlarge a tt h et i m eo ft h ec h a n g ei n
the money market interest rate. This is a long-run equilibrium condition that holds when
the degree of risk in the market center equals the degree of risk in the market periphery.
For equal risk, persistent diﬀerentials in the shadow value of capital cannot prevail because
they are eliminated in course of an arbitrage process between the market center and market
periphery.43
Analytical conclusions are drawn by assuming that the interest rate response of the shadow
value of capital of small and large ﬁrms is identical. In order to deﬁne the sensitivity of the
shadow value of capital to a change in the money market interest rate, we start by explicitly
deﬁning the time discount factor β as the combination of the money market interest rate rM
and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk premium rFP according to
βt =
1





The ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk premium is a function of the money market interest rate deﬁned as






1 +( 1 + α)rM,t
. (3.23)
Because small and large ﬁrms are equally risky, we have αsmall = αlarge. For small and large
ﬁrms, the response of the shadow value of capital at time t with respect to a change in the
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respectively.44 As indicated, the interest rate response of small- and large-ﬁrm investment is
the same when the shadow value of capital is at the size-independent long-run equilibrium
43Note, the long-run equilibrium condition λ∗ ∼ = λsmall ∼ = λlarge holds even if small and large ﬁrms diﬀer in
terms of risk. The cross-ﬁrm heterogeneity in riskiness is reﬂected in the risk-adjusted discount factor β and
hence in the fundamental ﬁrm value (cf. equation 3.8).
44Equation (3.25) is derived using equation (3.13).3.4 Firm Size and Interest Rate Sensitivity 79
value λ∗ at the time of the interest rate change. Furthermore, we assume that the rate
of capital depreciation is independent of ﬁrm size and hence the same for customized and
standardized capital and that persistent diﬀerentials in net operating proﬁts are infeasible
because of arbitrage.
Given these preliminaries, we illustrate the response of large- and small-ﬁrm investment to a
monetary policy contraction for two cases which diﬀer in terms of the assumed magnitude
of the interest rate shock. Case 1 discusses the investment eﬀects of a small increase in the
money market interest rate. For this scenario, large ﬁrms are assumed to move within their
range of investment inactivity without crossing the threshold level of negative investment.
Opposite to this, small ﬁrms are assumed to leave the range of zero investment, starting to
disinvest. Case 2 represents the investment eﬀects of a large increase in the money market
interest rate. The contraction in monetary policy is such that small as well as large ﬁrms
cross the threshold levels associated with negative investment. The discussion of case 1 and 2
will show that size-related diﬀerences in the interest rate response of investment are primarily
due to size-related diﬀerences in the ﬁxed cost per unit of installed capital pK. The ﬁxed
cost aﬀects the interest rate sensitivity of investment through its eﬀect on the magnitude of
the discrete jump in capital, which prevails once the shadow value of capital λ crosses the
threshold of zero and non-zero investment.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the eﬀect of a small (case 1) and large (case 2) interest rate shock on
the investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms.45 The picture is drawn by assuming that
small and large ﬁrms, respectively, employ standardized and customized capital. As noted in
section 3.3.5, the conclusions of the model are robust to this assumption. In line with the
arguments above (cf. equation 3.24 and 3.25), the shadow value of large- and small-ﬁrm
capital reacts to the same extent to a change in the money market interest rate.
Considering case 1 of a change in monetary policy, a small increase in the money market
interest rate lowers the shadow value of capital of small and large ﬁrms from λ∗ to λSI.
The change in the shadow value of capital causes small ﬁrms to adjust their investment
behavior: small ﬁrms move from the region of investment inactivity to the range of disin-
vestment. Small-ﬁrm investment falls by 0A in due course, with the strength of the eﬀect
being determined by the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed capital pK.D i ﬀ e r e n tt o
small ﬁrms, the interest rate response of large-ﬁrm investment is conﬁned to adjustments
within the range of zero investment. Large ﬁrms move closer to the boundaries of negative
investment, but do not cross the threshold. The asymmetry in the interest rate sensitivity of
small- and large-ﬁrm investment reﬂects the size-related diﬀerence in the range of investment
inactivity which originates from size-related diﬀerences in the investment expenditures per
unit of capital (pI,pK).
The size-related asymmetry in the interest rate sensitivity of small and large ﬁrms coheres
45Note, Figure 3.3 reﬂects arbitrary values. The shape of the graph is chosen for illustrative purpose.80 Chapter 3
Figure 3.3: The Investment Eﬀects of a Small and Large Interest Rate Shock
Figure 3.3 is adopted from B¨ ohm and Funke (1999). The solid lines denote the investment path of ﬁrms.
λ∗ denotes the equilibrium shadow value of capital, which is the same for small and large ﬁrms. λSI and λLI
represent the shadow value of capital prevailing after the ’small’ and ’large’ interest rate shock, respectively.
Figure 3.3 is drawn for the case of linear homogeneity of investment and capital in the investment cost
function. Note, the small ﬁrm panel has the same dimension as the large ﬁrm panel. For example, λ∗, λSI,
and λLI are at the same position in both panels.3.5 Conclusion 81
well with the empirical ﬁnding in, for example, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Oliner and
Rudebusch (1996), Ganley and Salmon (1997), De Bondt (2000), Dedola and Lippi (2005),
and Ehrmann (2004) according to which small ﬁrms are relatively more responsive to interest
rate shocks than large ﬁrms. However, it contradicts the evidence in Carlino and DeFina
(1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen (2002), and Arnold and Vrugt
(2004). The latter evidence can theoretically be explained with case 2 which stresses the
response of investment to a large interest rate shock. Figure 3.3 illustrates a large interest
rate shock as a decline in the shadow value of capital of small and large ﬁrms from λ∗ to λLI.
The decline in λ causes small as well as large ﬁrms to adjust their investment behavior: small
and large ﬁrms move from the region of investment inactivity to the region of disinvestment.
When crossing the threshold levels, small- and large-ﬁrm investment behavior displays discrete
jumps. Investment by small and large ﬁrms falls by 0B and 0C, respectively. Because the
ﬁxed cost per unit of installed capital pK increases with the size of ﬁrms, the discrete jumps
are more accentuated for large than for small ﬁrms, with 0C > 0B. Stated diﬀerently, large-
ﬁrm investment is more interest rate sensitive than small-ﬁrm investment for large interest
rate changes.
Summarizing the results, we stress the role of size-related asymmetries in investment irre-
versibility as source of diﬀerences in the interest rate response of small and large ﬁrms. We
show that the interest rate sensitivity of small- and large-ﬁrm investment depends on the cost
per unit of capital investment through its eﬀect on the range of non-zero and zero investment
activity. Furthermore, the interest rate response depends on the magnitude of the monetary
policy change, which determines the extent to which small- as well as large-ﬁrm investment
displays discrete jumps. We ﬁnd that large ﬁrms do not move as often as small ﬁrms, but
when they move, the change in investment is more pronounced than that of small ﬁrms.
Overall, we illustrate that monetary policy shocks of diﬀerent magnitudes have asymmetric
eﬀects on large- and small-ﬁrm investment. This, however, suggests that conclusions as to
the existence of small ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy crucially depend on the magnitude
of the monetary policy change.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presented a dynamic investment model that aimed at explaining diﬀerences in
the interest rate sensitivity of small- and large-sized ﬁrms. Diﬀerent to existing studies on
the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy, the importance of ﬁrms as monetary transmission
channel does not result from credit market imperfections, but from investment irreversibility.
The theoretical model suggests that conclusions as to the interest rate sensitivity of small
and large ﬁrms depend on two interacting factors: the cost of capital investment and the
magnitude of the monetary policy shock.
As to the ﬁrst factor, the augmented investment cost function was modeled to consist of82 Chapter 3
endogenous and exogenous (ﬁxed) investment expenditures. Endogenous sunk costs relate
to R&D expenditures and aﬀect the type of capital that ﬁrms operate, while exogenous sunk
costs arise from organizational and informational ineﬃciencies. We have shown that the
adjustment costs per unit of capital investment determine the width of the region for which
zero and non-zero investment is optimal. Assuming a dual market structure, the adjustment
costs per unit of capital investment and hence the region of investment inactivity are positively
related to ﬁrm size. The size-related diﬀerences in the adjustment costs per unit of capital
investment and hence in the range of investment inactivity suggest, on the one hand, that
small ﬁrms change investment regimes more frequently than large ﬁrms. On the other hand,
if small and large ﬁrms change investment regimes, size-related diﬀerences in the ﬁxed cost
per unit of existing capital cause swings in large-ﬁrm investment to be more accentuated
than swings in small-ﬁrm investment. This ﬁnding is in line with the prediction by Cabral
(1995) according to which small ﬁrms invest more gradually than large ﬁrms.
Considering the second factor, the magnitude of the interest rate change was shown to
determine the investment response of small and large ﬁrms: small ﬁrms change investment
regimes for smaller monetary policy shocks than large ﬁrms. For pronounced changes in
monetary policy, the investment response of large ﬁrms was predicted to be stronger than that
of small ﬁrms. Again, the size-related asymmetries arise from diﬀerences in the adjustment
cost per unit of capital investment and from the consequent dissimilarities in the width of
the range of investment inactivity.
We also argued that the size-related diﬀerences in investment behavior and in the interest rate
sensitivity of ﬁrm investment prevail even if large ﬁrms do not incur endogenous sunk costs
and small and large ﬁrms consequently operate similar types of capital. While the assumption
of a dual market structure ampliﬁes the main conclusions of the present model, they do not
depend on it. Fixed adjustment costs per unit of existing capital have the strongest eﬀect
on the investment behavior of small and large ﬁrms and on the interest rate response of ﬁrm
investment. Being at the core of size-related organizational and informational ineﬃciencies,
ﬁxed capital investment expenditures aﬀect investment behavior regardless of the underlying
market structure.
In summary, the interest rate sensitivity of small and large ﬁrms is determined by the cost of
capital investment and by the magnitude of the change in the money market interest rate.
Because the interest rate response of small and large ﬁrms depends on the relative importance
of these factors, conclusions as to the nature of the relationship between the interest rate
sensitivity of ﬁrm investment and ﬁrm size cannot clearly be drawn. This ﬁnding indicates
that the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy cannot unambiguously be linked to the relative share
of small ﬁrms in an economy as is frequently done in empirical work. Instead, we conclude
that large ﬁrms may also drive monetary policy eﬀectiveness via an investment channel and
the underlying degree of investment irreversibility. This in turn suggests that tests for ﬁrm
size eﬀects of monetary policy should allow for small and large ﬁrm size eﬀects.4
New Evidence on the Firm Size Eﬀects in US
Monetary Policy Transmission
4.1 Introduction
The United States and the Euro area constitute the most prominent monetary unions of our
time. In the years preceding the formation of the European economic and monetary union
(EMU), the United States were frequently treated as the natural yardstick against which to
assess the appropriateness of the European countries’ decision to adopt a common currency.
The usefulness of the United States as benchmark country arises from two sources. Firstly,
similar to the Euro area, the United States comprise a large set of heterogeneous regions
whose economic performance is inﬂuenced by the actions of a single central bank. Secondly,
in contrast to the Euro zone countries, the United States report high-quality data of suﬃcient
length on the structural characteristics of its regions. Regional disaggregated data are the
necessary prerequisite for the appropriate identiﬁcation of factors that determine the process
of monetary transmission and that cause cross-region diﬀerences in the eﬀects of monetary
policy. Since disaggregated data are not available for a comprehensive sample of Euro zone
regions, investigations of the transmission of US monetary policy may provide insights into
the regional eﬀects of the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB).
A large theoretical and empirical literature exists that stresses relative asset prices, wealth,
exchange rates, ﬁnancial structure and the interest rate sensitivity of industries, ﬁrms, and
banks as mechanisms that propagate and amplify the eﬀects of monetary policy on economic
activity. Because these transmission channels do not work independently from each other,
regional diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy are attributable to regional dis-
similarities in their relative importance. This chapter acknowledges the importance of the
numerous mechanisms as source of cross-region diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy. It seeks to provide further evidence for the role of industry mix and ﬁrm size dis-
tribution as monetary transmission channels. As is illustrated in chapter 2, these variables
are typically used to study monetary policy transmission through an interest rate channel or
credit channel, respectively.
Most empirical studies of monetary policy eﬀectiveness report results that point to the role
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of small-sized businesses as monetary transmission mechanism.1 The statistical signiﬁcance
of the business size variable is usually taken as evidence of the importance of credit market
imperfections. Explanations which attribute the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy to the
operation of an investment channel (cf. chapter 3) are not considered. In attributing the
business size eﬀect to the operation of a credit channel, existing studies largely neglect the
possible interaction between business size and the cyclical sensitivity of industries. However,
as Eichenbaum (1994) notes, the potential interdependence of business size and industry
complicates the identiﬁcation of factors associated with either the credit channel or interest
rate channel. For example, if business size would be correlated with the cyclical behavior of
industries, the neglect of industry eﬀects in empirical work could explain the signiﬁcance of
business size, even in the absence of any credit market imperfections.
Motivated by the argument of Eichenbaum (1994), this chapter aims to analyze the industry
eﬀects of monetary policy in more detail. To this end, we ﬁrst analyze the interest rate
sensitivity of US industry earnings over the period 1958-2000/01. Having documented dif-
ferences in the interest rate sensitivity of industries, we next investigate whether the industry
characteristics business size and capital intensity can explain the cross-industry heterogeneity
of monetary policy eﬀects. This will enable an assessment of the nature of the interrela-
tionship between business size and the cyclical sensitivity of industries. Does business size
indeed pick up industry eﬀects, as Eichenbaum (1994) suggests, or is there an independent
eﬀect of business size? Attention is also paid to the capital intensity of production as an
additional determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness. In contrast to business size, this
industry characteristic is more closely associated with the interest rate channel of monetary
policy than with the credit channel.2
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the role of interest
rates and credit market conditions as monetary transmission mechanisms and as potential
sources of regional diﬀerences in the eﬀects of monetary policy.3 Section 4.3 reports the
results of the time-series analysis of the interest rate channel. Cross-section diﬀerences in the
eﬀects of monetary policy are detected by determining the interest rate sensitivity of economic
activity by industry sector and by US state. Building on the estimates of the time-series study,
section 4.4 describes the cross-section analysis that links the long-run interest rate sensitivity
of industries to the size distribution of businesses and to the degree of capital intensity.
Estimates are derived for speciﬁcations that exclude and include interrelationships between
business size and industry. Section 4.5 contains concluding comments and presents lines of
future research. Annex 4B reports empirical evidence on the ﬁrm size eﬀects for countries in
Europe. The evidence is mainly reported for completeness and should not be used to draw
1Section 4 in chapter 2 and section 2 in the present chapter provide details.
2Chapter 2 provides theoretical arguments for the role of capital intensity as monetary transmission mech-
anism and chapter 6 reports additional (although weak) empirical evidence.
3Because of data unavailability, the present study cannot determine whether the ﬁrm size eﬀects of
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inferences as to the industry eﬀects of monetary policy in Europe. Given the unavailability
of data of suﬃcient quality for a sample period of suﬃcient length, the explanatory power of
the models is very low and the quality of the results is poor.
4.2 Transmission Mechanisms of Monetary Policy
The literature attributes the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy to the operation of numerous
monetary transmission channels. Regional diﬀerences in the relative strength of these monet-
ary transmission mechanisms explain regional dissimilarities in the eﬀects of monetary policy.
This section reviews the transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate and credit
channel.4 In most empirical work, the factors the present study focuses on - industry eﬀects,
business size, and capital intensity - are associated with one of these two channels.
The discussion about the role of interest rates in the monetary transmission process is also
referred to as the debate on the relevance of the money view.5 According to this latter
approach, market interest rates constitute the main avenue through which monetary policy
operates. The interest rate channel results from price stickiness that causes changes in
monetary policy to have real short-run eﬀects. Following a contraction in monetary policy,
the real eﬀects arise from an increase in the user cost of capital that lowers the degree of
physical capital investment and durable goods consumption. This development comes at the
expense of lower industry output, especially in industries producing investment goods and
durable consumption goods. These industries tend to be capital intensive in production.
The interest rate channel attributes regional diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy
to regional dissimilarities in the relative importance of capital-intensive and interest-sensitive
industries and hence to regional diﬀerences in economic structures.6 Previous empirical
research has shown that regions with a large share of capital-intensive industries like goods
manufacturing, mining, construction, and transportation are likely to respond more strongly
to interest rate disturbances than less capital-intensive industries like the service, government,
and agricultural sector.7
Diﬀerent to the traditional interest rate approach, the credit view goes beyond the concept
4See, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Dornbusch,
Favero, and Giavazzi (1998), Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), De Bondt (1998), and chapter 2 for surveys of
the diﬀerent theoretical and empirical analyses of monetary policy transmission channels.
5See Hubbard (1995), Kashyap and Stein (1995), Mojon (2001), Kakes, Sturm, and Maier (2001), and
Kuttner and Mosser (2002) for a detailed discussion of the traditional interest rate channel.
6Because the strength of the interest rate eﬀects depends on industry structure, the interest rate channel
can also be referred to as the industry channel.
7Ganley and Salmon (1997) provide evidence of cross-industry diﬀerences in the interest rate sensitivity
of output for the United Kingdom. Evidence of regional or cross-country disparities in the strength of the
interest rate channel is provided by Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), Hayo and Uhlenbrock
(2000), Arnold (2000), Dedola and Lippi (2005), Arnold and Vrugt (2004), and Peersman and Smets (2005).86 Chapter 4
of sticky prices in that it also considers frictions in ﬁnancial markets. Dependent on whether
capital market imperfections are modeled to be more important at the level of banks or ﬁrms,
a distinction is made between the narrow and broad credit channel, respectively. Both credit
channels require external and internal funds to be imperfect substitutes because of information
asymmetries in ﬁnancial markets.8 The narrow credit view, also known as the bank lending
channel, emphasizes the inﬂuence of monetary policy actions on bank lending through their
eﬀect on bank reserves.9 At the core of this monetary transmission channel is the practice
of banking institutions to ﬁnance loans in part with liabilities that are subject to reserve
requirements. Considering a tightening in monetary policy, the level of bank reserves declines
due to the consequent sale of securities. In the presence of credit market imperfections,
banks cannot oﬀset the fall in reserves with alternative forms of non-reservable ﬁnance.
Their ability and willingness to supply loans therefore deteriorates. If ﬁrms or households
are bank-dependent and lack substitutes for bank loans, the cutback in bank lending raises
competition for loans among debtors. In worsening the terms under which debtors can obtain
funds from banks, the decline in loan supply may curtail consumption and investment and
thus aggregate spending.
The broad credit view, also known as the balance sheet channel, works through the inﬂuence
of monetary policy on the balance sheet position of potential borrowers such as ﬁrms.10
Following a monetary tightening, the balance sheet position of ﬁrms deteriorates. Because
of asymmetric information problems in credit markets, this development causes an increase
in the risk premium on external funds. Reﬂecting the decline in the creditworthiness of ﬁrms,
the higher risk premium comes along with a cutback in lending to debtors on the part of
bank and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions. Similar to the bank lending channel, the decline in
the supply of external funds comes at the expense of lower investment.11
Given the reasoning of the broad and narrow credit view, regional dissimilarities in the strength
8See Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999),
and Gertler and Gilchrist (1993b, 1994). Chrystal and Mizen (2002) develop a structural ﬂow of funds model
for ﬁrms, households, and ﬁnancial institutions to describe the money-determined supply and demand eﬀects
of credit supply.
9See Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox (1993) for
a discussion of the bank reserve channel. See Romer and Romer (1990), Kashyap and Stein (2000), and
Van den Heuvel (2002a, 2002b) for a criticism on the signiﬁcance of the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy. Kashyap and Stein (1997) and Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon, and Terlizzese (2003), among others,
report evidence in favor of a bank lending channel. Garretsen and Swank (1998), Favero, Giavazzi, and
Flabbi (1999), Kakes, Sturm, and Maier (2001), and Topi and Vilmunen (2003) present results which lend
weak or no support to the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy.
10See Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), Ganley and Salmon (1997), De Bondt
(2000), Dedola and Lippi (2005), Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000), Audretsch and Elston (2002), and
Ehrmann (2005) for studies that lend support to the operation of a balance sheet channel. Kalckreuth (2003)
ﬁnds ﬁrm size to be weakly important. Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), Siegfried (2000),
and Arnold and Vrugt (2004) do not ﬁnd evidence for the broad credit channel.
11Similar arguments can be used to explain the negative relationship between interest rates and household
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of the credit channel reﬂect disparities in the structure of ﬁnancial markets. The narrow
credit view attributes these diﬀerences to regional asymmetries in the size distribution of
banks. Regions with a relatively large share of poorly capitalized banks would respond more
strongly to changes in the monetary policy stance than regions with a large proportion of well-
capitalized banks. The broad credit view links regional diﬀerences in monetary transmission
to diﬀerences in the size distribution of ﬁrms. Information asymmetries and a lower level of
net worth increase the bank dependence of small ﬁrms relative to large businesses and hence
the susceptibility of small ﬁrms to ﬂuctuations in bank loan supply.12 So, regions with a high
share of small ﬁrms should respond more strongly to monetary policy shocks.
According to Eichenbaum (1994), ﬁrm size is an appropriate measure of the credit channel
only if size and industry are not interdependent. If this condition does not hold, the unique
identiﬁcation of the credit channel eﬀects and interest rate eﬀects of monetary policy will not
be possible. Evidence in favor of a credit channel - based on a signiﬁcant ﬁrm size eﬀect - will
hence be biased in estimations that do not control for industry eﬀects. Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and Ehrmann (2005) try to solve this problem in the following ways. Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994) assess the independence properties for the United States by computing the
ratio of durable sales over total manufacturing sales for ﬁve size classes. Since the evidence
points to equal ratios for the sampled size categories, size distribution is concluded to be
unrelated to industry. Ehrmann (2005) addresses the interdependence problem by comparing
the distribution of ﬁrm size across 27 sub-sectors of the German manufacturing industry.
Because all size categories are present in almost all sub-sectors, he decides not to model the
interaction between ﬁrm size and industry.
Yet in our view, neither Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) nor Ehrmann (2005) succeed in satisfac-
torily solving the independence problem. The industry classiﬁcation in Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) lacks detail. Regarding Ehrmann’s (2005) solution: even the presence of all size cat-
egories in every sub-sector does not exclude the possibility of interdependence. Arnold and
Vrugt (2004) formally test the independence assumption by identifying the relative contribu-
tion of regions and industries to the variation in ﬁrm size for German data.13 Their results
show that industries are the main source of variation in business size, suggesting that business
size and industry are related. Motivated by their results of the independence tests, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994) and Ehrmann (2005) test for the existence of a credit channel excluding
industry eﬀects, whereas Arnold and Vrugt (2004) include industry dummy variables. The
ﬁrst two studies subsequently report evidence in favor of a credit channel, while the third
study provides counter-evidence. Apparently, controlling for industry eﬀects can strongly
aﬀect the empirical outcomes.14
12See also Gertler and Gilchrist (1993b), Oliner and Rudebusch (1996), Kashyap and Stein (1995, 1997)
for a discussion of the diﬀerential regional eﬀects.
13The study also stresses the sensitivity of empirical evidence to the stratiﬁcation criteria of ﬁrm size.
14Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) unconsciously control for industry eﬀects by including
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4.3 The Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
This study explores the relevance of industries in monetary policy transmission by building on
the estimation framework in Carlino and DeFina (1998)15 and Arnold (2000). Whereas the
investigation uses the same structural estimation framework, it adds to the existing work by
combining the geographical and sectoral dimension of the earlier studies. In particular, the
present investigation resembles Carlino and DeFina (1998) by estimating models for 51 US
states, the eight main BEA regions, and the US aggregate. It also follows Arnold (2000) by
estimating interest rate sensitivities for a set of industries.
4.3.1 Empirical Model
In order to examine the short-run and long-run impact of exogenous monetary policy changes
on the performance of industries in US regions16, the time-series study involves the estimation
of a structural vector autoregressive system. In line with the study of Carlino and DeFina
(1998) and Arnold (2000), the vector of endogenous variables consists of real earnings of
industry i in region j (Yij,t), a measure of US energy prices (EPt), and US core consumer
prices (CPt).17 Energy prices and core consumer prices are included to control for supply
shocks and to capture developments in the aggregate price level, respectively. Next to these
non-policy factors, the Federal funds rate (FFRt) is included as monetary policy instrument.18
The vector of endogenous variables is thus deﬁned as
Zij,t =[ Yij,t CPt EPt FFRt]
 , (4.1)
with i = 1,...,13 and j = 1,...,60. That is, we estimate the system separately for each
industry i in each region j. Except for the Federal funds rate, all variables are expressed in
logarithm.
In order to determine whether the vector autoregressive system should be speciﬁed in levels
or in ﬁrst diﬀerences, we ﬁrst determine the stationarity properties of the variables. The test
statistics of augmented Dicky-Fuller tests (ADF, 1979) and Phillips-Perron tests (PP, 1988)
15Carlino and DeFina (1999a, 1999b, 2000) build on the same framework as Carlino and DeFina (1998).
Given the similarities in the structure of the estimations, the present study uses Carlino and DeFina (1998)
as reference.
16The term region equally refers to the US aggregate, a US region, or a US state.
17The vector of endogenous variables can also include variables that aﬀect the policy variable only with a
lag, but respond contemporaneously to policy shocks. Examples of such variables are monetary aggregates
and the real exchange rate. Because the estimation results are robust to the inclusion of such variables in the
present analysis, they are not further considered.
18See, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Garcia and Schaller (2002) for arguments which
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suggest that the individual time series are integrated of order one.19 Standard unit root
tests are criticized for not being able to discriminate between near-unit root and unit root
processes in small samples.20 In order to control for this criticism, the unit root properties are
also determined by means of the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS, 1992). The
results of the KPSS tests largely conﬁrm the ﬁrst-diﬀerence stationarity of the time series.
Given the unit root behavior of the time series, we test for the presence of cointegrating
relationships. For most state-industry combinations, Johansen cointegration tests point to
the existence of one or more cointegrating relations in test speciﬁcations that include all four
endogenous variables. Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) argue that a vector autoregressive
model can be speciﬁed in levels when the non-stationary endogenous variables of the system
are linked by some cointegrating relations. However, a VAR needs to be speciﬁed in ﬁrst
diﬀerences when the endogenous variables do not represent a cointegrated system. Because
the cointegration tests point to the existence of cointegrating relationships for many, but
not all industry-state combinations, the present analysis estimates all state-industry VARs in
levels as well as in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Similar to the ﬁndings in Carlino and DeFina (1998),
the empirical results tend to be robust to the vector autoregressive representation in levels or
in ﬁrst diﬀerences.21 The remainder of this chapter therefore emphasizes the results of the
VAR in levels in order to avoid the exclusion of cointegrating relationships from the vector
autoregressive system.22
Throughout this study, monetary policy shocks are approximated with one standard deviation
shocks to the Federal funds rate. These are identiﬁed by means of a recursive Choleski
decomposition, with the variables ordered as in equation (4.1).23 This ordering implies that
the interest rate is contemporaneously aﬀected by changes in industry earnings, core consumer
prices, and energy prices. These non-policy variables with inertia, in turn, respond to a shock
in the interest rate only with a lag. Furthermore, each of the endogenous variables displays
a contemporaneous response to its own shocks.
The Choleski decomposition method is criticized for its seemingly arbitrary assumptions re-
garding the direction of the causal relationship between monetary policy and measures of eco-
nomic performance. Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1999), among others, argue that the Choleski factorization does not suﬃciently control for
the endogeneity of monetary policy changes and that conclusions regarding the causal eﬀect
19In some cases, ADF and PP statistics provide contrasting evidence. The inconclusive border cases are
assumed to be ﬁrst-diﬀerence stationary.
20See Nelson and Plosser (1982), DeJong and Whiteman (1991), and Caner and Kilian (2000).
21The results of the Johansen cointegration tests and of the ﬁrst-diﬀerence VARs are available on request.
22Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997), Ganley and Salmon (1997), Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), and Carlino
and DeFina (1998) also estimate the VAR in levels in order to account for the weakness of unit root test
statistics.
23More precisely, monetary policy shocks are identiﬁed with a lower triangular Choleski factorization of the
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of monetary policy on the economy are sensitive to the underlying identiﬁcation scheme.24
We acknowledge the shortcomings of the recursive Choleski identiﬁcation scheme. In order
to determine the robustness of the results to the ordering in equation (4.1), we compute the
impulse response functions for diﬀerent orderings of the variables in the VAR system. The
change concerns the position of the money market interest rate (the policy variable) and in-
dustry earnings (the non-policy variable) in the vector of endogenous factors.25 In putting the
policy variable at the ﬁrst position and the industry earnings variable at the fourth position
in the model, the two-year cumulative impulse response estimates change quantitatively, but
not qualitatively. While the quantity eﬀect is sizeable for some industry-region combinations,
it is marginal for others. Because the change in the ordering of the policy and non-policy
variable leaves the nature of the cumulative impulse response eﬀect unaﬀected, it is assumed
not to inﬂuence the sign properties of the subsequent cross-section estimates.
The model in equation (4.1) is subject to one more limitation. The structure of the VAR model
generates monetary policy shocks which are likely to diﬀer across the individual industry-region
speciﬁcations. The reason is that the system in equation (4.1) is separately estimated for
each industry i in each region j given the assumption that interest rates are endogenously
determined by industry-speciﬁc earnings.26 Because the relationship between earnings and
interest rates diﬀers between industries and regions, the corresponding monetary policy shock
diﬀers and the cumulative interest rate response of earnings cannot be compared across
industry-region combinations. An alternative procedure would identify monetary policy shocks
from a speciﬁcation that derives monetary policy shocks from a measure of US aggregate
rather than industry-speciﬁc output. The cumulative impulse response of region-speciﬁc
industry earnings could then be determined by adding region-speciﬁc industry earnings as
exogenous (i.e., last) variable to the aggregate VAR. In the present sample, the approach in
equation (4.1) is preferred to the estimation of an integrated system with aggregate output
since it yields results which can be compared with those in Carlino and DeFina (1998) and
Arnold (2000). Future research will determine the sensitivity of the main conclusions to
monetary policy shocks from the alternative speciﬁcation with aggregate output.
24For the United States, event studies oﬀer a more promising avenue to address the identiﬁcation problem
of monetary policy. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) employ information
on market expectations and identify the exogenous component of monetary policy changes as the diﬀerence
between (i) survey-based market expectations regarding the future monetary policy stance and (ii) announce-
ments of the Federal funds rate target (cf. section 2.3.1). While intrinsically appealing, the underlying
approach cannot be applied in the present analysis since it requires high-frequency information on industry
activity at the state and region level.
25The results are robust to a change in the ordering of the variables within the set of non-policy variables.
See Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) for an explanation of the invariance property.
26Carlino and DeFina (1998) and Arnold and Vrugt (2004) adopt a comparable approach and assume that
the monetary policy stance is endogenous to region-speciﬁc output in the United States and in Germany,
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4.3.2 Time-Series Data
The VAR speciﬁcations model the relationship between earnings in industry i in region j,
price measures, and the Federal funds rate by using annual data. Considering the regional
dimension of the study, estimates are computed for each US state, the main eight regions
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and a measure of the US aggregate. Turning
to the sectoral dimension of the analysis, the empirical estimates are derived for mainly
those industries for which business size data are available. In employing two-dimensional
disaggregated data, we control for criticisms regarding the use of aggregated data put forward
by Carlino and DeFina (1998), Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta, and Terlizzese (1999), and Dedola
and Lippi (2005). According to their reasoning, data aggregates are only useful to assess
the overall eﬀect of monetary policy, whereas they are unable to capture the direct eﬀects
of monetary policy at the industry and regional level. Finally, in order to have a benchmark
to compare the interest rate sensitivity of industries, impulse-response estimates are also
computed for region-speciﬁc personal income - a proxy variable of aggregate industry earnings.
Annex 4A contains a detailed description of the data.
Personal income and earnings in industry i in region j are expressed in 1996 prices by means
of the US implicit GDP deﬂator.27 Besides the indirect incorporation of price developments
by deﬂating nominal industry earnings, the VAR model includes two more measures of prices,
i.e., core consumer prices and energy prices. Core consumer prices are approximated by the
consumer price index less the eﬀects of food and energy prices. Energy prices are measured by
the producer price index for fuels, related products, and power relative to the total producer
price index. The monetary policy instrument is approximated by the Federal funds rate. The
VAR models are computed by using data for the sample period 1958-1997 and 1958-2000/01.
Diﬀerences in the endpoint of the sample are due to missing values in some industry earnings
series for 1998 and 2001.
The time-series analysis of the interest rate channel is subject to two shortcomings. One
weakness concerns the computation of impulse response functions for annual but not for
quarterly data. The reason for the limited analytical focus is the unavailability of quarterly
data of suﬃcient quality. In choosing only one time frequency, the analysis cannot account
for time aggregation problems that will arise if data of similar quality but diﬀerent frequencies
follow econometric processes that do not mirror each other. If time aggregation matters, it
might be that high frequency data generate results that diﬀer from those of low frequency
data. Besides, annual data and the underlying assumption that monetary policy shocks only
have real eﬀects after one year may amplify the weaknesses of the Choleski decomposition
method. The second shortcoming arises from the fact that the short sample period for which
annual data are available prevents the computation of impulse response estimates for sub-
27In using the implicit GDP deﬂator for the US aggregate, the estimates of real earnings reﬂect diﬀerences
in regional industry structures, but do not account for diﬀerences in regional prices. It would certainly be more
appropriate to deﬂate the nominal data by using US state price indices. However, if at all, the corresponding
data are only available as of 1986.92 Chapter 4
sample periods. As a consequence, the analysis cannot control for structural breaks and
hence parameter instability in the VAR models and resulting impulse response functions.
4.3.3 Empirical Results of the Time-Series Analysis
The empirical results are inﬂuenced by the number of lags that are used in the estimation of
the VAR model.28 The present analysis determines the optimal lag length by minimizing the
Akaike information criterion (AIC, 1974). The quality of the estimation results is assessed
by testing for serial correlation, normality, and heteroscedasticity in the residuals. Given the
interest in the impulse response of industry earnings, the Ljung-Box Q-statistic (Ljung and
Box, 1978), Jarque-Bera statistic (Jarque and Bera, 1980, 1987), and Lagrange multiplier test
statistic for heteroscedasticity are only computed for the earnings speciﬁcation of the VAR
system. The results of these residual tests indicate that the error terms are well-behaved for
almost all cross sections.29 In view of this ﬁnding, the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators
of the earnings equation are not only unbiased and consistent, but also eﬃcient.
The dynamic impact of a monetary policy shock on industry performance is summarized by
the two-year cumulative impulse response of industry earnings.30 In order to ascertain the
signiﬁcance of the cumulative impulse response estimates, the impulse response functions
of the US aggregate and the US regions are computed with 95 percent analytic asymptotic
standard error bands. Since the asymptotic standard error bands are by and large diﬀerent
from zero, the VAR models are concluded to do well in explaining the dynamic response of
industry earnings.31
Since the time-series analysis is carried out for a large set of industries and regions, com-
plications arise as to the presentation and interpretation of the empirical ﬁndings. In order
to ensure the readability of the results, this section only discusses the interest rate respon-
siveness of industries in the eight BEA regions and in the US as a whole. In our view, the
restricted focus of the analysis is appropriate given the results of the two-way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) of the two-year cumulative impulse response estimates of all cross sections.
The analysis of variance reported in Table 4.1 shows the relative contribution of industries
and regions as source of variation in the interest rate sensitivity of earnings.
28Because we employ annual data, the optimum number of lags is allowed to vary between one and two.
29The Q-statistic is computed at residual lag one, two, and four. The corresponding diagnostic test statistics
are available on request.
30Carlino and DeFina (2000) use an eight-quarter horizon to determine the cumulative response of output
to a monetary policy shock. The choice of this window is suggested by Monte Carlo studies. These indicate
that the maximum cumulative response of output arises around eight quarters (i.e., two years) after the
occurrence of a monetary policy disturbance. Also see Arnold (2000) and Arnold and Vrugt (2004) for
studies that compute the cumulative impulse responses for a two-year period.
31The impulse responses are insigniﬁcant for some industry-state combinations. Because the impulse
responses are at the core of the subsequent cross-section analysis, this may aﬀect the corresponding evidence.
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Table 4.1: Two-Way Analysis of Variance of the Cumulative Impulse Responses
US States US Regions
Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Value SS DF MS F-Value
Industries 0.315 10 0.0315 71.49∗ 0.0437 10 0.0044 46.22∗
Regions 0.105 50 0.0021 4.79∗ 0.0037 7 0.0005 5.67∗
Error 0.220 500 0.0004 0.0066 70 0.0001
Total 0.641 560 0.0540 87
Note 1: SS = sum of squares, DF = degrees of freedom, MS = mean squares (i.e., SSSource divided by
DFSource), and F-value = F-statistic (i.e., MSSource divided by MSError). Diﬀerences between the MS-
and F-statistics in the table and the MS- and F-statistics determined in calculations with the reported
SS-statistics and the degrees of freedom are due to rounding. Note 2: ∗ denotes the statistical
signiﬁcance at the one percent level. Note 3: We exclude real personal income and total goods
manufacturing from the ANOVA analysis. Columns 2 to 5 summarize the results of the two-way
analysis of variance for 51 US States and 11 industries. Columns 6 to 9 present the results of the
analysis for the 8 BEA regions and 11 industries.
Formally, the two-way analysis of variance is deﬁned for the hypothesis that the long-run
earnings eﬀect of monetary policy is the same across either industries or regions. The entries
in Table 4.1 indicate that this hypothesis can be rejected on the state level and the regional
level because of discernible cross-industry and cross-region dissimilarities in the eﬀects of
monetary policy. Even though impulse responses diﬀer across both industries and regions,
the industry eﬀects appear to be the main source of variation in the interest rate eﬀects
of monetary policy. This conclusion arises from the observation that the F-value for the
industry eﬀect is much larger than the F-value for the regional eﬀect.32 Since diﬀerences in
the eﬀects of monetary policy are predominantly accounted for by diﬀerences in the interest
rate sensitivity of industries, this study proceeds by evaluating the long-run earnings response
of industries for the US aggregate and the main BEA regions rather than for individual US
states.33
The analysis of variance points to signiﬁcant cross-industry diﬀerences in the eﬀects of mon-
etary policy. Evaluating the two-year cumulative impulse response estimates in Table 4.2,
negative long-run interest rate eﬀects are reported for all industries except for the govern-
ment and mining sector. Since the mining industry is supply-shock rather than demand-shock
driven, this ﬁnding indicates that the energy price variable in the VAR system does not fully
capture supply shock eﬀects. There are two explanations of this result. Theoretically, the
positive response of the mining industry to higher interest rates could be attributed to the
opportunity costs of not extracting resources. Empirically, the oil crises in the 1970s stimu-
lated the mining sector through their positive eﬀect on the demand for US oil, but obviously
invoked higher interest rates from the central bank.
32Similar conclusions apply for the cumulative impulse responses from the ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation.
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Although an exact quantitative comparison with Carlino and DeFina (1998) and Arnold
(2000) is not possible because of diﬀerences in the speciﬁcation of the model, the present
results qualitatively conﬁrm the earlier ﬁndings. Higher interest rates trigger a decline in real
personal income, with the negative eﬀect of monetary policy being most pronounced for the
Great Lakes economy. Corroborating the sectoral ﬁndings in Arnold (2000), the magnitude
of the interest rate response of real personal income is largely attributable to the negative
impulse responses of earnings in (durable goods) manufacturing, ﬁnance, and construction.
The mining sector mitigates the negative eﬀects of higher interest rates in almost all US
regions. The exceptions are the Great Lakes economy and the Rocky Mountains area, where
earnings in the mining sector decline in response to higher interest rates. Again similar to
the ﬁndings in Arnold (2000), the weakest interest rate response is visible in the government
and service sector. Since these industries are less capital-intensive than the manufacturing,
construction, and mining sector, the evidence suggests a positive relationship between the
degree of capital intensity and the interest rate responsiveness of earnings.
4.4 Factors Behind the Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
The time-series evidence lends support to the existence of an interest rate channel of monetary
policy transmission. In line with existing empirical research, the strength of this channel is
determined by the relative interest rate sensitivity of industries. Since industries diﬀer in their
responsiveness to monetary policy, regional diﬀerences in the eﬀects of monetary policy are
predominantly attributable to cross-region dissimilarities in industry composition. Building
on this result of the time-series analysis, this section aims to explain the variation in impulse
responses across industries and consequently across regions, using two industry characteristics.
The ﬁrst factor is business size. As discussed above, diﬀerential eﬀects of monetary policy
may arise from diﬀerences in the relative importance of small- and large-sized businesses.
The second factor is a proxy of the capital intensity of industries. By including a measure
of capital intensity, the analysis investigates whether the interest rate response of industry
earnings is indeed positively related to the degree of capital intensity.
4.4.1 Cross-Section Framework
The analysis adopts a cross-section approach to investigate the inﬂuence of business size and
capital intensity on the industry eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. The underlying models
are deﬁned along two dimensions: by industry i and by geographic unit j. In order to make
eﬃcient use of all available information, cross-section estimates are derived for US states
rather than for US regions. The use of state-level data is motivated by the observation
that some of the cross-section variation in the size distribution of ﬁrms and in the degree of
capital intensity is eliminated in regional data. In using disaggregated data, the cross-section
model by region and by industry builds on a grid that consists of 50 US states and nine96 Chapter 4
industries. The upper bound on the number of industries is imposed by data constraints and
data weaknesses.34 Annex 4A contains a summary of the source and the industries for which
data on business size and capital intensity are collected.
The degree of capital intensity in industry i of US state j is approximated as the ratio of
employment to real gross product in industry i of US state j. Using this deﬁnition, the degree
of capital intensity is inversely related to the relative importance of employment per unit
value of output. In line with existing empirical studies, the present analysis measures and
classiﬁes business size by employment. Because of data limitations and disagreements on
the deﬁnition of small business size, empirical studies make diﬀerent choices on the number
of employees that classiﬁes businesses as being small. This study uses the deﬁnition of
small business size as presented by Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and reports results
for entities with less than 100 employees. Henrekson and Johansson (1999) argue that the
adoption of broad size categories prevents the eﬃcient use of information since the majority
of businesses employs fewer than 10 employees. Therefore, broad measures of small business
size may capture eﬀects that cannot be attributed to small ﬁrm or establishment size. To
account for this criticism and to determine the robustness of the empirical results to the
deﬁnition of small business size, the present study divides small businesses into entities with
up to 4, 9, 19, and 99 employees. Furthermore, existing studies employ measures of either
ﬁrm size or establishment size.35 As there are marked diﬀerences between the size distribution
of ﬁrms and establishments, this choice may also have a quantitative and qualitative eﬀect on
the cross-section evidence. To determine whether the choice of the business variable matters,
the present study uses information on both the size of ﬁrms and establishments.
Throughout the cross-section analysis, we measure capital intensity and business size as
averages over the period for which each explanatory variable is available. The degree of capital
intensity represents the average over the period 1977-2001 and business size is measured as
the average over the period 1992 and 1997-2000. Following Carlino and DeFina (1998) and
Dedola and Lippi (2005), among others, averaging is appropriate given that the estimated
cumulative impulse responses of industry earnings illustrate the average behavior of industries
during the sample period. As to business size, the use of averages is also motivated by the
degree of variability in the variable. Visual inspection of the two-dimensional data indicates
that there is not much year-to-year variation between 1992 and 1997 and 1998-2000, while
there is a break from 1997 to 1998. In taking the average of the 1992 and 1997-2000 data
points, the analysis tries to account for the break that results from the shift in the industry
classiﬁcation scheme from SIC to NAICS.
34Descriptive statistics suggest that information on the District of Columbia is an outlier. The cross-section
analysis therefore omits this state.
35Dedola and Lippi (2005) and Arnold and Vrugt (2004) employ measures of ﬁrm size. As regards the
work of Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000), no clear distinction is made between ﬁrm size and
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The empirical cross-section analysis is carried out for two sets of model speciﬁcations; one
without and one with industry eﬀects. The analysis without industry eﬀects determines the
role of small business size as monetary transmission mechanism by estimating the model
Ψij = μ + Θijα +  ij. (4.2)
Ψij depicts the non-absolute value of the two-year cumulative impulse response of earnings
in industry i in US state j, where i = 1,...,9a n dj= 1,...,50.36 Θij denotes the exogenous
business size variable that equals the percentage share of small ﬁrms or establishments in
industry i of US state j. The coeﬃcient α measures the signiﬁcance of cross-state and cross-
industry diﬀerences in the average interest rate response of industry earnings.  ij depicts the
error term.
Section 4.3.3 attributed regional diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy changes
to regional dissimilarities in the relative share of interest-sensitive industries. Since interest-
sensitive industries usually produce capital-intensive goods, regional disparities reﬂect diﬀer-
ences in the relative importance of capital-intensive industries. In order to determine the
relevance of capital intensity as monetary transmission channel, a univariate cross-section
model is estimated that includes the proxy of capital intensity as exogenous variable.37 The
corresponding model speciﬁcation equals
Ψij = μ + Φijβ +  ij, (4.3)
where Φij represents the measure of capital intensity and β measures the signiﬁcance of
cross-state and cross-industry diﬀerences in explaining the average interest rate response of
industry earnings. Finally, the analysis also investigates the importance of capital intensity
next to business size as joint determinants of the interest rate sensitivity of industry earnings.
The corresponding model speciﬁcation is
Ψij = μ + Θijα + Φijβ +  ij. (4.4)
36Carlino and DeFina (1998) determine the ability of business size to explain the absolute impulse response
estimate. The use of the absolute value of the cumulative impulse response estimate as dependent variable
is advantageous since it generates results whose interpretation is straightforward and intuitive. However, the
results of the corresponding cross-section models will present a biased view on the direction, magnitude, and
signiﬁcance of the business size eﬀect on the long-run interest rate response if the non-absolute cumulative
impulse response estimates of the i industries are neither completely negative nor completely positive. In
including the non-absolute cumulative impulse response estimate as dependent variable, the present analysis
controls for this bias.
37An alternative model speciﬁcation includes the ratio of operating surplus to gross value added of industry i
in US state j as measure of industry internal funds of ﬁnance. The relationship between the industry sensitivity
of an industry and industry operating surplus is expected to be negative: industries with positive and high
operating surplus are less dependent on external ﬁnance than industries with low or even negative operating
surplus. The empirical results are ambiguous and not robust to the choice of business size class or industry
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The expected signs of the coeﬃcient estimates on business size and capital intensity are
determined by the way in which the variables are deﬁned. As regards capital intensity,
economic theory stipulates a positive relationship between the degree of capital intensity and
the long-run interest rate response of industry earnings. Since capital intensity is deﬁned on
the labor side, this relationship holds if the variable displays a positive sign in the cross-section
estimations.
Considering the measure of business size, the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy is anticipated
to be negatively related to the size of ﬁrms and establishments. In contemplating this re-
lationship, the analysis follows the argumentation of Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994) and
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). According to their reasoning, diﬀerences in the scope
for production smoothing render large-sized ﬁrms less sensitive to cyclical demand ﬂuctua-
tions than small-sized businesses. The size-dependent diﬀerences in the cyclical exposure of
ﬁrms suggest a positive relationship between the interest rate sensitivity of industries and
regions and their relative share of small-sized ﬁrms. For the non-absolute value of the cu-
mulative impulse response estimate, the evidence supports these theoretical predictions if the
small business size variable enters with a negative sign.
Common to model speciﬁcations (4.2) to (4.4) is the exclusion of possible interrelationships
between business size and industry or between capital intensity and industry. In order to
assess the robustness of the empirical results to the independence assumption, all cross-
section equations are revised to also include industry dummy variables. The next section
illustrates the need to model interrelationships between business size and industry and capital
intensity and industry.
4.4.2 Independence Tests
This section reports ANOVA test statistics to illustrate the need to account for linkages be-
tween industry and industry characteristics. The two-way analysis of variance is computed to
test whether variations in the distribution of business size and in the degree of capital inten-
sity are accounted for by industry sectors or by regions. If capital intensity and business size
are unrelated to industry, diﬀerences in the degree of capital intensity or in the relative share
of small ﬁrms and establishments should prevail across regions rather than across industries.
Table 4.3 summarizes the results for the share of small businesses (deﬁned as businesses
of up to 4 employees) and for the measure of capital intensity.38 The evidence indicates
that the null hypothesis of equal average capital intensity and of equal average business size
across industries and regions can be rejected at least at the one percent signiﬁcance level.39
38Since the results for businesses with 0 to 9, 0 to 19, and 0 to 99 employees do not diﬀer from those for
businesses with 0 to 4 employees, the corresponding test statistics are not reported. The results are available
on request.
39Additional support for the interdependence of industry and business size is provided in contingency tables
for Chi-square tests of independence. The results are not reported, but available on request.4.4 Factors Behind the Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy 99
Furthermore, the F-statistic for the industry eﬀect is much larger than the F-value for the
regional eﬀect. Diﬀerences in the average size of ﬁrms and establishments and in the average
degree of capital intensity are consequently predominantly accounted for by industries rather
than by regions.
Eichenbaum (1994) suggests that the interdependence of industry and business size is also
reﬂected in the degree of correlation between the cyclical sensitivity of industries and the
size distribution of businesses, with small ﬁrms being particular to volatile industries. In the
presence of such a relationship, small and large ﬁrms are contemplated to react diﬀerently
to monetary policy shocks even in the absence of credit market imperfections. In order to
assess the relevance of this claim, the degree of correlation between the cyclical sensitivity
of industries and business size has been computed. Approximating cyclical sensitivity by the
standard deviation of industry-speciﬁc real earnings growth, we determine the correlation
coeﬃcient for two sets of data. The ﬁrst dataset includes all sampled industries, while the
second excludes data on the mining industry for reasons presented in section 4.4.3. For
almost all deﬁnitions of small business size, the correlation coeﬃcients in Table 4.4 point to
a statistically signiﬁcant and positive relationship between the relative share of small-sized
b u s i n e s s e sw i t hu pt of o u re m p l o y e e s 40 and the cyclical volatility of real earnings growth. The
evidence in favor of a positive relationship is particularly strong for the dataset that excludes
the mining industry.
Summarizing the results of the independence tests, business size and industry and capital
intensity and industry appear to be interdependent. This ﬁnding has two interrelated impli-
cations. Firstly, conclusions as to the role of business size and capital intensity as monetary
transmission mechanisms are likely to depend on the structure of the cross-section model.
Speciﬁcations that disregard the relationship between industry and either business size or
capital intensity are expected to yield evidence that also captures the industry eﬀects of mon-
etary policy, i.e., those eﬀects caused by the unobserved determinants of industry-speciﬁc ﬁrm
size distribution and capital intensity. Secondly, small business size eﬀects of monetary policy
may also prevail in the absence of credit market imperfections. Keeping these inferences in
mind, the following sections report the cross-section evidence.
40As regards the dataset with the mining industry, signiﬁcant and positive ﬁrm size correlation coeﬃcients
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Table 4.4: Correlation between Business Size and the Volatility of Industry Earnings
Business Entity 0-4 Employees 0-9 Employees 0-19 Employees 0-99 Employees
Firm (i) 0.08∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.03 -0.15∗
Establishment (i) 0.16∗ 0.13∗ 0.17∗ 0.21∗
Firm (ii) 0.44∗ 0.42∗ 0.40∗ 0.32∗
Establishment (ii) 0.59∗ 0.54∗ 0.60∗ 0.61∗
Notes: (i) indicates that the correlation coeﬃcient is computed across all US states (except the District
of Columbia) and across all sampled industries including the mining sector. The number of observations
T is 450. (ii) indicates that the correlation coeﬃcient is computed across all US states (except the
District of Columbia) and across all sampled industries excluding the mining sector. The number of
observations T is 400. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ depict the statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent level,
respectively, for critical values from the two-tailed student t-distribution.
4.4.3 Cross-Section Evidence
The cross-section models are estimated by assuming cross-section heteroscedasticity and
residual heteroscedasticity. In order to correct for heteroscedastic residuals, all cross-section
equations are estimated by using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance
matrix estimator. To deal with cross-section heteroscedasticity, the cross-section estimates
are weighed by means of generalized least squares. The resulting empirical evidence is subject
to data limitations. One major shortcoming of the present dataset relates to the small number
of cross sections for which estimates are computed. The upper bound on the number of cross
sections is imposed by constraints on the availability of business size data at the industry level.
Since a cross-section analysis should ideally build on a large set of cross-section observations,
the present study may report ineﬃcient coeﬃcient estimates. Another weakness concerns the
short sample period for which business size data are available. Consisting of ﬁve disjointed
data points, the dataset cannot be used to investigate the role of business size as monetary
transmission mechanism at diﬀerent stages of the business cycle.
A diﬀerent limitation results from the observation that the impulse responses from the re-
cursive Choleski identiﬁcation scheme are insigniﬁcant for some industry-state combinations.
The cross-section study thus partly builds on insigniﬁcant long-run responses. If the sign of
the cumulative impulse response is correctly estimated, the inclusion of insigniﬁcant long-run
estimates is expected to have no qualitative eﬀect on the cross-section estimates. Because
this assumption is certainly restrictive, future research needs to establish the robustness of
the sign of the long-run monetary policy response to the choice of alternative decomposition
and estimation methods.102 Chapter 4
Even though all cross-section models are estimated for measures of ﬁrm size and establishment
size, the subsequent sections only report the evidence of the estimations with ﬁrm size.41 The
restricted focus is motivated by two observations. Firstly, the cross-section estimates do not
diﬀer in terms of sign across model speciﬁcations with ﬁrm and establishment size. Secondly,
the coeﬃcient estimates are quantitatively close to each other in estimations with ﬁrm and
establishment size. While the choice of the business size measure does not inﬂuence the
cross-section results, the choice of the business size category matters in some instances. In
view of this ﬁnding, the empirical outcomes are reported for the four sampled size classes.
The analysis proceeds by ﬁrst discussing the results of the cross-section estimations without
industry dummies and next the evidence of the estimations with industry dummies.
(i) Cross-Section Evidence without Industry Eﬀects
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of the cross-section models that do not control for industry
eﬀects. The coeﬃcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and have the expected negative
sign regardless of the size category. Absent industry dummy variables, the relative interest
rate responsiveness of industries therefore seems to increase with the relative share of small-
sized businesses. This in turn lends support to the operation of a credit channel. Including
the measure of capital intensity does not inﬂuence the results. The ﬁrm size variable is
still signiﬁcant and correctly signed in all estimations in Table 4.5. Diﬀerent to this, capital
intensity only explains the long-run earnings eﬀect of interest rate disturbances in the model
that uses the ﬁrm size category of 0 to 99 employees. The measure is insigniﬁcant or wrongly
signed in the remaining cases.
The ﬁndings from the cross-section models without industry eﬀects thus seem to support the
operation of a credit channel. Since the strength of the channel is suggested to increase with
the relative share of small-sized ﬁrms in an industry, regional diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness
of monetary policy arise from cross-region dissimilarities in the relative importance of small
ﬁrms. In contrast to ﬁrm size, the degree of capital intensity has no eﬀect on the interest
rate sensitivity of industries in estimations that do not account for industry eﬀects.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(ii) Cross-Section Evidence with Industry Eﬀects
In order to determine the robustness of the empirical evidence to the independence assumption
of business size and industry or capital intensity and industry, the speciﬁcations (4.2) to (4.4)
are re-estimated by including industry dummy variables. Two main conclusions arise. Firstly,
inferences as to the operation and strength of the credit channel and interest rate channel
are extremely sensitive to the incorporation of industry dummies. Secondly, the strength of
the industry eﬀect diﬀers across sectors. The need to control for the interdependence of
industry and ﬁrm size or industry and capital intensity is most apparent for the mining sector.
Motivated by the strength of the empirical evidence for the mining industry, the discussion
of the interdependence eﬀects predominantly centers on the results obtained for this sector.
Table 4.6 reports the estimation results of the cross-section speciﬁcations (4.2) to (4.4) with
the mining dummy.
For each speciﬁcation of the cross-section model, the estimate of the mining dummy is
statistically discernible from zero. The variable’s positive sign corresponds to the sign of the
cumulative impulse response estimate and indicates that the long-run interest rate sensitivity
of earnings decreases with the relative share of mining. The coeﬃcient estimates of the
mining dummy are very close to each other for all cross-section models. After controlling
for the mining sector, ﬁrm size becomes statistically insigniﬁcant. The evidence against the
existence of independent business size eﬀects in monetary transmission points to the absence
of a credit channel. This ﬁnding is robust to the choice of the size category and prevails
in the cross-section model with and without the measure of capital intensity. In contrast to
ﬁrm size, the measure of capital intensity now helps to explain the interest rate response of
industry earnings. Since the coeﬃcient estimate is positive in all cross-section estimations
with the mining dummy, the degree of capital intensity reinforces the interest rate eﬀects of
monetary policy. The magnitude of the eﬀect is found to be invariant to the structure of the
cross-section model and to the choice of the size category. This new evidence against the
existence of independent business size eﬀects in monetary policy transmission points to the
absence of a credit channel.
Summarizing the evidence, the mining industry appears to be a strong source for business
size eﬀects in estimations that do not control for industry eﬀects. The sensitivity of the
cross-section results to the inclusion of the mining dummy is attributable to the properties of
the mining sector. In comparison to the other industries, the mining sector is characterized
by a high degree of capital intensity and a low share of small-sized businesses. In addition,
the exceptional positive interest rate sensitivity suggests that the mining industry is supply-
shock rather than demand-shock driven. In being supply-shock driven, the mining dummy
captures the eﬀects of the industry’s positive interest rate response on the sign and signiﬁcance






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The role of the mining industry is also evident from the results of estimations that control
for the eﬀects of (i) the mining sector and the demand-shock driven industries and (ii) the
demand-shock driven sectors only.42 For speciﬁcation (i) and (ii), business size and capital
intensity usually turn out to explain the interest rate response of industry earnings. Conﬁrming
the need to pay particular attention to the eﬀects of the mining industry, the business size
eﬀect is stronger and the capital intensity eﬀect is weaker in estimations that do not control
for the properties of this sector. Finally, the importance of industry eﬀects is also evident in
estimations that capture the eﬀects of each industry separately. The corresponding evidence
typically points to a decline in the importance of small business size as monetary transmission
channel.43
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has identiﬁed and explained the industry eﬀects of US monetary policy, using
industry data from US states for the sample period 1958-2000/01. The identiﬁcation of the
industry eﬀects has been accomplished by using a vector autoregressive model that provides
estimates of the long-run interest rate response of industry earnings. In line with existing
empirical work, the impulse response estimates point to cross-industry diﬀerences in the
degree of interest rate sensitivity and accordingly to the operation of an interest rate channel
that propagates and ampliﬁes the eﬀects of monetary policy changes. Regional diﬀerences
in the eﬀects of monetary policy originate from cross-region dissimilarities in the mix of
industries and consequently from diﬀerences in regional economic structures.
In order to explain the cross-industry and cross-region heterogeneity of monetary policy ef-
fects, the analysis has introduced small business size and capital intensity as variables that
may play a role in monetary policy transmission. The analysis shows that the conclusions
regarding the role of business size and capital intensity as monetary transmission mechanisms
depend strongly on the assumed interdependence of these variables with industries in general
and with the mining sector in particular. Empirical ﬁndings are therefore very sensitive to
the incorporation of industry eﬀects. Cross-section estimates that do not control for indus-
try eﬀects attribute the interest rate sensitivity of industries to the relative share of small
ﬁrms in an industry and hence to the operation of a credit channel. In these models, capital
intensity does not improve the results. However, opposite conclusions can be drawn from
cross-section speciﬁcations that account for the interrelationship between industry and either
business size or capital intensity using industry dummies. The corresponding empirical results
indicate that industry eﬀects dwarf the eﬀects of business size, but not those associated with
42The corresponding empirical results are available on request.
43Although in a diﬀerent context, Mallick and Chakraborty (2002) also provide evidence that points to
the role of industry eﬀects. When estimating the magnitude of the credit constraint or credit gap for small
businesses, they show that small ﬁrms are credit-constrained in manufacturing, wholesale, and services, while
they are unconstrained in utilities, insurance, and mining.4.5 Conclusion 107
capital intensity. Particularly strong industry eﬀects are found for the mining sector. The
evidence hence supports the view of Eichenbaum (1994) and we conclude that any test for
the existence of a credit or interest rate channel of monetary transmission should control for
industry eﬀects.
Evaluating the relevance of the present empirical investigation, the evidence of the cross-
industry and cross-region diﬀerences in the eﬀects of US monetary policy provide insights
into the likely sectoral and regional impact of the common monetary policy in the Euro area.
Similar to the United States, Euro member countries and regions diﬀer in terms of industry
structure. Given the empirical results for the United States, the heterogeneity of Euro zone
regions hints at cross-region diﬀerences in the eﬀects of a common monetary policy. These
dissimilarities will be aggravated if the European integration process triggers an increase in
the degree of regional specialization that deepens the regional diﬀerences in the industry mix
and in the size distribution of businesses. Annex 4B reports empirical evidence for these
hypothetical relationships and explores the role of industry mix and business size as source of
cross-industry and cross-country diﬀerences in the eﬀects of monetary policy in Europe.44 In
order to avoid that the evidence overemphasizes the importance of business size as monetary
transmission mechanism, the corresponding investigations explicitly control for the possible
relationship between business size and industry.
44In order to increase the degrees of freedom in the cross-section estimation, the analysis does not only
consider the Euro zone countries, but European economies in general.108 Chapter 4
Annex 4A Data Sources and Descriptions
This annex summarizes the availability of information on industry earnings and business
size distribution for US states, US regions, and the US aggregate. Industry earnings data are
collected from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (Regional Economic Information System,
2002) for the sample period 1958-2001. Information is available on the following industries:
• Total (personal income)




• Durable goods manufacturing
• Non-durable goods manufacturing
• Wholesale trade
• Retail trade
• Transportation and warehousing
• Transportation and public utilities
• Finance and insurance
• Real estate, rental, and leasing
• Services (total)
• Government
The variables on transportation and ﬁnance also contain information on other industry sectors.
In the subsequent tables, transportation and ﬁnance are used as synonym for the wider
classiﬁcation. For some industries, the sample period does not extend to 1958-2001 due to
missing observations (see Table 4A.1).
Table 4A.1: Missing Values
Industry US State/Region Sample Period
1. End-of-Sample Missing Values
• Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing Delaware 1958-1998
• Mining Idaho, Minnesota, Mideast, Plains,
Rocky Mountains
1958-1998
• Retail trade Florida 1958-2000
• Transportation and warehousing US Aggregate 1958-2000
• Real estate, rental, and leasing US Aggregate 1958-2000
2. In-Sample Missing Values
• Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing Idaho, Minnesota, District of Columbia,
Mideast, Plains, Rocky Mountains
1958-1997
• Mining Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii 1958-1997
• Real estate, rental, and leasing Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine,
M i c h i g a n ,M o n t a n a ,O h i o ,P e n n s y l v a n i a ,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming
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Table 4A.2 reports the industries for which business size data can be compiled. The data
are obtained from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) along two dimensions, i.e.,
by industry and by US state. Information on the size distribution of businesses is available
for the data points 1992 and 1997 (SIC classiﬁcation) and for the period 1998-2000 (NAICS
classiﬁcation). Caused by the shift in the industry classiﬁcation scheme from SIC to NAICS in
1998, the deﬁnition of industry sectors changed. We ﬁnd the diﬀerences in the classiﬁcation
of industries to be particularly pronounced for the agricultural, ﬁnance, and transportation
sector.
Table 4A.2: Overview of Industries by Classiﬁcation Scheme
SIC Classiﬁcation (1992, 1997) NAICS Classiﬁcation (1998-2000)
• Grand total • Grand total
• Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing • Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing, and hunting
• Mining • Mining
• Construction • Construction
• Manufacturing • Manufacturing
• Wholesale trade • Wholesale trade
• Retail trade • Retail trade
• Transportation, communication, and utilities • Transportation and warehousing
• Finance, insurance, and real estate • Finance and insurance
• Services (total) • Services (total)
• Real estate, rental, and leasing
• Utilities
• Subcategories of servicesA
NoteA: The level of aggregate services is computed as the sum of the service sub-sectors.110 Chapter 4
Annex 4B Firm Size Eﬀects in Europe
This annex extends the analysis for the United States to countries in Europe. We speciﬁcally
ask: are business size eﬀects of monetary policy in European countries attributable to the
operation of a credit channel or are they driven by industry eﬀects? Because the empirical
analysis is heavily inﬂuenced by poor data availability in terms of data frequency and the very
small number of observations, the results are only reported for completeness. If at all, the
evidence for Europe is indicative and much care needs to be exercised in its interpretation.
The structure of the analysis closely follows that of the study for the United States. That is,
we ﬁrst determine the long-run interest rate response of industry earnings to country-speciﬁc
monetary policy shocks and then explain the cumulative impulse response with industry
characteristics. Again, the industry characteristics refer to ﬁrm size as measure of the credit
channel and capital intensity as measure of the interest rate channel.
4B.1 Empirical Model
We ﬁrst estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) system to determine the interest rate respon-
siveness of industries in European countries to exogenous monetary policy changes. Given
the focus on individual countries in Europe rather than on country-speciﬁc regions, the vector
of endogenous variables in the VAR model is separately deﬁned for each industry i in country
j according to
Zij,t =[ VAij,t CPjt EPjt IRjt REERjt]
  , (4B.1)
with i = 1,...,≤ 23 and j = 1,...,13.45 The sample of 23 industries refers to 22 industry
sectors and the grand total of all industries. We consider the long-run interest rate response of
aggregate value added as benchmark to evaluate the interest rate sensitivity of the individual
industries. For each country j, the model includes information on the level of real value added
of industry i (VAij,t), country-speciﬁc energy prices (EPjt), consumer prices (CPjt),a n dt h e
real eﬀective exchange rate (REERjt). Energy prices and consumer prices are included to
control for country-speciﬁc supply shocks and to capture developments in the aggregate price
level, respectively. Besides these variables, we also include the real eﬀective exchange rate to
account for external eﬀects associated with the degree of international competitiveness. The
monetary policy stance is approximated by the country-speciﬁc short-term nominal interest
rate (IRjt). Except for the short-term interest rate, all variables are expressed in logarithm.
As in the US study, monetary policy shocks are identiﬁed by means of a recursive Choleski
decomposition, with the variables ordered as in expression (4B.1). We again deﬁne the VAR
45In order to ensure that the error terms display white noise properties, the VAR speciﬁcations for most
industry-country combinations also include single time dummies as exogenous variables. These capture the
eﬀects of historical events like, for example, the 1992 EMS crisis and the consequent recession.4B Firm Size Eﬀects in Europe 111
in levels to allow for cointegrating relationships. This approach is preferred to ﬁrst-diﬀerence
speciﬁcations given that unit root test statistics ﬁnd most sampled variables to be integrated
of order one.46 The exception is the nominal interest rate that appears to be level stationary
for some countries regardless of the selected test statistic.
4B.2 Time-Series Data
The VAR models are estimated by using annual data on industry-speciﬁc value added, internal
and external price measures, and the short-term interest rate. As concerns the industry
dimension of the data, industry data on output and employment are collected from the
OECD’s STAN database for Industrial Analysis for the sample period 1980-1999. We mainly
include those industries for which data on ﬁrm size are available. The industry output data
are adjusted for price developments by means of the GDP deﬂator at market prices which
is available from the OECD Economic Outlook. Also published by the OECD are data
on country-speciﬁc consumer prices. The corresponding index variable captures the price
eﬀects of demand-driven developments. In order to measure the price eﬀects of supply-driven
developments, we use the international oil price expressed in terms of national currency as
proxy variable of country-speciﬁc energy prices. The underlying information is available from
the US Energy Information Administration.47 T h er e a le ﬀ e c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t ee n t e r st h e
analysis as a measure of external competitiveness and is available from the IMF. Finally, the
monetary policy instrument is approximated by the short-term interest rate. Dependent on
the country, the interest rate is measured by the money market interest rate, discount rate,
or central bank rate. The data are again compiled from the IMF.
The cumulative impulse response estimates are derived for two diﬀerent sets of data. The
ﬁrst (second) dataset includes industries for which observations are available for each year
in the period 1970-1999 (1980-1999).48 The ﬁrst dataset combines information on a much
smaller number of industries than the second dataset. Since the reliability of the cross-section
analysis depends on the industry dimension, we subsequently discuss the results for the short
sample period 1980-1999. This choice is not expected to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the conclusions
of the empirical analysis given that the impulse response estimates of industries included in
the short- as well as long-sample dataset are mostly positively and signiﬁcantly correlated.
Considering the case of Germany, industry-speciﬁc value added data need to be adjusted for
the reuniﬁcation eﬀect. Industry information on value added and other industry characteristics
46The unit root test statistics of the augmented-Dicky-Fuller test (1979), Phillips-Perron test (1988), and
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (1992) are available upon request.
47The corresponding data are available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb1107.html and cor-
respond to the price of Saudi Arabian light oil.
48Country-speciﬁc data are usually available until 2001. The exceptions are Portugal and Sweden for which
the sample period only extends to 1999. To ensure the comparability of the results across countries, the
estimates are derived for the sample period that ends in 1999.112 Chapter 4
only refer to West-Germany until 1991, but to West- and East-Germany (i.e., Germany) as
of 1991. In order to control for the consequent break in the time series, we ﬁrst compute
the ratio of value added of industry i for aggregate Germany over the corresponding value
for West-Germany in 1991. We then multiply this ratio with the pre-1991 value added
data of industry i for West-Germany to obtain a pre-1991 measure for aggregate Germany.
Although this procedure mitigates the reuniﬁcation eﬀect in the data, it can be criticized
for its assumption that the ratio of value added of Germany over that of West-Germany is
time-invariant. However, this approach is preferred to the inclusion of dummy variables in
light of the short sample period.
4B.3 Time-Series Evidence
Similar to the US study, the optimal lag length in the VAR is determined by minimizing
the Akaike information criterion (AIC, 1974). Testing for serial correlation, normality, and
heteroscedasticity in the residuals, the results of the underlying test statistics suggest that the
error terms of the output equations are generally well-behaved.49 Even though the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimator of the industry output equations appears to be unbiased,
consistent, and eﬃcient, the estimated long-run output eﬀect of monetary policy should be
interpreted with caution since the results might be driven by the short-sample period and the
consequent low number of observations.
Table 4B.1 displays the two-year cumulative impulse response of industry value added. The
evidence suggests that higher interest rates suppress value added for the grand total of
industries, with the negative eﬀect of monetary policy being most pronounced for Portugal.
For many countries, the magnitude of the interest rate response of total value added is mainly
attributable to the negative impulse responses of value added in the construction sector, the
non-metallic mineral product sector, the basic metals and fabricated metal products sector,
and the wood and products of wood and cork sector. It is evident that the importance of these
industries as source of the negative interest rate response of aggregate value added diﬀers
across countries. As will be illustrated in section B.4, the country heterogeneity seems to be
caused by cross-country diﬀerences in the capital intensity of industry-speciﬁc production.
Diﬀerent to the US evidence, the mining sector propagates rather than alleviates the neg-
ative eﬀects of higher interest rates in almost all sampled countries, including resource-rich
countries like the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The exceptions are Germany and
Norway, with the positive interest rate eﬀect reﬂecting the relative importance of oil drilling in
Norway and coal mining in Germany during the 1980s and 1990s. Similar to the US evidence,
the positive interest rate sensitivity of mining indicates that the energy price variable in the
VAR system does not fully capture the eﬀects of supply shocks in the case of Germany and
Norway.
49The Ljung-Box Q-statistics (Ljung and Box, 1978), Jarque-Bera statistics (Jarque and Bera, 1980, 1987),




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to determine the relative contribution of countries and industries as source of variation
in the interest rate response of value added, two-way analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) are
computed. Given missing values on some industries for some countries, the tests are carried
out for two sets of industries and countries. The ﬁrst set (sample I) includes all 21 industries,
but excludes some countries.50 The second set (sample II) is composed of all 13 countries,
but contains fewer industries. Table 4B.2 reports the corresponding results. Regardless of the
underlying sample, the evidence shows that industries but not countries explain the variation
in the long-run interest rate eﬀects of monetary policy. This ﬁnding suggests the operation
of an industry channel of monetary policy transmission, but casts doubt on the operation
of a credit channel. However, these results need to be interpreted with caution given that
many cumulative impulse response estimates lack statistical signiﬁcance. Furthermore, since
we employ country rather than regional data, much of the regional cross-section variation
in industry output is lost. Cross-country heterogeneities, however, might be too small to
cause signiﬁcant cross-country diﬀerences in the long-run interest rate sensitivity of industry
output.
Table 4B.2: Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Impulse Responses
Sample I Sample II
Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Value SS DF MS F-Value
Industries 0.041 20 0.002 1.74∗∗ 0.039 16 0.002 2.55∗
Countries 0.008 9 0.001 0.78 0.006 12 0.001 0.56
Error 0.212 180 0.001 0.183 192 0.001
Total 0.261 209 0.229 220
Notes: See note 1 in Table 4.1 for explanations of the column entries. ∗ and ∗∗ depict the statistical
signiﬁcance at the ﬁve and ten percent level, respectively. Sample I excludes France, Norway, and
Portugal. Sample II excludes the mining and quarrying sector, the coke, reﬁned petroleum products
and nuclear fuel sector, the chemicals and chemical products sector, and the rubber and plastic
products sector.
4B.4 Factors Behind the Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
The time-series evidence lends support to the existence of an interest rate channel of monetary
transmission for industries in European countries. Cross-country diﬀerences in the strength of
the interest rate channel are predominantly attributable to country heterogeneity in industry
mix. This section aims to explain the variation in impulse responses across industries and
consequently across countries. To this end, we again assess the explanatory power of business
size and capital intensity, using the cross-section approach in equation (4.2) to equation (4.4)
in the main text. The cross-section models are estimated for a grid of 13 countries and 21
industries.51
50See the notes in Table 4B.2 for details.
51Note, the cross-section model excludes the grand total of industries and total manufacturing.4B Firm Size Eﬀects in Europe 115
We emphasize the size distribution of ﬁrms rather than establishments and deﬁne business
size in terms of employment. The corresponding data by industry and country are compiled
for ﬁrms with 1 to 9, 1 to 19, 1 to 49, and 1 to 99 employees from Eurostat’s New Cronos
database, which contains annual information for the sample period 1995-2001. Even for
this short period, the coverage of ﬁrm size data diﬀers between countries and industries and
frequently does not extend to the whole sample period. We therefore estimate the cross-
section speciﬁcations for an unbalanced panel and approximate the size distribution of ﬁrms
by country and industry as the average of the years for which data exist. The degree of
capital intensity in industry i of country j is again measured as the ratio of employment to
real value added in industry i of country j. We estimate the cross-section models for the
1980-1999 average of this proxy variable.
Similar to the US analysis, the cross-section study will control for the interdependence of
industry and either ﬁrm size or capital intensity. The interdependence is evident from the
results of ANOVA independence tests. The corresponding evidence in Table 4B.3 illustrates
that variations in the distribution of ﬁrm size and in the degree of capital intensity are
explained by industry mix and by countries.52 That is, the independence tests suggest that
ﬁrm size and industry and capital intensity and industry are correlated. However, the relative
importance of industries and countries as source of variation diﬀers. Industry eﬀects appear
to be the stronger (weaker) source of diﬀerences in ﬁrm size (capital intensity) compared
with country eﬀects. This is suggested by the observation that the F-statistic is larger for
the industry eﬀect (country eﬀect) in the ANOVA tests for ﬁrm size (capital intensity).
Table 4B.3: Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Industry Characteristics
Firm Size (1 to 9 Employees) Capital Intensity
Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Value SS DF MS F-Value
Countries 0.614 12 0.051 14.76∗ 0.070 12 0.00586 49.69∗
Industries 1.517 11 0.138 39.77∗ 0.013 13 0.00102 8.66∗
Error 0.458 132 0.003 0.018 156 0.00012
Total 2.589 155 0.102 181
Notes: See note 1 in Table 4.1 for explanations of the column entries. ∗ depicts the statistical
signiﬁcance at the one percent level. The measure of capital intensity is deﬁned as the industry-
speciﬁc ratio of the number of employees over real value added (in thousand Euros).
In order to determine whether industry eﬀects inﬂuence conclusions as to the existence of ﬁrm
size and capital intensity eﬀects of monetary policy, we estimate the cross-section models in
equation (4.2) to equation (4.4) with and without industry dummy variables. The empirical
evidence is subject to data limitations. One shortcoming concerns the plausibility of the
52Since the conclusions regarding the interdependence of ﬁrm size and industry are invariant to the choice
of ﬁrm size category, Table 4B.3 only reports the results for ﬁrms with 1 to 9 employees.116 Chapter 4
cumulative impulse response estimates in view of the short sample period and the low number
of degrees of freedom. Another weakness concerns the small number of observations in the
cross-section speciﬁcations. The upper bound is imposed by the small number of sampled
countries and by the limited availability of industry-speciﬁc ﬁrm size data. In order to obtain
the largest possible set of cross sections, we also consider Norway despite the country’s
economic and political independence from the rest of Europe.53 Nonetheless, we need to
be aware that the cross-section models display poor goodness of ﬁt properties according to
the adjusted R2-value and the F-statistic especially in estimations without industry eﬀects
(see Table 4B.4 and Table 4B.5). Given the apparent mis-speciﬁcation of the models, the
evidence of ﬁrm size eﬀects is far less conclusive for European countries than for the United
States. US estimations without and with industry eﬀects explain at least 20 percent and 50
percent of the variation in the cumulative impulse response estimates, respectively (cf. Table
4.5 and Table 4.6). In addition, the US explanatory variables are jointly signiﬁcant according
to the F-statistic.
Table 4B.4 reports the empirical results of the cross-section models without industry dum-
mies. The coeﬃcient estimates have the expected negative sign for all sampled business size
categories, but are only statistically signiﬁcant in estimations which include ﬁrms with up to
49 or 99 employees. Including the measure of capital intensity does not aﬀect the results.
The evidence of estimations without industry eﬀects thus suggests that the smallest ﬁrms do
not display a stronger response to monetary policy shocks and that the credit channel eﬀects
of monetary policy arise for broader deﬁnitions of small ﬁrm size. Considering the capital
intensity coeﬃcient, it is correctly signed but statistically insigniﬁcant in all estimations. That
is, the degree of capital intensity does not determine the interest rate sensitivity of industries
in estimations that do not account for industry eﬀects.
In order to determine the robustness of the empirical evidence to the independence assumption
of business size and industry or capital intensity and industry, the speciﬁcations (4.2) to
(4.4) in the main text are re-estimated with an industry dummy variable. The industry
dummy is a binary indicator that equals unity if industry i produces durable goods and zero
otherwise.54 Table 4B.5 reports the results. Regardless of the speciﬁcation of the cross-
section model, the dummy variable enters with a statistically signiﬁcant and negative sign.
This sign lends support to the common view that the earnings eﬀect of monetary policy is
stronger in industries producing durable goods.55
53The results of estimations without Norway do not diﬀer qualitatively from those with Norway.
54The durability dummy is closely related to the deﬁnition suggested by Dedola and Lippi (2005) and
includes (i) wood and products of wood and cork, (ii) basic metals and fabricated metal products, (iii)
machinery and equipment, (iv) transport equipment, (v) pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing,
and (vi) chemical, rubber, plastics, and fuel products. An alternative deﬁnition of the industry dummy variable
excludes the last two sectors. Since the corresponding results are not diﬀerent, they are not reported.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.4B Firm Size Eﬀects in Europe 119
When controlling for durable goods producing industries, ﬁrm size turns out to have a statis-
tically signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on the cumulative impulse responses. In fact, the small
ﬁrm size eﬀect is even stronger than in estimations without the industry dummy. This empiri-
cal ﬁnding is robust to the choice of the size category and prevails in the cross-section model
with and without the measure of capital intensity. The evidence therefore lends support to
the existence of independent ﬁrm size and hence credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy
transmission. Even more important, it illustrates that demand-shock driven (i.e., durable
goods producing) industries amplify the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy. Considering the
measure of capital intensity, the variable is positively signed in all estimations. However, a
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of capital intensity only prevails in estimations for ﬁrms with up
to 49 and 99 employees.
Summarizing, the results of the cross-section models with the industry dummy point to the
transmission of monetary policy shocks through independent ﬁrm size eﬀects and hence to
the operation of a credit channel in Europe. We ﬁnd that eﬀects associated with durable
goods producing industries amplify the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy.
4B.5 Conclusion
This annex has extended the analysis of the industry eﬀects of US monetary policy to the case
of Europe. To this end, we have used data on value added for 22 industries in 13 European
countries for the sample period 1980-1999. In line with the evidence for the United States,
the vector-autoregressive evidence points to cross-industry diﬀerences in the interest rate
response of industry output and hence to the operation of an industry channel of monetary
policy. Using the time-series results, the analysis has investigated whether the cross-industry
diﬀerences in monetary policy eﬀects can be explained by the industry characteristics ﬁrm
size and capital intensity. In contrast to the US analysis, the European study cannot be used
to draw sensible conclusions about the industry eﬀects of monetary policy and the role of
ﬁrm size and capital intensity as monetary transmission channels in Europe. This is evident
from the very poor goodness of ﬁt properties of the European models. These are conditioned
by data shortcomings related to the small number of cross-section observations, the short
sample period, the low frequency of the data, and the use of country rather than regional
data. In view of these weaknesses, the empirical results for Europe are not reliable and at
most indicative. Although indicative, the evidence for Europe lends cautious support to the
US ﬁnding according to which studies on monetary policy transmission need to control for
possible industry eﬀects.5
Industries and the Bank Lending Eﬀects of
Bank Credit Demand and Monetary Policy in
Germany
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 emphasizes the importance of the interest rate and credit channel as propaga-
tion and ampliﬁcation mechanisms of monetary policy changes. Both types of transmission
channels predict bank lending to change in response to monetary policy actions. While the
direction of the change is the same in the credit and interest rate view, the underlying reasons
diﬀer. The credit channel view explains monetary-policy-induced movements in bank lending
with changes in bank loan supply, whereas the interest rate channel stresses changes in bank
loan demand. Apparently, the correlation of monetary policy shocks with loan demand and
loan supply and the consequent role of interest rates as joint determinant of credit demand
and credit supply precludes the unique identiﬁcation of the interest rate and credit channel
eﬀects of monetary policy.
In order to identify the loan supply eﬀects of monetary policy, empirical studies usually rely
on disaggregated macro- or microeconomic data. These illustrate the distributional eﬀects of
monetary policy by stressing the within-group and between-group heterogeneity of banks in
terms of asset size (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 1995), liquidity (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000),
and capitalization (e.g., Peek and Rosengren, 1995). When stressing bank characteristics,
the identiﬁcation of bank credit supply eﬀects rests on several assumptions. Firstly, it is
assumed that bank heterogeneity in bank size, liquidity, and capitalization reﬂects cross-bank
diﬀerences in the severity of asymmetric information problems and consequently diﬀerences in
the ability of banks to oﬀset monetary-policy-induced changes in deposits with other types of
ﬁnance. Cross-bank diﬀerences in bank characteristics are not allowed to reﬂect diﬀerences in
bank customers. Secondly, the response of bank lending to changes in bank credit demand is
assumed to be homogenous across all banks.1 Thirdly, banks are assumed to serve customers
1For details see Deutsche Bundesbank (2001), Worms (2003), and the theoretical and empirical review on
the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy in chapter 2. This is comparable to the credit channel assumption
that the interest rate sensitivity of credit demand does not depend on ﬁrm size.
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which do not diﬀer in terms of bank credit demand. These are strong assumptions and their
potential violation suggests the persistence of the identiﬁcation problem.
The identiﬁcation bias is likely to be particularly strong for Germany for two reasons. The
ﬁrst reason refers to the housebank principle in German banking. German banks belong
to banking groups that conﬁne their business to customers which diﬀer in the degree of
bank dependence: commercial banks are the housebank to large corporations and savings
and cooperative banks are the housebanks to small- and medium-sized ﬁrms.2 Small ﬁrms
tend to be more dependent on banks as source of external ﬁnance than large ﬁrms. The
greater bank dependence results from credit market imperfections, which are more severe
for small than for large ﬁrms given that reporting and accounting standards become more
stringent with ﬁrm size. Credit market imperfections therefore cause the portfolio of savings
and cooperative banks to be biased towards bank-dependent ﬁrms and that of commercial
banks to be biased towards ﬁrms with access to non-bank sources of ﬁnance (cf. Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1998a, 2002a). In view of these relationships, banking groups are likely to diﬀer
in the extent to which they (i) face changes in credit demand and (ii) adjust credit supply.
The second reason refers to the existence of pronounced cross-industry diﬀerences in credit
demand. The Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) attributes these to heterogeneities in the cycli-
cal and structural characteristics of industries. The cyclicality of industry output aﬀects
the need for external ﬁnance through its impact on the availability of internal funds of ﬁ-
nance. Cross-industry diﬀerences in bank credit demand reﬂect dissimilarities in the amplitude
and frequency of cyclical ﬂuctuations and in the sensitivity of cash ﬂow to cyclical demand
changes. Structural characteristics such as the degree of capital intensity, ﬁrm size distribu-
tion, or openness to trade emphasize industry diﬀerences (i) in the costs of maintaining and
expanding production structures and (ii) in the severity of credit market imperfections as
source of diﬀerences in credit demand.
Existing studies on the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy primarily assume that bank
credit demand does not diﬀer between debtors in general and industries in particular. The un-
derlying analyses involve the estimation of bank lending functions for the aggregate economy,
where macroeconomic aggregates approximate credit demand.3 Although the macroeconomic
data are useful since they are available for long time periods at relatively high frequencies,
the underlying models only illustrate the bank lending eﬀects of credit demand changes for
the average industry. Diﬀerences in credit demand across industries are ignored. In addition,
macroeconomic data do not control for possible diﬀerences in the monetary policy response
of industry-speciﬁc bank lending. The eﬀectiveness of monetary policy is thus considered to
be independent of the industry structure of bank credit portfolios. Furthermore, most studies
2See Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for evidence on the role of housebanks as source of ﬁnance for small and
large ﬁrms in Germany.
3See, for example, Deutsche Bundesbank (2002c), De Bondt (1998), Kakes and Sturm (2002), Ehrmann
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do not account for possible cross-banking group diﬀerences in the response of bank lending to
changes in bank credit demand or monetary policy. Instead, they typically provide evidence
for an aggregate measure of all banks, disregarding cross-banking group eﬀects.4
In our view, however, knowledge regarding the industry eﬀects and banking group eﬀects
of bank lending is important as the results illustrate whether the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy depends on the industry composition of bank credit portfolios and on the institutional
setting of the banking system. The results may help to anticipate the eﬀect of banking
sector consolidation and industry specialization on future monetary policy eﬃcacy. Besides,
an understanding of industry eﬀects is also of importance since they determine the availability
of bank credit to industries and - through this channel - industry performance. To illustrate
this point, note that German banks are not restricted in the maximum share of credit they
can grant to a particular industry.5 The availability of bank credit to individual industries
hence depends on the allocation of bank credit between industries. If there would indeed be
industry eﬀects of bank lending, a monetary policy change could cause the reallocation of
bank credit between industries. For a monetary policy contraction, the shift in bank credit
between industries may leave some industries credit constrained beyond what is suggested by
the monetary-policy-induced decline in aggregate lending.
This chapter is motivated by these considerations. We do not impose the assumption of
homogenous bank credit demand, but use the industry dimension of bank lending data to
identify the response of bank credit supply to changes in industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand
and monetary policy in Germany. We do not only compile evidence for the aggregate banking
sector. Instead, we distinguish the savings banking group and the sub-groups of the credit
cooperative banking sector in order to identify the bank lending eﬀects that are due to
cross-banking group diﬀerences in the industry composition of bank credit portfolios. We
hypothesize that industries and banking groups determine the response of bank lending to
changes in bank credit demand and monetary policy. In particular, we argue that changes in
bank lending are industry-speciﬁc and that the industry composition of a bank’s loan portfolio
determines the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy through credit channel eﬀects.
We discuss two questions. Firstly, are changes in the industry-speciﬁc volume of bank credit
explained by bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy or do they reﬂect changes in industry-
speciﬁc bank credit demand?6 Secondly, does the sensitivity of bank lending to changes in
monetary policy or bank credit demand diﬀer between industries or between banking groups?
4The notable exceptions are K¨ uppers (2001) and Kakes and Sturm (2002) who distinguish banking groups
in empirical studies for Germany.
5Limits only prevail with respect to the maximum exposure to a single debtor.
6Throughout this chapter, we cannot control for the response of bank lending to monetary-policy-induced
changes in credit demand. However, to the extent that monetary policy aﬀects industry output or industry
price only with a lag, changes in the volume of bank loans can still predominantly be attributed to changes
in bank credit demand. Also see section 5.7 and chapter 7 for additional caveats of the present empirical
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We address these problems for Germany by using the Bundesbank database on bank lending
and bank balance sheet information. The answer to these questions will show that industry
bank lending predominantly responds to changes in industry bank credit demand rather than
to monetary policy changes. Furthermore, the results lend very strong support to the existence
of industry eﬀects of bank lending, whereas banking group eﬀects are comparatively weak.
Evidence in favor of credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy crucially depends on the choice
of industry and banking group. In view of these ﬁndings, we conclude that empirical studies
which do not control for the industry structure of bank credit provide an incomplete view on
the bank lending eﬀects of bank credit demand and monetary policy. The underlying results
only reﬂect the impact of the average industry. However, neglecting banking group eﬀects is
unlikely to aﬀect the overall conclusions as to the determinants of bank lending.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the existing evidence on the credit
channel eﬀects of monetary policy via bank lending in Germany. Section 5.3 describes the
German banking industry. Within this framework, the discussion stresses the balance sheet
structure of the main banking groups and the industry structure of the corresponding loan
portfolios. Section 5.4 discusses the empirical model and the empirical estimation strategy.
Section 5.5 presents the industry and bank data and describes the bank outlier detection
procedure. Section 5.6 reports the empirical results from dynamic panel estimations and
robustness checks. We will ask whether diﬀerences in the response of bank lending to changes
in bank credit demand and monetary policy are explained by eﬀects associated with banking
groups or industries. We conclude in section 5.7.
5.2 The Credit Channel Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany
This section reviews the existing empirical evidence on the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy. Common to the existing studies is that they typically do not determine the response of
bank lending to changes in bank credit demand.7 When studies control for the bank lending
eﬀects of bank credit demand, they do not allow bank credit demand to diﬀer between
diﬀerent types of customers.8 Given the lack of evidence for the response of bank lending
to changes in bank credit demand, this section primarily analyzes the existing evidence with
respect to the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy.
There is a wide range of studies on the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy in Europe. Be-
cause individual ﬁrm- and bank-level data are only available to a limited extent, the empirical
investigations largely rely on aggregate data. The studies diﬀer in terms of the geographical
scope of the analysis, the empirical approach, and the variables used to characterize banks.
7Dale and Haldane (1995) implicitly allow for diﬀerences in bank credit demand between the corporate
and household sector. Unfortunately, the analysis does not identify the response of bank lending to changes
in bank credit demand.
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Furthermore, dissimilarities prevail as to the dimension of the data. Many studies on the
credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy ignore the microeconomic structure of the bank
credit market and employ highly aggregated loan variables. The corresponding evidence dif-
fers in terms of conclusions as to the operation of a credit channel in Europe in general and
Germany in particular. As regards the aggregate evidence for Germany, Holtem¨ oller (2003),
H¨ ulsewig, Winker, and Worms (2004), H¨ ulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2005) report
evidence that is consistent with the existence of credit channel eﬀects of bank lending, while
Guender and Moersch (1997) report unambiguous evidence against bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy.
Aggregate studies can be criticized for providing an incomplete view on the bank lending
eﬀects of monetary policy because they only identify the monetary policy response of bank
lending associated with the average bank and average debtor. Empirical studies with dis-
aggregated lending data provide more insights into monetary policy transmission since they
distinguish the monetary policy response of the individual components of bank lending. The
corresponding evidence points to the sensitivity of the results to the type of bank loan and to
the choice of banking group. Kakes, Sturm, and Maier (2001) and Kakes and Sturm (2002)
employ disaggregated data on short-, medium-, and long-term lending to households and
ﬁrms and aggregate lending data by banking groups, respectively, to test for a credit channel
in Germany. Kakes, Sturm and Maier (2001) report evidence against bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy in Germany. Lending to most loan categories is found to expand rather than
to contract in response to a monetary contraction. Kakes and Sturm (2002) report weak
evidence supporting the credit channel eﬀects via bank lending in Germany. They ﬁnd that
bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy only exist for the credit cooperative banking group,
but not for the commercial or savings banking group. The discrepancy in the result for credit
cooperatives and savings banks is interesting since both banking groups operate under com-
parable institutional setups and serve comparable customers. K¨ uppers (2001) identiﬁes the
credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy in Germany for a sample of heterogeneous banks,
operating in diﬀerent banking sectors. He reports signiﬁcant bank size eﬀects of monetary
policy. However, inconsistent with the credit channel theory, size eﬀects originate with big
banks rather than with savings banks or credit cooperatives.
While studies using disaggregated data allow for more detail on the determinants of bank
lending, they still provide an incomplete view. This is because they identify the bank lending
eﬀects of monetary policy by exploiting the between-group, but not the within-group dissimi-
larities of agents and markets. For example, Kakes and Sturm (2002) capture diﬀerences
in bank size by estimating separate models for diﬀerent banking groups. The corresponding
evidence allows for behavioral asymmetries between diﬀerent banking groups, but not be-
tween banks within each banking group. In contrast to macroeconomic and disaggregated
studies, microeconomic studies exploit heterogeneities within samples to identify the bank
credit demand and the bank credit supply eﬀects of monetary policy. The remainder of this
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project, we only discuss those studies which contain Germany.9
Microeconomic studies for European countries including Germany are reported by De Bondt
(1998), Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999), Altunba¸ s, Fazylov, and Molyneux (2002),
Ehrmann et al. (2003), and Worms (2003). Using data from BankScope, De Bondt (1998)
reports panel econometric evidence that lends support to the transmission of monetary policy
shocks through bank lending in Germany. The bank lending eﬀect is strong in comparison
to other European countries and larger for small and less liquid banks. Even though Favero,
Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999) use the same database, the cross-section analysis does not yield
evidence of a credit channel via bank lending in Germany. In fact, small banks are found to
increase credit supply in response to monetary policy shocks. Also using BankScope data,
Altunba¸ s, Fazylov, and Molyneux (2002) employ a panel estimation framework to provide
evidence on the interest rate sensitivity of bank lending in European countries. In line with
Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999), the results do not point to the operation of a credit
channel in Germany. Evidently, conclusions regarding the credit channel eﬀects of monetary
policy diﬀer between studies. Because De Bondt (1998), Favero, Giavazzi, and Flabbi (1999),
and Altunba¸ s, Fazylov, and Molyneux (2002) employ the same database, the diﬀerences in
the empirical results are due to cross-study heterogeneities in estimation methods and sample
periods.
Ehrmann et al. (2003) question the usefulness of the BankScope database given its well-
known large sample bias. They therefore test for the existence of a bank lending eﬀect of
monetary policy by using microeconomic data compiled by national central banks. Ehrmann
et al. (2003) empirically account for the response of bank lending growth to changes in bank
lending demand and monetary policy by estimating dynamic panel models, using bank-speciﬁc
bank asset size, liquidity, and capitalization as loan supply proxy variables and macroeconomic
measures of economic activity as loan demand variables. The evidence points to the trans-
mission of monetary policy shocks through bank lending. However, cross-bank diﬀerences in
the reaction of bank lending to monetary policy changes are only attributable to diﬀerences
in liquidity and not to dissimilarities in asset size and capitalization. As regards loan demand
factors, bank lending is found to respond to inﬂation, but not to output growth.
Worms (2003) presents a study closely related in terms of structure to that of Ehrmann
et al. (2003). In line with the earlier study, Worms (2003) uses bank liquidity and bank
capitalization next to bank asset size to test for the operation of a credit channel in Germany.
Using a dynamic panel estimation methodology, the evidence largely conﬁrms the results in
Ehrmann et al. (2003). Bank lending is found to be more sensitive to changes in monetary
policy, the less liquid and capitalized a bank is. Bank size per se only captures cross-bank
diﬀerences in the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy when the analysis controls for
9See Angeloni, Kashyap, and Mojon (2003) for a compilation of microeconomic studies that document
the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy in European countries. Also see section 2.4.2 for a review of the
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short-term interbank deposits. Interestingly, the results strengthen if the smallest banks
are excluded from the analysis. Worms (2003) attributes this result to the pronounced
dependence of small banks on interbank liquidity. Very small banks are argued to hold more
short-term interbank deposits to avoid discontinuous and accelerated shifts in their loan
portfolio in general and in their lending to private debtors in particular. In that respect,
short-term interbank deposits are seen as means to maintain close housebank relationships
with bank customers especially in the presence of adverse monetary policy shocks. Finally,
Worms (2003) documents a positive response of bank lending growth to an increase in real
output and hence bank credit demand.
To summarize, existing studies report ambiguous results regarding the bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy in Germany. The ambiguity prevails for micro- as well as for macroeconomic
analyses. Furthermore, existing empirical studies diﬀer in the cross-sectional dimension of
the estimations. Some studies only exploit a single data dimension and divide the banking
sample by either bank size, bank liquidity, or bank capitalization. Other studies also split
the sample along a second dimension, using the maturity of bank credit, the banking group,
or the group of debtors as additional model criterion. Among the existing studies, only
Worms (2003) controls for a possible industry bias in bank lending. However, he models the
interdependence between loan supply and industry indirectly by including a weighed average
of real sectoral output as measure of bank credit demand. The resulting estimates do not
allow for inferences as to the industry-speciﬁc eﬀects of bank lending and as to the response
of bank lending to industry-speciﬁc changes in bank credit demand.
A common caveat applies to the existing empirical studies. When identifying the bank
lending eﬀects of monetary policy, the empirical literature does not control for the observation
that the identiﬁcation of the bank credit supply eﬀects is not only complicated by possible
heterogeneities in bank credit demand and in the response of bank lending to changes in bank
credit demand, but also by the balance sheet eﬀects of monetary policy. The complication
arises because balance sheet eﬀects cause the volume of bank lending to be simultaneously
determined by bank credit supply and bank credit demand side eﬀects. The supply side
eﬀects are at the core of the credit channel theory of monetary policy transmission. This
theory argues that the balance sheet (net worth) position of potential borrowers such as ﬁrms
inﬂuences the credit supply decisions of banks. For example, bank credit supply is predicted
to decline in response to a monetary contraction given the associated deterioration in the
balance sheet position of ﬁrms (cf. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989).10
In contrast to bank credit supply, a monetary-policy-induced decline in net worth has an
ambiguous eﬀect on bank credit demand: it may expand or contract. On the one hand, ﬁrms
may demand more bank credit in order to be able to ﬁnance ﬁxed and inventory investment
and to preserve liquidity. On the other hand, ﬁrms may not change or even reduce bank credit
10Also see Trautwein (2000) and chapter 2 for a literature review on the balance sheet eﬀects of monetary
policy and on the relationship between a ﬁrm’s balance sheet position and its access to bank credit.128 Chapter 5
demand in the wake of a monetary contraction. This response requires ﬁrms to be swift in
adjusting production to the monetary-policy-induced decline in output demand so as to reduce
the variable costs of production and to avoid the costs associated with undesired inventory
accumulation. In addition, bank credit demand may decline when ﬁrms delay physical capital
investment in anticipation of lower future interest rates.
Overall, the balance sheet eﬀect of monetary policy causes bank credit supply to contract,
while bank credit demand may expand or contract. Unfortunately, we can only stress this
caveat. Similar to existing studies, the present analysis cannot identify the balance sheet
eﬀects on bank credit supply or bank credit demand. However, this shortcoming is not
expected to aﬀect our conclusions regarding the bank supply eﬀects of monetary policy given
that existing empirical research lends no or weak support to the existence of balance sheet
eﬀects of monetary policy in Germany. Evidence against the existence of balance sheet eﬀects
is provided by Siegfried (2000), Mojon, Smets, and Vermeulen (2002), Chatelain et al. (2003),
and Arnold and Vrugt (2004). Von Kalckreuth (2003) reports supportive evidence. However,
the balance sheet eﬀect of monetary policy is small and attributable to ﬁrm creditworthiness
rather than to ﬁrm size. The relative unimportance of ﬁrm size eﬀects is explained with
tight housebank relationships, which mitigate the severity of the link between ﬁrm size and
ﬁnancial constraints.
5.3 Banks and Industries in Germany: An Overview
In order to provide the framework for the subsequent discussion, this section describes the
German banking system.11 To this end, we compile quarterly data from the monthly bank
balance sheet statistics and the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank for
the period 1992:1-2002:4. Section 5.5 and annex 5A describe the data in detail. We are
speciﬁcally interested in the balance sheet structure of the main banking groups and in the
industry structure of bank credit portfolios.
Throughout this study, we emphasize the industry distribution of aggregate and short-term
bank credit. The focus on short-term lending is motivated by existing studies that point
to an immediate response of short- rather than long-term lending to changes in monetary
policy (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1993a; Kakes and Sturm, 2002). Short-term loans are also
likely to respond more (i) to cyclical ﬂuctuations in bank credit demand factors like industry
output and prices and (ii) to changes in monetary policy since they are renewed at shorter
intervals than long-term loans. The importance of short-term credit can be explained in
terms of expectations. If ﬁrms belief that output growth, inﬂation, and interest rates are
mean-stationary, they will expect an increase in inﬂation or interest rates and a decline in
output growth today to be followed by an opposite movement tomorrow. Firms therefore also
11Refer to Hackethal (2004) for an extensive discussion of the properties of the German banking sector.5.3 Banks and Industries in Germany: An Overview 129
expect real income and hence internal funds of ﬁnance to follow a predictable mean-stationary
long-term growth path. As a consequence, they are more likely to cushion temporary changes
in internal funds with short- rather than medium- or long-term external credit.12 As regards
an increase in interest rates, short-term lending may also increase because ﬁrms shorten the
maturity of debt in anticipation of lower future interest rates.
Besides these considerations, we also focus on short-term lending because long-term credit
is determined by factors that cannot easily be constructed given the available information.
For example, long-term ﬁnancing needs depend on strategic considerations and expectations
regarding future changes in industry activity and prices. Because data on expected output and
prices are unavailable at a low level of industry aggregation, we cannot estimate our empirical
model for long-term lending without incurring the risk of reporting biased and inconsistent
estimates due to an omitted variable bias. Surely, the omitted variable bias may also aﬀect the
results of the model with aggregate lending, where aggregate lending is computed as the sum
of short-, medium-, and long-term bank credit. The evidence for aggregate lending should
therefore be viewed as reference point to judge the plausibility of the results for short-term
lending.
5.3.1 The Structure of the German Banking Sector
The ﬁnancing system in Germany is a bank-based system, with banks being the most import-
ant source of external ﬁnance. The banking system can be divided into two main categories:
universal banks and specialized banks. At the end of 2003, the German banking sector con-
sisted of 2,466 banks of which 2,255 were universal and 211 were special. The German
banking system is hence a universal banking system. Given this property, the present analysis
disregards specialized banks and focuses on the three main universal banking groups, i.e., the
savings, cooperative, and commercial banking sector.
Each of the main banking groups can be divided into two tiers. The ﬁrst tier consists of few
large institutions, which are the Land banks, cooperative central banks, and the big banks for
the savings, credit cooperative, and commercial banking sector, respectively. These banks are
subsequently referred to as ’head’ institutions. The second tier is composed of many primary
institutions: local savings banks in the savings banking sector, credit cooperatives in the
cooperative banking sector, and regional and private banks in the commercial banking sector.
Commercial banks and the head institutions of the savings and credit cooperative sector op-
erate product portfolios that diﬀer from those of the primary savings and credit cooperative
banks. The head institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking sector are the
central bank to the corresponding primary (local) banks and oﬀer universal banking services
to larger foreign and domestic banks and to non-bank customers (cf. Hackethal, 2004). Par-
12See Kakes and Sturm (2002) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) for the eﬀect of interest rate changes
on the demand for short-term ﬁnance.130 Chapter 5
ticular to the head institutions of the savings banking group is their role in providing services
to the government of the state in which they are located. Considering commercial banks,
they structure their product portfolio around investment and wholesale banking activities,
predominantly serving large rather than small- and medium-sized clients.
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for the head and primary institutions regarding the
distribution of total assets, bank capitalization, liquidity, short-term interbank claims, and
non-bank lending.13 As is evident for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4, the structural diﬀer-
ences between the head and primary institutions are reﬂected in the descriptive statistics of
the bank balance sheet variables. Primary institutions are on average better capitalized than
their respective head institutions even though they are smaller. Besides, local savings banks
and regional and private commercial banks tend to be more liquid than Land banks and big
banks, while the primary institutions of the cooperative banking sector are on average less
liquid than their central institutions. Regardless of the banking group, a comparatively large
share of liquidity is accounted for by short-term interbank claims. With the exception of
regional and private commercial banks, primary institutions hold a larger share of interbank
claims than their respective head institutions.
Considering the distribution of lending to non-banks14, the primary institutions in each bank-
ing sector lend on average more to non-banks than the respective head institutions. The
diﬀerence is particularly pronounced for the credit cooperative sector: lending by central in-
stitutes accounts on average for 17 percent of total assets, while the corresponding number
for credit cooperatives is 60 percent. The central institutions’ low involvement in non-bank
lending is attributable to their main role as central bank to the primary credit cooperatives.
In this function, they act as clearing institutions for interbank transfers between credit coop-
eratives and assist primary credit cooperatives in accessing ﬁnancial markets and in serving
their customers.15
As regards the share of industry bank credit to non-bank credit, the primary and head insti-
tutions of the commercial or savings banking group do not diﬀer in the degree of industry
lending. A comparatively large share of aggregate non-bank lending is allocated towards
industries (i.e., businesses and self-employed), exceeding 50 percent and 40 percent of total
non-bank lending for the commercial and savings banking group, respectively. Pronounced
diﬀerences again prevail between the primary and head institutions of the credit cooperative
sector: industry lending by central credit institutes and primary credit cooperatives accounts
13As regards local savings banks, the descriptive statistics refer to public savings banks only. The present
study excludes private savings banks since they operate under a diﬀerent institutional setup. The existence
of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the balance sheet structure of public and private savings banks is conﬁrmed by
the test statistics of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) for almost all sampled balance sheet items. The
ANOVA test statistics are available on request.
14Non-bank lending involves bank credit supply to domestic businesses, private households, government,
and foreign non-banks.
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Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Bank Balance Sheet Variables, 1992:1-2002:4
N Mean Stdev Skewness Kurtosis
1. Assets
Commercial BG
• Big B. 144 19.98 0.44 -0.29 1.90
• Regional, Private B. 6,475 14.25 1.80 0.28 3.02
Savings BG
• Land B. 571 18.74 1.02 -1.84 10.11
• Savings B. 25,200 14.69 0.94 0.06 3.02
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 152 18.36 0.77 0.73 2.42
• Cooperative B. 96,785 12.63 1.06 0.41 3.32
Aggregate BG 128,604 13.12 1.40 0.61 3.58
2. Capitalization
Commercial BG
• Big B. 148 0.06 0.01 0.28 1.81
• Regional, Private B. 6,770 0.08 0.04 1.43 5.05
Savings BG
• Land B. 592 0.03 0.01 0.55 2.88
• Savings B. 25,800 0.04 0.01 0.37 3.12
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.03 0.01 0.50 3.66
• Cooperative B. 101,360 0.05 0.01 0.71 4.09
Aggregate BG 133,673 0.05 0.02 4.46 40.27
3. Liquidity
Commercial BG
• Big B. 148 0.20 0.04 0.51 2.53
• Regional, Private B. 7,433 0.29 0.18 0.84 3.70
Savings BG
• Land B. 592 0.23 0.07 0.22 2.27
• Savings B. 26,552 0.32 0.10 0.84 3.78
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.36 0.08 0.41 2.52
• Cooperative B. 101,831 0.28 0.10 0.72 3.76
Aggregate BG 135,829 0.29 0.11 0.79 4.54
4. Short-Term Interbank Claims
Commercial BG
• Big B. 148 0.03 0.01 0.26 2.43
• Regional, Private B. 6,817 0.06 0.07 1.41 5.06
Savings BG
• Land B. 592 0.06 0.05 1.75 7.42
• Savings B. 25,851 0.03 0.04 1.77 7.02
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.12 0.08 0.55 2.59
• Cooperative B. 101,183 0.05 0.05 1.72 7.02
Aggregate BG 133,158 0.05 0.05 1.66 6.40
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N Mean Stdev Skewness Kurtosis
5. Lending to Non-Banks
Commercial BG
• Big B. 131 0.50 0.11 -0.95 3.40
• Regional, Private B. 3,395 0.55 0.20 -0.34 2.74
Savings BG
• Land B. 568 0.40 0.09 -0.44 3.65
• Savings B. 20,386 0.61 0.10 -1.34 5.24
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.17 0.07 -0.20 1.74
• Cooperative B. 91,683 0.60 0.11 -0.70 3.40
Aggregate BG 115,595 0.60 0.11 -0.85 4.09
6. Total Credit to Industries
Commercial BG
• Big B. 131 0.58 0.08 -0.68 3.12
• Regional, Private B. 3,043 0.54 0.25 -0.56 2.19
Savings BG
• Land B. 568 0.45 0.09 -0.19 2.92
• Savings B. 20,350 0.45 0.08 -0.28 3.42
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.65 0.16 -0.65 2.21
• Cooperative B. 91,309 0.46 0.13 -0.28 4.07
Aggregate BG 114,833 0.46 0.12 -0.19 4.44
7. Short-Term Credit to Industries
Commercial BG
• Big B. 131 0.40 0.10 -1.69 5.14
• Regional, Private B. 3,036 0.54 0.26 0.13 2.02
Savings BG
• Land B. 568 0.16 0.09 5.40 48.64
• Savings B. 20,342 0.22 0.06 1.14 8.20
Cooperative BG
• Central Institutes 156 0.33 0.09 0.65 4.93
• Cooperative B. 91,031 0.26 0.08 0.63 5.22
Aggregate BG 114,540 0.26 0.10 2.53 16.53
Notes: Assets (panel 1) are expressed in logarithm. The balance sheet positions capi-
talization (panel 2), liquidity (panel 3), interbank claims (panel 4), and total lending to
non-banks (panel 5) are expressed as share of total assets. Lending to non-banks includes
lending to domestic businesses, private households, government, and foreign non-banks.
Lending to industries combines bank credit supply to businesses and self-employed. Ag-
gregate lending to industries (panel 6) is expressed as share of total non-bank lending.
Short-term lending to industries (panel 7) is expressed as share of aggregate lending
to industries. The descriptive statistics for savings banks are for public rather than for
private savings banks. The aggregate banking group only consists of the primary institu-
tions of the commercial, savings, and cooperative banking group. N refers to the number
of bank-quarter observations. The quarterly data are computed from the monthly bank
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on average for approximately two-third and four-ninth of total non-bank lending, respectively.
Considering the share of short-term lending to total lending, we ﬁnd considerable diﬀerences
between the head and primary institutions for all banking groups. Except for the credit co-
operative sector, head institutions provide on average less short-term ﬁnance than primary
banks.
The entries in Table 5.1 also demonstrate that there are not only diﬀerences in the balance
sheet structure within each banking group, but also between banking groups. These diﬀer-
ences are expected to aﬀect the conclusions regarding the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy for individual banking groups. For example, banks belonging to banking groups with a
relatively large amount of liquid assets (group i) might be better able to insulate their lending
activities from monetary policy changes than banks in banking groups with only few liquid
assets (group j). If this holds, cross-bank diﬀerences in liquidity will be a less important
source of the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy in group i than in group j. This in
turn suggests that banking group diﬀerences in liquidity may aﬀect conclusions regarding the
strength of the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy.
Because they constitute the focal point of the present empirical analysis, we conﬁne the
comparison to the primary institutions of the banking groups. As is evident from Table 5.1,
the largest and most liquid banks operate in the savings banking sector, while the smallest
and least liquid banks belong to the group of credit cooperatives. The regional and private
banks in the commercial banking sector report the largest share of bank capital, exceeding
that of savings and cooperative banks by more than 90 and 60 percent, respectively. The
descriptive analysis also shows that each banking group reports a high share of non-bank
lending to total assets. Whereas the primary institutions of the credit cooperative and savings
banking sector report on average comparable shares of non-bank lending to total assets, the
corresponding share tends to be lower for the commercial banking group. This reﬂects the
greater involvement of commercial banks in lending to banks.16
However, when looking at the share of total industry lending to non-bank lending, the primary
institutions of the commercial banking sector lend on average more to industries than savings
banks and credit cooperatives. The descriptive evidence suggests that the diﬀerence in the
average share of total industry lending reﬂects considerable diﬀerences in the role of banking
groups as source of short-term ﬁnance to industries. Regional and private commercial banks
tend to be more heavily engaged in short-term ﬁnance than credit cooperatives or savings
banks. In fact, short-term lending to industries as share of total industry lending is approxi-
mately twice as large for commercial banks than for credit cooperatives and savings banks.
The apparent weak role of savings banks and credit cooperatives as source of short-term ﬁ-
nance is attributable to their practice of conﬁning business to local areas. Superior knowledge
of local market conditions facilitates assessments regarding the long-term creditworthiness of
16For 1992:1-2002:4, the share of bank lending to total assets was on average equal to 34 percent, 13
percent, and 8 percent for commercial, credit cooperative, and savings banks, respectively.134 Chapter 5
debtors, and this yields a comparative advantage in long-term lending.
In order to ascertain the statistical signiﬁcance of cross-banking group diﬀerences in the bal-
ance sheet structure, we analyze the variance properties of the bank characteristics by means
of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Table 5.2 reports the ANOVA test statistics
for asset size, liquidity, capitalization, short-term interbank claims, and the volume of bank
credit. Panel A contains the results for the three main banking groups, i.e., commercial, sav-
ings, and credit cooperative banks and panel B summarizes the evidence for six sub-groups of
the credit cooperative banking group. Using the classiﬁcation scheme of the Deutsche Bun-
desbank, the credit cooperative sub-groups are commercial cooperatives, rural cooperatives,
Raiﬀeisen banks, Sparda banks, PSD banks (Post-, Spar-und Darlehensvereine), and civil
servants banks. We deem this distinction necessary to control for banking group diﬀerences
in the balance sheet structure and for diﬀerences in the type of customer.
A comparison of the mean squared values in Table 5.2 illustrates that the hypothesis of equal
means can be rejected for all bank characteristics and for each banking group sample. The
evidence thus points to statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the balance sheet structure of
banking groups. This in turn suggests that conclusions regarding the bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy changes might be sensitive to the choice of banking group. To control for
this possibility, we will therefore estimate industry-speciﬁc bank lending functions by explicitly
allowing for individual ’sub-group’ eﬀects.
5.3.2 The Industry Structure of Bank Loan Portfolios
So far, the description of the structure of the German banking sector is conﬁned to the
distribution of lending to the grand total of industries. This section extends the analysis in
that it stresses the industry structure of bank credit portfolios. Table 5.3 reports lending to
industry i in total lending by banking group for eight industries at the one-digit industry level
(main industries) and for nine industries at the two-digit industry level (manufacturing sub-
sectors). Given the focus of the present chapter, we only stress the distribution of aggregate
and short-term lending as provided by commercial banks (big banks, regional, and private
banks) and by the primary institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking group.
We express aggregate and short-term lending to industry i as share of, respectively, aggregate
and short-term lending to the grand total of industries. Because the industry distribution of
aggregate and short-term credit is largely comparable, we provide a general discussion.
The statistics in Table 5.3 point to cross-industry diﬀerences in the distribution of bank credit.
Banks predominantly lend to those industries that account for the largest share of output in
the aggregate economy: the service, wholesale and retail trade, and manufacturing industry.
Cooperative, savings, and commercial banks hold on average, respectively, 69 percent, 81
percent, and 89 percent of their bank loan portfolio with these sectors.17 As regards the
17The data suggest that approximately half of these shares is accounted for by lending to the service sector.5.3 Banks and Industries in Germany: An Overview 135
Table 5.2: One-Way ANOVA of Bank Balance Sheet Variables, 1992:1-2002:4
Variable Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Value
Panel A: Main Banking Groups
Assets Between Groups 97,209 2 48,604 39,429∗
Within Groups 158,911 128,913 1.23
Capitalization Between Groups 7.10 2 3.53 19,356∗
Within Groups 24.46 133,982 0.000
Liquidity Between Groups 29.96 2 14.98 1,350∗
Within Groups 1,510 136,138 0.011
Short-Term Interbank Claims Between Groups 6.25 2 3.12 1,290∗
Within Groups 323 133,467 0.002
Lending to Non-Banks Between Groups 12.15 2 6.08 491∗
Within Groups 1,431 115,592 0.012
Total Credit to Industries Between Groups 20.52 2 10.26 676∗
Within Groups 1,744 114,830 0.015
Short-Term Credit to Industries Between Groups 99.81 2 49.90 13,897∗
Within Groups 411 114,537 0.004
Panel B: Cooperative Banking Groups
Assets Between Groups 48,626 5 9,725 15,512∗
Within Groups 60,673 96,775 0.627
Capitalization Between Groups 0.24 5 0.047 493∗
Within Groups 9.66 100,942 0.000
Liquidity Between Groups 34.20 5 6.84 713∗
Within Groups 975 101,683 0.010
Short-Term Interbank Claims Between Groups 4.06 5 0.811 320∗
Within Groups 254 100,329 0.003
Lending to Non-Banks Between Groups 31.35 5 6.27 546∗
Within Groups 1,053 91,677 0.011
Total Credit to Industries Between Groups 416 5 83.30 7,491∗
Within Groups 1,015 91,303 0.011
Short-Term Credit to Industries Between Groups 42.39 5 8.28 3,457∗
Within Groups 218 91,025 0.002
Note 1: SS = sum of squares, DF = degrees of freedom, MS = mean squares (i.e., SSSource divided
by DFSource), and F-value = F-statistic (i.e., MSbetween divided by MSwithin). Diﬀerences between
the MS- and F-statistics in the table and the MS- and F-statistics determined in calculations with
the reported SS-statistics and the degrees of freedom are due to rounding. Note 2: ∗ denotes the
statistical signiﬁcance at the one percent level. Note 3: The degrees of freedom related to the
within groups variation refer to bank-quarter observations. Note 4: Assets are expressed in logarithm.
Total and short-term credit to industries are expressed as share of non-bank lending. The remaining
variables are expressed in terms of total assets. Note 5: The main banking groups are the commercial
banking group and the primary institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking sector.
The cooperative banking group comprises commercial and rural credit cooperatives, Raiﬀeisen banks,
Sparda and PSD banks, and civil servants banks. Note 6: The quarterly data are computed from the
monthly bank balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.136 Chapter 5
remaining main industries, the volume of bank credit tends to be more evenly distributed
across sectors. Agriculture and construction primarily obtain bank ﬁnance from the credit
cooperative banking group, with rural credit cooperatives and Raiﬀeisen banks being the
primary source of bank ﬁnance.18 The importance of credit cooperatives for agriculture and
construction reﬂects the regional character of (i) credit cooperatives and (ii) agricultural
and constructing ﬁrms: lenders and borrowers conﬁne their activities to a particular local
area. In adopting a regional focus, credit cooperatives have superior knowledge of local
market conditions, which facilitates assessments regarding local economic prospects and the
creditworthiness of potential debtors.
The share of bank credit is on average smallest for the ﬁnance and insurance industry. One
possible explanation of this relationship is the large operating surplus in the ﬁnance sector that
reduces the need for external ﬁnance in general and bank ﬁnance in particular.19 Next to the
ﬁnance industry, the energy sector also receives comparatively little credit from commercial
banks and from the primary institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking group.
Although not reported in Table 5.3, the Land banks are an important source of ﬁnance to the
energy sector. For the period 1992:1-2002:4, 12 percent of total lending by Land banks was
directed towards the energy sector, with short- and long-term bank credit accounting for 28
and 60 percent, respectively. The importance of Land banks as source of long-term ﬁnance
to the energy sector is attributable to the components of this sector: mining and quarrying;
electricity, gas, and water supply. Given the importance of each of these sub-sectors for the
functioning of the economy, general interest is with the maintenance and improvement of the
underlying infrastructures. Maintenance requires large ﬁxed expenditures, while infrastructure
investment involves costs that tend to be sunk. In order to encourage investment, Land banks
grant favorable access to especially long-term ﬁnance even though investment per se might
not be proﬁtable.
While lending to the service sector is certainly substantial, no clear conclusions prevail as to the sector’s
absolute importance as recipient of bank lending. The reason is that the borrower statistics of the Deutsche
Bundesbank report bank lending to the service sector as residual of bank lending to the remaining industries.
For the remainder of this chapter, this shortcoming should be kept in mind when interpreting the empirical
evidence for the service sector.
18Raiﬀeisen banks and rural credit cooperatives grant 26 (19) percent and 16 (12) percent of aggregate
(short-term) credit to agriculture, respectively. In comparison, the corresponding number for commercial
credit cooperatives is 6 (5) percent. The cross-banking group diﬀerences are less pronounced for lending
to the construction industry. Raiﬀeisen banks, rural credit cooperatives, and commercial credit cooperatives
hold 14 (19) percent, 12 (16) percent, and 12 (15) percent of aggregate (short-term) loans with construction,
respectively.
19For the time period 1992:1-2002:4, the share of operating surplus to value added equals 51 percent with
a standard deviation of 2.30 percent for the ﬁnance and insurance sector (own computation using the OECD’s
STAN database for Industrial Analysis). In comparison, operating surplus accounts for at most 31 percent of






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Turning to the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry, lending to each of the sectors only
accounts for a small share of total bank credit, with the share of bank credit to each sector
being positively related to its size in the aggregate economy. Lending to the manufacturing
sub-sectors hence tends to be unevenly distributed. The share of bank credit is compara-
tively small for the coke and chemicals, rubber and plastic, and non-metallic mineral goods
producing sector. However, it is relatively large for the wood and paper, machinery and
transport equipment, food, and metals producing sector. In fact, lending to these sectors is
of approximately the same magnitude as lending to the ﬁnance and transport sector.
5.3.3 Industry Determinants of Bank Lending
Motivated by the cross-industry diﬀerences in the distribution of bank credit supply, this
section discusses possible determinants of industry-speciﬁc bank lending related to struc-
tural properties of industries. Industry-speciﬁc cyclical determinants of bank lending will be
discussed in section 5.6. We identify possible structural determinants of bank lending by
determining the degree of correlation between the share of bank credit to industry i and
either ﬁrm size distribution, openness to trade, a measure of internal funds of ﬁnance, and
proxy variables of capital intensity.20 In order to avoid that the correlation coeﬃcients are
confounded by scale eﬀects, the degree of correlation is determined for the ratio of lending
to industry i over lending to the grand total of industries.
Capital intensity is included to control for the view that the need for external ﬁnance increases
with the capital intensity of production. External ﬁnancial funds are required to meet the
costs associated with replacing depreciated capital, adjusting existing capital, or installing new
capital. The costs of ﬁnance are hereby heavily dependent on the monetary policy stance
through its eﬀect on the opportunity cost of capital investment. This link is emphasized by
the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission.21 The literature on industry eﬀects
of monetary policy favors several measures of capital intensity.22 We use industry-speciﬁc
capital intensity measures which appear to be time-invariant and hence robust to cyclical
ﬂuctuations: the ratio of the capital stock to employment and the ratio of employment to
real value added in industry i.23
W ei n c l u d eﬁ r ms i z et ot e s tf o rap o s s i b l ei n v e r s er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nﬁ r ms i z ea n dt h en e e d
for bank ﬁnance. The Deutsche Bundesbank (2000) uses bank ﬁnance needs as synonym for
20We also test whether the relative importance (i.e., size) of industries in an economy aﬀects the industry
composition of a bank’s credit portfolio. Since the conclusions are confounded by a scale eﬀect for absolute
as well as for relative measures of industry size, they are not reported.
21See Kashyap and Stein (1995), Mojon (2001), and Kuttner and Mosser (2002).
22See Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000), Peersman and Smets (2005), and Dedola and Lippi (2005).
23We also use the ratio of the stock of capital over output as proxy variable of capital intensity. Because
the results are qualitatively the same as those for the ratio of the stock of capital over employment, we do
not report the corresponding evidence.5.3 Banks and Industries in Germany: An Overview 141
bank dependence and explains the negative relationship between the demand for bank ﬁnance
and ﬁrm size by stressing the transaction costs and information asymmetries associated with
bond-based ﬁnancing. Transaction costs such as brokerage and underwriting fees are largely
independent of the amount of bonds issued and thus render only large amounts of bond issues
feasible from a ﬁnancial point of view. Information asymmetries arise between the issuer and
potential holder of bonds. In order to mitigate asymmetric information problems, suﬃcient
information on the bond issuing company needs to be easily available. Because large ﬁrms
are subject to more stringent regulation, disclosure rules, and reporting standards than small
ﬁrms, such information is more freely disseminated for large than for small companies and the
degree of information asymmetries hence decreases with the size of ﬁrms. As a consequence,
the ability to substitute bonds for bank lending increases with ﬁrm size and the degree of
bank dependence diminishes with ﬁrm size.24 These relationships cause business size to be
usually associated with the credit channel of monetary policy.
In Germany, the diﬀerence in the relative importance of bonds and bank credit as source
of external ﬁnance also rests on relationship banking and the corresponding notion of banks
being the housebank to especially small ﬁrms.25 The housebank principle facilitates the ﬂow
of information between creditors and debtors, establishes conﬁdence, and reduces asymmetric
information problems. Tight bank-ﬁrm relationships leave banks therefore with a comparative
advantage regarding risk assessment, monitoring, and information asymmetries and lower the
costs of bank-ﬁnance relative to non-bank ﬁnance.26 Because bank-ﬁrm relationships are
particularly strong for small ﬁrms, we hypothesize that banks lend more to industries with a
large share of small ﬁrms. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the share of small ﬁrms in
industry i to approximate the distribution of ﬁrm size.
Besides ﬁrm size distribution, we approximate the need for external ﬁnance by including the
industry-speciﬁc ratio of operating surplus over value added as proxy variable of internal funds
of ﬁnance or working capital.27 Credit market imperfections cause the expected relationship
between internal funds of ﬁnance and bank credit to be negative. The underlying argument
is similar to that of the balance sheet eﬀect in section 5.2 and predicts a mismatch between
credit demand and credit supply.
Finally, we include openness to trade in order to determine the extent to which industry-
24Also see Deutsche Bundesbank (1998a, 2002a) and Elsas and Krahnen (2004) for a discussion of the
bank dependence of small- and medium-sized companies.
25See Berger and Udell (1998, 2002) and the references therein for a discussion of the relationship between
ﬁrm size and relationship lending.
26Harhoﬀ and K¨ orting (1998) report empirical evidence that lends support to the importance of housebank
relations and relationship lending in Germany. Especially small ﬁrms are suggested to maintain long-term
relationships with a bank.
27An alternative and more direct measure of internal ﬁnance is cash ﬂow. However, because industry-
speciﬁc information on cash ﬂow or the components thereof (earnings, interest payments, taxes, dividend
payments, depreciation) is unavailable, we use operating surplus as a simple measure.142 Chapter 5
speciﬁc exposure to trade and exchange rate ﬂuctuations aﬀect bank credit demand. Whether
bank lending to open industries responds more or less to changes in bank credit demand factors
like industry production and industry price depends on the argumentation. On the one hand,
open industries may not adjust loan demand in response to output growth or inﬂation as
much as closed industries if cyclical changes in product demand abroad and at home are
not synchronous but occurring at a periodic lag. This smoothes cash ﬂow and therefore
the cyclical demand for bank credit. On the other hand, lending to open industries might
be more sensitive to changes in domestic output and inﬂation when domestic and foreign
business cycles are dis-concordant and when real exchange rate developments cause adverse
developments in international competitiveness.
Table 5.4 reports the degree of correlation between short-term lending and structural industry
characteristics for the period 1992-2002.28 The results for aggregate lending are not reported
because they do not diﬀer qualitatively from those for short-term lending. In order to match
the frequency of bank-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc data, the quarterly bank-level data are
expressed in annual terms. Furthermore, the microeconomic data are aggregated over all
banks in order to avoid that the signiﬁcance properties of the correlation coeﬃcients are driven
by the number of observations. The correlation coeﬃcients are computed for seven industries
at the one-digit industry level and for nine sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry.29 Similar
to the analysis in chapter 4 and 6, data on industry characteristics are obtained from the
New Cronos database of Eurostat and from the STAN database for Industrial Analysis of
the OECD. The ﬁrm size data refer to the size class of 1 to 19 employees; a size category
which corresponds to the deﬁnition of small ﬁrm size (cf. Loveman and Sengenberger, 1991;
Henrekson and Johansson, 1999). The bank lending data are compiled from the quarterly
borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The degree of correlation between industry
characteristics and bank lending is computed for the variables’ ratio of industry i to the grand
total of industries for the aggregate banking group, the sub-groups of the credit cooperative
banking sector, and for commercial and savings banks.30
Considering the relationship between the relative degree of capital intensity of industry pro-
duction and the share of bank credit, banks lend comparatively less to capital-intensive in-
dustries. This ﬁnding is robust to the choice of capital intensity measure and is particularly
strong for the sub-groups of the credit cooperative sector. The negative link between relative
capital intensity and the relative share of bank lending is counterintuitive if one considers the
costs of physical capital investment, which ask for substantial ﬁnancial means. The Deutsche
Bundesbank (1996) suggests that the inverse relationship between the volume of bank lending
and capital intensity is due to credit rationing to capital-intensive industries on the part of
28Because of data availability constraints, the ﬁrm size correlation coeﬃcients are constructed for the period
1999-2000.
29The aggregate manufacturing sector is excluded given that the manufacturing sub-sectors are included.
30The conclusions are robust to the deﬁnition of industry characteristics. That is, they do not change when
the industry characteristics are expressed in absolute rather than in relative terms.5.3 Banks and Industries in Germany: An Overview 143
Table 5.4: Correlation between Industry-Speciﬁc Bank Lending and Industry Characteristics,
Short-Term Bank Lending
Agg. BG Comm. BG Savings BG Comm. CC Rural CC Raiﬀeisen BG
Empl’t/Output 0.14∗∗∗ 0.03 0.23∗ 0.25∗ 0.40∗ 0.55∗
Capital/Empl’t -0.25∗ -0.17∗∗ -0.34∗ -0.35∗ -0.36∗ -0.34∗
Firm Size 0.27 0.15 0.38 0.40 0.43 0.47
Openness 0.04 0.07 0.004 0.02 -0.06 -0.15∗∗∗
Op. Surplus -0.06 -0.08∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.05 0.03 0.12
Notes: Short-term lending to industry i is the cumulative sum of bank-speciﬁc lending and expressed
as share of short-term lending to the grand total of industries. The coeﬃcients are derived from annual
data for all sampled industries except for total manufacturing. The sample period is 1999-2000 for
ﬁrm size and 1992-2002 for the remaining variables. Empl’t/Output = employment over real value
added; Capital/Empl’t = physical capital over employment; Openness = exports and imports over
value added; Op. Surplus = operating surplus over value added. Because of missing values along the
time and cross-section dimension, the number of observations tends to be lower than 176 (11 years
times 16 industries). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten percent
level, respectively. Own computations using the New Cronos database, the OECD’s STAN database
for Industrial Analysis, and the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
banks. Capital rationing arises because lending to capital-intensive industries is considered
to be characterized by higher probabilities of loan losses than lending to capital-extensive
industries.
As regards the evidence for ﬁrm size, the correlation coeﬃcients have the expected positive
sign, which points to an inverse relationship between ﬁrm size and the share of bank credit.
According to the European Commission (2003), this reﬂects the greater need of relatively
small ﬁrms for working capital.31 Unfortunately, the correlation coeﬃcient is statistically
insigniﬁcant, which leaves the relationship indicative rather than aﬃrmative. We attribute the
insigniﬁcance to the small number of data points on ﬁrm size. Next to ﬁrm size, the correlation
coeﬃcients for operating surplus and openness also tend to be insigniﬁcant. The exception
concerns lending by Raiﬀeisen banks which grant relatively more credit to open industries
and lending by commercial banks which grant less credit to industries with relatively high
operating surplus. However, the poor signiﬁcance properties again cause these relationships
to be suggestive at best.
Overall, the correlation coeﬃcients provide ambiguous evidence as to the existence of a rela-
tionship between structural industry characteristics and the share of bank credit to individual
industries. Signiﬁcant relationships are conﬁned to the proxy variables of relative capital
intensity. Alternative industry characteristics do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the industry
composition of a bank’s credit portfolio. We will show in section 5.6 that industry eﬀects of
bank lending arise from cyclical factors related to industry output and industry prices.
31The descriptive evidence in European Commission (2003) illustrates that (small) businesses in manu-
facturing, transport and communication, and wholesale require more bank credit than (small) ﬁrms in other
sectors.144 Chapter 5
5.4 Empirical Model
The remainder of this chapter disregards structural industry characteristics and stresses
industry-speciﬁc cyclical determinants of bank credit demand as factors that have a strong
eﬀect on bank lending to industries. Besides cyclical credit demand factors, we will also
stress the role of monetary policy as determinant of industry-speciﬁc bank lending and test
for credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy via bank lending. We ask whether diﬀerences in
the bank lending eﬀects of credit demand and monetary policy are accounted for by industries
or by banking groups. The corresponding evidence allows for inferences as to the importance
of the industry structure of bank credit portfolios and the structure of the German banking
sector as determinants of monetary policy eﬀectiveness and industry performance through
the availability of industry-speciﬁc bank credit. Furthermore, we test whether conclusions are
robust to the choice of aggregate and short-term bank credit. The remainder of this section
presents the industry-speciﬁc bank lending functions and the methodological approach that
will be employed to identify the industry and banking group eﬀects of bank credit demand
and monetary policy.
5.4.1 Empirical Estimation Framework
In order to identify the response of industry-speciﬁc bank lending to changes in monetary
policy and industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand, we apply the dynamic panel estimation
framework of Ehrmann et al. (2003), Worms (2003), and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004).
Although we use the same structural estimation framework, the analysis adds to the existing
work by exploring the industry dimension of bank lending. Equation (5.1) describes the
empirical bank lending function for bank b and industry i.32
















γ5jXb,t−1ΔrM,t−j +  bi,t. (5.1)
The coeﬃcient αb is a bank-speciﬁc intercept that is included to allow for ﬁxed eﬀects across
banks and  bi,t is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and constant variance, i.e.,
N ∼ (0,σ 2).L bi,t denotes aggregate or short-term lending by bank b to industry i at time
t, with b = 1,...,Nb and t = 1,...,T. The autoregressive parameters βij are assumed to
be the same across banks, but heterogeneous across industries. Furthermore, they may diﬀer
32Also see section 5.6.4 and annex 5C for alternative speciﬁcations of the bank lending function. An
appealing alternative speciﬁcation of model (5.1) stacks bank lending by industry for all industries and captures
industry eﬀects with industry dummies. Given the large number of banks and industries, computational
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across banking groups. In order to control for cross-banking group diﬀerences, we estimate
the model for individual banking groups.
Δ is the ﬁrst log-diﬀerence operator of variable V deﬁned as Δ ≡ logVt − logVt−1.W i t h
the exception of the money market interest rate, the ﬁrst log-diﬀerence transformation is
applied to all variables. The money market interest rate enters in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Ehrmann
et al. (2003) motivate the ﬁrst-diﬀerence structure of the empirical model by stressing that
the monetary policy eﬀect on bank lending is conﬁned to new loans. They hence interpret
the ﬁrst log-diﬀerence of bank credit as ﬂow variable and introduce the level of loans as
stock variable. When suggesting this measure of new loans, Ehrmann et al. (2003) fail to
recognize that the ﬁrst diﬀerence is an imperfect measure of new bank loans since it reﬂects
the net eﬀect of new loan issues and loan repayments. Unfortunately, the present study can
only acknowledge this shortcoming, but cannot resolve it because of data unavailability. As
a consequence, reductions in the volume of loans outstanding may reﬂect a decline in new
loan issues or a net increase in loan repayments.
IPit approximates industry-speciﬁc output at time t, which serves as a measure of cyclically
determined industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand. Priceit denotes the industry-speciﬁc price at
time t and is included to capture cyclical ﬂuctuations in industry-speciﬁc price developments.33
These variables do not only determine the external ﬁnancing needs of industries, but also
inﬂuence the perceptions of banks as to the riskiness of industries. Monetary policy actions
are represented by the change in the three-months money market interest rate ΔrM.W e
assume that the interest rate is strictly exogenous to bank lending.34 In order to identify
the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy, the money market interest rate (rM,t−j) at time
t - ji si n t e r a c t e dw i t hb a n kc h a r a c t e r i s t i c s(Xb,t−1) at time t-1. The vector of bank-speciﬁc
characteristics Xb includes asset size (TA), liquidity (A), and capitalization (K) at time t-1.
Bank characteristics are introduced with one lag to avoid an endogeneity bias (cf. Kashyap
and Stein, 1995, 2000; Ehrmann et al., 2003; Worms, 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004).
Annex 5B contains a formal deﬁnition of the bank characteristics.
Worms (2003) and Ehrmann and Worms (2004) show that the tight relationship between
the primary and head institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking sector causes
bank asset size to be an inappropriate proxy variable of the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy. One explanation is that interbank operations enable small banks to shield their loan
portfolio and funding possibilities against monetary policy shocks by providing a relatively
unconstrained access to central bank money. In that sense, the interbank market helps to
redistribute liquidity within the banking sector from banks with excess liquidity to banks
in need of liquidity. This in turn moderates ﬁnancing constraints for small banks. As a
consequence, the interest rate sensitivity of small bank lending does not have to be higher
33Section 5.5 provides details regarding the deﬁnition of the industry production and price variable.
34See Worms (2003) for empirical evidence regarding the robustness of the interest rate response of bank
lending to the exogeneity assumption.146 Chapter 5
than that of large banks. Bank size might also be an inappropriate measure of information
asymmetries because savings banks as well as credit cooperatives back their funds with
mutual guarantees. This serves to recapitalize banks and creates a type of insurance scheme
for creditors in case of bank insolvency. The existence of these insurance schemes implies that
information asymmetries may not aﬀect the lending behavior of banks. Consequently, size
appears to be an inadequate variable to identify the loan supply eﬀects of monetary policy
and better measures might be bank capitalization or bank liquidity.
The present model employs a ’broad’ and ’narrow’ measure of bank liquidity. The main
diﬀerence concerns the way short-term interbank claims are treated. The ’broad’ measure of
liquidity includes short-term interbank claims and is deﬁned as the ratio of cash plus securities
plus short-term interbank claims over total bank assets. For this deﬁnition, possible signiﬁcant
relationships between bank liquidity and the monetary policy response of bank lending can
be driven by short-term interbank claims (cf. Worms, 2003 and Ehrmann and Worms, 2004).
In order to determine whether short-term interbank claims indeed drive liquidity eﬀects, we
follow Worms (2003) and split the broad measure of liquidity into two components: (i) a
’narrow’ part of liquidity deﬁned as the ratio of cash plus securities over total bank assets and
(ii) the share of short-term interbank claims to total assets. Both components are separately
included in estimations of model (5.1).35 The corresponding models will subsequently be
referred to as narrow liquidity and interbank speciﬁcations.
We summarize the bank lending eﬀects of changes in monetary policy and changes in bank
credit demand by computing the long-run elasticities of bank lending with respect to the
explanatory variables in model (5.1).36 The industry-speciﬁc long-run coeﬃcients αLR,i are
deﬁned as the sum of the lags of the variable in question divided by one minus the sum of




j=1 βij, where J=4.37 Since
the long-run coeﬃcients are a non-linear function of the estimated parameters, we derive the
corresponding standard errors by means of the delta method (cf. Rao, 1973; Greene, 2003).38
We hypothesize the long-run coeﬃcient estimates in model (5.1) to enter with the following
signs. Motivated by the negative eﬀects of higher interest rates on bank reserves, we expect
bank lending to decline in response to a monetary contraction. The distributional eﬀects of
monetary policy are anticipated to be such that the response of bank lending to monetary
policy changes is less pronounced for larger, more liquid, and better capitalized banks. This
35The subsequent analysis will thus report the results for a broad and narrow deﬁnition of liquidity and for
short-term interbank claims.
36We follow the existing literature when referring to long-run elasticities (e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank, 2002b;
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Worms, 2003; Ehrmann et al., 2003). An alternative and more intuitive
interpretation views the ’long-run’ coeﬃcient as the lasting response of bank lending growth to changes in
either bank credit demand or monetary policy.
37The properties of the residuals do not change with J=5.
38We only report the short-run coeﬃcient for the one-period lag of the normalized bank characteristics.
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holds if the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between each bank characteristic and the
interest rate is positive. Ambivalent conclusions prevail with respect to the expected eﬀect of
industry output growth on bank lending growth. On the one hand, good economic conditions
raise the number of investment projects with positive net present value and hence the demand
for bank ﬁnance. On the other hand, economic growth stimulates internal cash ﬂow, which
may reduce credit demand. Because evidence in favor of a negative relationship between
output and bank lending is hardly existing, the long-run coeﬃcient on output growth is
expected to be positive.39 Finally, industry inﬂation is anticipated to stimulate bank lending
growth. This relationship is attributable to the negative eﬀect of positive price changes on
real income and hence real cash ﬂow.40
The present analysis does not explicitly account for merger-driven changes in the German
banking system and hence does not control for the eﬀects of mergers on the individual
characteristics of the merging banks. The appropriateness of this approach is suggested by
Worms (2003) who ﬁnds the long-run bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy to be the
same for samples that do not control for mergers and for samples which treat a merged bank
as single bank for the pre- and post-merger sample period. Besides, implementation lags
between the time a merger is oﬃcially announced and the time a merger is legally realized
makes it diﬃcult to determine the date of a merger. For these reasons, we will eliminate
most merger eﬀects with the outlier detection procedure introduced in section 5.5.
5.4.2 Methodology
The system in equation (5.1) represents a ﬁxed eﬀects dynamic (unbalanced) panel with
large T and large N. Lagged values of the dependent variable are included to control for an
omitted variable and endogeneity bias. Because the lagged dependent variable is correlated
with the error term, dynamic panel models are usually not estimated with the static panel
ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. Doing so would introduce a ﬁnite sample bias of order 1
T for N →∞
and ﬁxed T (see Nickell, 1981; Kiviet, 1995). In order to avoid biased and inconsistent
estimates, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the use of a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator. Recent studies have challenged this method. Blundell and Bond (1998)
and Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer (2000) have shown that the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM
estimates are biased downwards in the direction of the within-group estimates and Alvarez
and Arellano (2003) show that the GMM estimator is close to the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator for
large T. Furthermore, Jung (2005) illustrates that Arrelano and Bond’s (1991) test of serial
residual correlation may build on inconsistently estimated residuals. Because these are used
39See De Bondt (1998), Worms (2003), Ehrmann et al. (2003), and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004)
for evidence in favor of a positive relationship between bank lending and output. Altunba¸ s, Fazylov, and
Molyneux (2002) report a positive output coeﬃcient for medium-sized and undercapitalized banks and a
negative coeﬃcient for small-sized and under- or overcapitalized banks in Germany.
40Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) report evidence of a positive price eﬀect on
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to decide on the optimal over-identifying restrictions, coeﬃcient estimates are likely to be
inconsistent.
In view of these points and given a comparatively large set of data points in the time di-
mension, we estimate the dynamic panel model by using the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. Besides,
the use of the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is also motivated by the Hansen J-statistic according
to which the over-identifying restrictions in the present set of GMM estimations are invalid
regardless of the instrumentalization. In order to ensure that the presence of autocorrelation
in the residuals  it does not result in inconsistent and ineﬃcient estimators, we compute
White-period standard errors (Arellano, 1987), which are robust to arbitrary serial correla-
tion and time-varying variances in the residuals. We test for the existence of ﬁrst-order and
second-order serial autocorrelation by regressing the within regression residuals against their
one- and two-period lag. The underlying model allows for ﬁxed eﬀects and White-period
standard errors.41
5.5 Data
Ideally, the analysis of the industry-speciﬁc bank lending eﬀects of changes in bank credit
demand and monetary policy would build on ﬁrm-level as well as bank-level data. Bank-level
data allow for the identiﬁcation of the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy through bank
lending and ﬁrm-level data allow for assessments regarding the operation of a credit channel
through balance sheet eﬀects. Although ﬁrm-level data are available from the corporate
balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, they are not useful for our purpose
because they are only available at an annual frequency and subject to a large ﬁrm bias.42
Given the unavailability of adequate ﬁrm-level data, we determine the bank lending eﬀects of
changes in credit demand and monetary policy for industry aggregates. We compile industry
data for 17 industries, which include eight industries at the one-digit industry level and nine
industries at the two-digit industry level. The latter are sub-sectors of the manufacturing
industry (see annex 5A).
Bank-level data on bank-speciﬁc balance sheet variables and bank-speciﬁc credit supply to in-
dividual industries are respectively obtained from the quarterly borrower statistics and monthly
bank balance sheet statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank for the period 1992-2003. Because
data in 2003 display patterns that are irreconcilable with those in earlier years, we conﬁne the
analysis of quarterly data to the period 1992:1-2002:4. The bank-speciﬁc balance sheet and
lending data display seasonal patterns. For each bank, these are removed by means of the
centered-moving average method. This is an admittedly simple adjustment procedure that
41Note, the conclusions regarding the existence of serial autocorrelation are robust to the way in which
the ﬁrst- and second-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient is computed. A simple least squares estimator without
ﬁxed eﬀects and White-period standard errors produces comparable results.
42See Deutsche Bundesbank (1998b) for details.5.5 Data 149
can be criticized for ignoring, for example, working day and leap year eﬀects. However, it is
the preferred method in the present analysis because it is applicable despite the large number
of cross sections. Furthermore, a comparison of the seasonally adjusted and non-adjusted
series shows that the centered moving average procedure captures seasonal ﬂuctuations well.
Information on industry production and industry prices are available from the New Cronos
database at a monthly frequency for most industries. The corresponding variables are indices
with base year 2000. For some industries, industry output is approximated with industry
value added. The corresponding data are provided by the German statistical oﬃce. The
monthly data on industry output and prices are converted into quarterly data to match the
frequency of the bank lending data. While data on industry output are directly obtained
for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4, information on industry prices is only available as of
1995:1. In order to identify the 1992:1-1994:4 values, we regress the industry-speciﬁc price
index against a constant and the contemporaneous value of the aggregate price index and
use the coeﬃcient estimates from ordinary least squares (OLS) to extrapolate the missing
values on industry-speciﬁc prices. Industry prices for the wholesale and retail trade, ﬁnance
and insurance, transport and communication, and service sector are not available from the
New Cronos database. Instead, we construct them using information on nominal and real
value added from the German statistical oﬃce for the whole sample period 1992:1-2002:4.43
The New Cronos database and the Deutsche Bundesbank’s quarterly borrower statistics oc-
casionally diﬀer in terms of industry aggregation. In particular, the borrower statistics tend to
refer to composites of industries rather than to individual units. In order to adopt the same
level of industry aggregation, the New Cronos data on industry production and industry char-
acteristics are also combined across some industries. The composite indices are constructed
by controlling for the relative importance of the single industries in the composite. Limited
by data availability, the weights are approximated as the 1992-2002 ratio of annual value
added of industry i to aggregate value added of the industries included in the composite.
Since the weights are time-invariant, the use of the 1992-2002 average as weight seems to
be innocuous.
In order to ensure the reliability of the empirical results, the quarterly data are screened
along diﬀerent lines. Firstly, the data are checked for outliers. Outlier detection concerns
the relationship between variables as well as the distribution of variables. One relationship
concerns the need of banks to meet their balance sheet constraint. For the requirement that
total assets equal total liabilities, the study keeps all but 5 data points.44 Another relationship
is deﬁned as the need to have positive entries for credit supply and total assets. In the present
43Note, the German statistical oﬃce reports data on nominal and real value added jointly for the (i)
wholesale and retail trade sector and (ii) transport and communication sector. Unfortunately, we cannot
disentangle the industry-speciﬁc price for each of these sectors, but have to rely on the composite price
measure.
44A data point is a single time observation associated with an individual bank (e.g., the observation
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sample, at most 18 data points for industry-speciﬁc loans and 47 data points for total assets
do not meet the non-negativity constraint. These observations are excluded from the sample.
As regards the distribution of variables, the outlier detection procedure is predominantly
implemented for variables in levels. The exception concerns the volume of bank credit and
total bank assets. In order to avoid the exclusion of very large and very small banks on
the ground of sheer size, the outlier detection procedure for total assets and the volume of
bank credit is implemented for their ﬁrst log-diﬀerences.45 Regardless of the variable, outliers
are detected by using the sequential outlier rejection (SOR) algorithm described in Corney
(2002). In contrast to standard methods like the z-score or box plot method, this outlier
detection procedure adopts a sequential approach that accounts for the eﬀect of outliers
on the standard error in the sample. Furthermore, the SOR approach does not assume the
normal distribution of banks at any point in time. This property is particularly valuable since
the hypothesis of normally distributed banks can be rejected for all sampled variables (see
Table 5.1 and Table 5.3). The SOR algorithm requires the data to be repeatedly clustered by
using any clustering algorithm. The present analysis uses k-means clustering for each of the
main banking groups, with k = 2.46 For each repetition, the sum-squared error for k-means
is computed, which describes the sum-squared deviation of each data point in the sample to
the nearest cluster center. The data point that contributes most to the sum-squared error
for k-means is excluded from the sample.
For each point in time and each banking group, the clustering algorithm is iteratively applied
to the dataset. The number of iterations is roughly equal to 5 percent of the number of banks
at each point in time.47 That is, the ﬁrst step of the procedure treats 5 percent of all banks
at each point in time as potential outlier. The second step builds on the iteratively excluded
observations from step one and determines the actual number of outliers by using the second
diﬀerence of the sum-squared error term. Under the assumption that the sum-squared error
rate is driven by outliers, the second derivative is close to zero and the cumulative sum thereof
is constant for the sequence of data that excludes atypical observations. In the present study,
we exclude any data point as outlier if it explains more than one percent of the cumulative
sum of the second derivative. Similar to other outlier detection methods (e.g., the box plot
method and the z-approach), the choice of threshold is arbitrary.
As a ﬁnal remark, the analysis is conﬁned to institutions that have the status of a mon-
etary ﬁnance institute (MFI) throughout the whole sample period. The restricted focus is
necessitated by a change in data deﬁnition. Until 1998:4, non-MFIs were treated as ﬁnancial
institutions and the Deutsche Bundesbank’s borrower statistics reported lending by these in-
45See Worms (2003) for a similar procedure.
46The large number of observations and computer limitations preclude the deﬁnition of more than two
clusters.
47The number of iterations depends on the availability of data for a given banking group at a particular
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stitutions to enterprises and households. As of 1999:1, non-MFIs are treated as enterprises
and the borrower statistics do no longer report lending by, but credit supply to these institu-
tions. In order to avoid that the deﬁnitional change of non-MFIs from being creditors to being
debtors biases the results, we exclude banks with a non-MFI status in any quarter during the
sample period. This leads to a loss of 1400 data points from the commercial banking group
and 208 data points from the cooperative banking group.
5.6 Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical results of the ﬁxed eﬀects dynamic panel estimation. In
section 5.6.1, we ﬁrst describe the diﬀerent samples for which the benchmark model (5.1)
is estimated. Section 5.6.2 then reports ANOVA test statistics that help to structure the
analysis of the panel data evidence in section 5.6.3. We conclude the present section with
robustness tests of the benchmark model (5.1). In the remainder of this chapter, we largely
disregard the results for the bank lending functions of the metals producing industry. This is
because of serially correlated residuals that cause the long-run coeﬃcients to be biased and
inconsistent. The autocorrelation properties do not improve in estimations with an alternative
lag structure and are robust to the structure of the model.
5.6.1 Sample Overview
The empirical model is estimated for diﬀerent combinations of banking groups. Table 5.5
summarizes the composition of the samples. One sample jointly includes the primary (local)
institutions of the commercial, savings, and credit cooperative sector. This group is subse-
quently referred to as the aggregate banking group. Group-speciﬁc eﬀects are captured with
banking group dummies for the savings and commercial banking group. Because the dummies
turn out to be statistically insigniﬁcant in almost all speciﬁcations, weak or no banking group
eﬀects appear to exist for savings and commercial banks relative to credit cooperatives. In
view of this ﬁnding, the subsequent evidence for the aggregate banking group refers to the
results of estimations without banking group dummies. We also estimate the model for the
credit cooperative banking sector, with banking dummies for the commercial credit cooper-
ative banking group and Raiﬀeisen banks. In contrast to the aggregate banking group, the
dummies turn out to be statistically signiﬁcant for most industry bank lending functions.
In order to allow for the possibility of parameter heterogeneity across banking groups, another
sample is separately deﬁned for the three main sub-groups of the credit cooperative banking
group (i.e., rural, commercial, and Raiﬀeisen banks) and for savings banks. The importance
of possible panel heterogeneity is suggested by the ANOVA evidence in section 5.3.1 that
points to structural diﬀerences between (i) the savings and cooperative banking group and
(ii) the sub-groups of the cooperative banking sector. When estimating individual models for152 Chapter 5
Table 5.5: Sample Overview
Bank Lending Functions for: Banking Group Composed of:
• Aggregate banking group (BG) • Commercial, savings, credit cooperative banks
• Credit cooperative BG • Commercial and rural credit cooperatives, Raiﬀeisen banks
• Savings BG • Public savings banks
• Commercial credit cooperatives
• Rural credit cooperatives
• Raiﬀeisen banks
the savings and credit cooperative banking group, we assume cross-bank homogeneity in the
interest rate elasticity of loan demand and hence cross-bank similarities in the distribution
of bank-dependent and bank-independent customers within each individual banking group.
We do not estimate an individual model for the commercial banking group or for the head
institutions of the savings and credit cooperative banking sector because they operate product
portfolios which diﬀer from those of the local savings and credit cooperative banks. Besides,
estimates for an individual sample of commercial banks are not reported since the number
of cross sections is low. The ﬁxed number of observations causes the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator
and the robust covariance matrix estimates to be inconsistent although T is relatively large.
5.6.2 Analysis of Variance Tests
The representation of the results is complicated by the cross-sectional dimension of the
study. To condense the analysis, this section ﬁrst reports test statistics of one- and two-
way analyses of variance which illustrate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of bank
characteristic, the choice of aggregate and short-term lending, and the choice of industry and
banking group. The test statistics are computed for the long-run coeﬃcients of model (5.1)
irrespective of the signiﬁcance properties of the coeﬃcient estimates. If we would conﬁne
the analysis to industries for which signiﬁcant estimates are reported, ANOVA would not
be feasible. Despite the inclusion of insigniﬁcant estimates, the results are still deemed to
be illustrative. On the one hand, we only compute test statistics for variables for which
most industry-speciﬁc long-run estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, i.e., for industry output
growth, industry inﬂation, and the interest rate change. Test statistics are not reported for the
interaction terms because of pronounced diﬀerences in their statistical signiﬁcance across the
diﬀerent bank lending speciﬁcations. On the other hand, the insigniﬁcant industry-speciﬁc
coeﬃcient estimates on either industry output growth, inﬂation, or the interest rate change
compare well with the signiﬁcant estimates in terms of sign and magnitude regardless of the
choice of bank characteristic.
We ﬁrst investigate whether the long-run coeﬃcient estimates for industry output growth,5.6 Empirical Results 153
inﬂation, and the interest rate change are inﬂuenced by the choice of bank characteristic,
i.e., bank asset size, capitalization, broad/narrow liquidity, or short-term interbank claims.
Because the results of the one-way analysis of variance are robust to the choice of banking
group and do not diﬀer for aggregate and short-term lending, we only report the results for
the aggregate banking group and for short-term lending.48 The results in Table 5.6 (columns
3 to 6) show that the null hypothesis of equal coeﬃcients across bank characteristics cannot
be rejected. The choice of bank characteristic hence does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the long-run
sensitivity of bank lending with respect to either industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand or the
m o n e ym a r k e ti n t e r e s tr a t e .
We next ask whether the long-run coeﬃcients of the sampled variables depend on the choice
of aggregate and short-term bank lending. Because the coeﬃcient estimates are insensitive
to the choice of bank characteristic, we only report the one-way ANOVA test statistics for
bank asset size. The evidence in Table 5.6 (columns 7 to 10) points to the equality of
the long-run coeﬃcients for aggregate and short-term lending. This in turn suggests that
conclusions regarding the determinants of bank lending growth do not diﬀer for aggregate
and short-term credit. This result holds with respect to all sampled variables.
We conclude the discussion by formally testing whether diﬀerences in the bank lending ef-
fects are accounted for by banking groups or by industries. To this end, we compute the test
statistics of a two-way analysis of variance. Given the one-way ANOVA test statistics, we
only report the results for short-term lending and bank asset size, noting that the evidence for
aggregate lending and the remaining bank characteristics does not diﬀer.49 Table 5.7 sum-
marizes the results. The analysis of variance shows that diﬀerences in the responsiveness of
short-term bank lending growth to industry output growth and industry inﬂation are attribu-
table to industries, but not to banking groups.50 That is, the evidence stresses discernible
industry dissimilarities in the bank lending eﬀects of industry output growth and inﬂation.
In contrast to output growth and inﬂation, diﬀerences in the long-run bank lending eﬀects
of interest rate changes are explained by banking groups and industries. However, industry
eﬀects appear to be the more important source of variation in the bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy. This conclusion builds on the observation that the F-value for the industry
eﬀect exceeds the corresponding value for the banking group eﬀect.
48The results for the remaining banking groups are available on request.
49The ANOVA test statistics for estimations with bank capitalization, liquidity, and interbank assets and
for aggregate lending are available on request.
50We replicate the analysis of variance for a sample that excludes the construction sector. The restricted
focus is motivated by the unexpected positive interest rate response of bank lending to this industry. We ﬁnd
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Table 5.7: Two-Way ANOVA Test Statistics, Short-Term Lending
Long-Run Coef.: Source of Variation SS DF MS F-Statistic
ΔIP Banking Group 7.25 3 2.42 0.77
Industry 277 14 20 6.32∗
Error 132 42 3.13
ΔPrice Banking Group 7.16 3 2.39 0.18
Industry 4,345 14 310 23.83∗
Error 547 42 13
ΔIR Banking Group 0.006 3 0.002 4.61∗
Industry 0.098 14 0.007 16.20∗
Error 0.018 42 0.0004
Note 1: SS = sum of squares, DF = degrees of freedom, MS = mean squares (i.e.,
SSSource divided by DFSource), and F-value = F-statistic (i.e., MSSource divided by
MSError). Diﬀerences between the MS- and F-statistics in the table and the MS-
and F-statistics determined in calculations with the reported SS-statistics and
the degrees of freedom are due to rounding. Note 2: ∗ denotes the statistical
signiﬁcance at the one percent level. Note 3: The table reports the ANOVA test
statistics for estimations with short-term lending and bank asset size. Note 4:T h e
banking group involves savings banks, rural and commercial credit cooperatives,
and Raiﬀeisen banks. The industry dimension includes 7 industries at the one-
digit level (excluding total manufacturing) and 8 manufacturing industries at the
two-digit level (excluding the metals producing sector).
The ANOVA evidence illustrates that industries are the more important source of diﬀerences
in the bank lending eﬀects of industry credit demand and monetary policy. In addition,
we ﬁnd the results regarding the bank lending eﬀects of industry output growth, industry
inﬂation, and monetary policy to be insensitive to the choice of aggregate and short-term
lending. Motivated by these ﬁndings and in order to focus the analysis, the following section
presents and discusses the empirical panel evidence on the determinants of industry-speciﬁc
short-term bank lending growth for the aggregate banking group.
5.6.3 Evidence from Industry-Speciﬁc Bank Lending Functions
The empirical evidence from the benchmark model (5.1) is discussed in two parts. In a ﬁrst
step, we report the response of bank lending growth to changes in bank credit demand (i.e.,
industry output growth, industry inﬂation) and to changes in the money market interest rate.
We then discuss the interaction terms between bank characteristics and monetary policy to
draw conclusions about the existence of credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy through
bank lending. Table 5.8 summarizes the coeﬃcient estimates for the industry-speciﬁc bank
lending functions.
(i) The Bank Lending Eﬀects of Loan Demand and Monetary Policy
We report evidence for individual industries and for the grand total of industries. The evidence
for the grand total of industries is our benchmark in the discussion of the industry-speciﬁc bank156 Chapter 5
lending functions. Besides, when emphasizing the results for the grand total of industries,
we can compare the present empirical ﬁndings with the evidence of earlier studies, which
do not adopt an industry-speciﬁc focus. In order to facilitate the readability of the results,
we label industries by using abbreviations. For example, the ﬁnance and insurance industry
is subsequently introduced as ﬁnance sector and the transport and communication sector is
referred to as transport sector. Annex 5A provides details. Because the evidence in section
5.6.2 shows that the choice of bank characteristic does not aﬀect the long-run sensitivity of
bank lending with respect to industry output growth, industry inﬂation, or the money market
interest rate, we provide a general discussion of the results regarding the industry-speciﬁc
bank lending eﬀects of bank credit demand and monetary policy.
Considering the response of bank lending growth to industry output growth, the entries in
Table 5.8 illustrate that bank lending to the grand total of industries increases in response
to higher output growth. The positive output response of lending to the grand total reﬂects
the statistically signiﬁcant and positive response of lending to growth in agriculture, con-
struction, trade, services, and the food manufacturing sector. At least for the construction
sector, the positive reaction of bank lending is inﬂuenced by the 1992-1995 re-uniﬁcation
construction boom period that induced heavy investment. Opposite relationships exist for
total manufacturing and for the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. This suggests
that manufacturing ﬁrms demand less bank credit in response to output growth.51 Possible
reasons are (i) higher internal ﬂows of ﬁnance, which reduce external ﬁnancing needs and/or
(ii) the absence of promising future economic prospects, which yield disincentives for invest-
ment. The relevance of the second point is suggested by the continuous decline in the share
of manufacturing value added in aggregate value added during the last decade.52 Next to the
manufacturing industry, we also ﬁnd an inverse relationship between bank lending growth and
output growth for the ﬁnance sector. In contrast to the manufacturing industry, the ﬁnance
sector accounts for an increasingly larger share of aggregate value added. The decline in bank
lending may therefore reﬂect the eﬀect of higher internal cash ﬂow and the consequent lower
need for bank ﬁnance.
As regards the response of bank lending growth to inﬂation, it is signiﬁcant and positive
for the grand total of industries. The positive reaction of bank lending to the grand total
of industries reﬂects the positive response of bank lending to almost all industries. The
exceptions are the transport and machinery and transport equipment manufacturing sector.
In contrast to expectations, bank lending to these sectors signiﬁcantly contracts in response
to higher industry inﬂation.
51Also see Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) for a similar conclusion.
52The ratio of value added for manufacturing to value added for the grand total of industries declined from


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Turning to the interest rate response of bank lending, the evidence conﬁrms the view that
higher interest rates cause lending to the grand total of industries to contract. The decline
in bank lending reﬂects the negative eﬀect of higher interest rates on bank reserves and
credit rationing on the part of banks in response to an increase in the risk of loan default.
The evidence in Table 5.8 also illustrates that this response is a weighed average of the
interest rate reaction of all industries. We ﬁnd unanimous cross-industry diﬀerences in the
nature of the interest rate response of bank lending. On the one hand, the negative interest
rate response of lending to the grand total of industries reﬂects lower bank credit supply to
the energy, manufacturing, and transport industry, with the interest rate eﬀect being most
pronounced for the ﬁrst two sectors. We attribute the strength of the eﬀect for the energy
and manufacturing industry to the comparatively high capital intensity of production, which is
associated with a higher probability of loan losses (cf. Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996). For the
manufacturing sector, the decline in lending reveals the negative interest rate eﬀects of bank
credit supply to the chemicals and coke, rubber and plastic, wood and paper, and textiles
producing sector. At least the wood and paper and textiles producing sector are again more
capital-intensive in comparison to the remaining industries.
On the other hand, a monetary policy contraction induces higher lending to the construction,
trade, and ﬁnance industry and to producers of non-metallic mineral, machinery and transport
equipment, and electrical and optical equipment goods. The positive interest rate response of
lending to construction is not consistent with expectations. However, it can be explained by
the structural and cyclical characteristics of the construction sector. As regards the structural
properties, the construction industry is characterized by a large share of small ﬁrms, which
predominantly obtain bank credit from local credit cooperatives and regional savings banks.53
Knowledge of local market conditions and local debtors reduces information asymmetries and
fosters housebank relationships. Housebank relationships, in turn, facilitate the access to
bank ﬁnance in general and in periods of high interest rates and low demand in particular.
Considering cyclical factors, the positive interest rate response of bank lending reﬂects the
demand-driven re-uniﬁcation boom in construction. Even during the 1991-1992 period of high
interest rates, demand for residential buildings and production plants was high and continued
to increase.
The positive interest rate response of bank lending to the ﬁnance industry can be explained
in terms of ﬁnancial stability considerations. A contraction in monetary policy lowers the net
present value of ﬁnancial assets and reduces the ability of ﬁnance and insurance companies to
generate proﬁts on ﬁnancial asset portfolios. When portfolio holders like ﬁrms or households
regard the return on their portfolio investment as unsatisfactory, they will withdraw their funds
from the ﬁnance and insurance sector. Besides return considerations, portfolio holders may
also withdraw funds to accommodate the negative eﬀect of higher interest rates on internal
cash ﬂow and hence liquidity. The drain of ﬁnancial funds leaves ﬁnance and insurance
53Also see section 5.3.2.5.6 Empirical Results 167
companies less able to meet liquidity requirements. Due to self-fulﬁlling prophecies and
herding behavior, this development may constitute a threat to the stability of the ﬁnance
and insurance sector, with possible spillover eﬀects to the whole ﬁnancial system. In view of
these relationships, the positive interest rate response of lending to the ﬁnance and insurance
sector may describe the eﬀort of banks to ensure the stability of the ﬁnancial system.
The entries in Table 5.8 point to pronounced cross-industry diﬀerences in the magnitude of
the bank lending eﬀects of output growth, inﬂation, and interest rate changes. The largest
response of bank lending to changes in monetary policy, industry inﬂation, and output growth
is observed for the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry. Indeed, bank lending to these
sectors tends to be more responsive than bank lending to the manufacturing aggregate or to
the grand total of industries. Next to the sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry, bank
lending also responds comparatively strongly to output growth in the ﬁnance industry and
to inﬂation in the construction and energy sector. The ﬁnance, construction, and energy
industry and the sub-sectors of manufacturing have in common that the share of credit to
these sectors is comparatively small (cf. Table 5.3). Bank lending thus seems to be more
responsive to output growth and inﬂation in industries which only account for a small share of
a bank’s loan portfolio. This in turn suggests that banks primarily re-distribute credit between
industries to which bank lending is relatively small and that the overall industry composition
of a bank’s loan portfolio is accordingly comparatively stable.
Overall, the evidence illustrates that the use of bank-level data on lending to the grand total
of industries (i.e., aggregate lending) only provides an imperfect view on the bank lending
eﬀects of credit demand and monetary policy. Our results indicate that the direction and
strength of aggregate bank lending eﬀects depend on the industry structure of bank credit
portfolios. This ﬁnding is particularly interesting for the deﬁnition of monetary policy as it
shows that the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy depends on industry structure.
(ii) Are there Bank Lending Eﬀects of Monetary Policy?
So far, the discussion has focused on the direct eﬀects of monetary policy. This section
analyzes the empirical results for the interaction between bank characteristics and monetary
policy in order to identify the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy on industry-speciﬁc
bank lending. As will become evident, conclusions as to the existence of cross-bank diﬀerences
in the interest rate response of bank lending are sensitive to the choice of bank asset size,
capitalization, liquidity, and short-term interbank claims.
The analysis of the interaction terms can be criticized. As stated, the signiﬁcance properties
of the interaction terms preclude tests regarding the relative contribution of industries and
banking groups as source of variation. Visual inspection of signiﬁcant interaction terms
points, however, to considerable diﬀerences in the sign and magnitude of the underlying
credit channel eﬀects across industries as well as banking groups. The diﬀerences are such168 Chapter 5
that a separate discussion of the coeﬃcient estimates of all interaction terms is valuable in
its own right. Unfortunately, this is beyond scope given the large number of industry-speciﬁc
bank lending models by bank characteristic, banking group, and loan maturity. We can only
acknowledge that conclusions regarding the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy depend
on the choice of model speciﬁcation and stress the interaction terms for short-term bank
lending growth for the aggregate banking group.
Existing studies question the usefulness of capitalization and liquidity as proxy variables of
the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) argue that
the capital-to-asset ratio is an inappropriate measure of bank capitalization. The reason is
that bank capital does not illustrate the riskiness of a bank’s portfolio. It therefore does
not correctly describe the severity of information asymmetries, which determines the ability
of banks to obtain non-reservable funding. Kashyap and Stein (2000) contemplate that
liquidity may provide a distorted view on the importance of bank balance sheet eﬀects. This
is because liquidity is also determined by cash that banks cannot freely use since it is subject
to reserve requirements. Furthermore, Worms (2003) notes that bank lending reﬂects the
liquidity preferences of banks, with more liquid banks lending less. If this holds, cross-bank
diﬀerences in the interest rate sensitivity of bank lending are not uniquely attributable to
cross-bank diﬀerences in liquidity. We only mention these weaknesses associated with some
bank characteristics, but do not control for them for two reasons. Firstly, the share of cash
in total assets relative to other liquidity components is low. Secondly, quarterly data on
the riskiness of capital are not available in the present dataset. Although capitalization and
liquidity might be imperfect identiﬁers of the bank credit supply eﬀects of monetary policy, we
report the results for these bank characteristics because we still assume that these variables
inﬂuence the response of bank lending to interest rate changes.
Table 5.8 contains the industry-speciﬁc bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy associated
with cross-bank diﬀerences in asset size, capitalization, liquidity, or short-term interbank
claims. Conclusions regarding the bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy transmission are
sensitive to the choice of bank characteristic and vary with the choice of industry. The
evidence lends strong support to the existence of bank size eﬀects in monetary policy trans-
mission. For the grand total of industries and for almost all sampled industries, a monetary
policy contraction causes bank lending of large banks to adjust less than bank credit of
small banks. That is, large banks are better able to insulate their lending activities against
monetary-policy-induced changes in the availability of reservable and non-reservable funds
of ﬁnance. Inconsistent with the credit channel theory, the interest rate response of bank
lending to the ﬁnance industry is more pronounced for large than for small banks. This ﬁnd-
ing possibly reﬂects the importance of commercial banks as source of lending to the ﬁnance
industry (cf. Table 5.3) and the fact that commercial banks are on average larger in terms
of asset size than savings banks and credit cooperatives (cf. Table 5.1). Insigniﬁcant eﬀects
are recorded in estimations for the construction and transport sector and for the non-metallic
goods and wood and paper products producing sector.5.6 Empirical Results 169
In contrast to bank asset size, cross-bank heterogeneities in capitalization do not explain
cross-bank diﬀerences in the interest rate sensitivity of bank credit to the grand total of
industries and to most individual industries. The exception is lending to agriculture, ﬁnance,
services, and manufacturing. Except for the agricultural sector, better capitalized banks
adjust lending less than poorly capitalized banks. The insigniﬁcance of bank capitalization
lends support to the view that a risk-unadjusted measure of capitalization may imperfectly
approximate the degree of information asymmetries.
Cross-bank asymmetries in the monetary policy response of bank lending to some industries
are also attributable to cross-bank heterogeneities in the share of liquid assets. As discussed,
the liquidity eﬀects of monetary policy are separately identiﬁed for a broad and narrow measure
of liquidity and for short-term interbank claims in order to determine whether short-term
interbank claims aﬀect the bank lending eﬀects associated with liquidity. The evidence shows
that broad and/or narrow liquidity signiﬁcantly attenuates the interest rate response of lending
to the grand total of industries and to the agricultural, construction, trade, transport, textiles,
and food industry. However, liquidity ampliﬁes the response of lending to the machinery and
transport equipment and electrical and optical equipment producing sector. The evidence
lends comparatively weak support to the role of short-term interbank claims as determinant
of the liquidity eﬀects of monetary policy. Indeed, signiﬁcant short-term interbank eﬀects
are conﬁned to very few industries: construction, trade, and transport. This suggests that
short-term interbank claims are a weak driving source of liquidity eﬀects. In addition, because
interbank claims are insigniﬁcant in explaining the interest rate response of credit supply to
industries for which bank asset size possesses explanatory power, bank asset size appears
to capture the bank lending eﬀects of information asymmetries. That is, the evidence in
the present study does not lend support to the ﬁnding of Worms (2003) according to which
interbank claims dwarf the eﬀects associated with bank asset size.
Comparing the magnitude of the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy, diﬀerences prevail
across bank characteristics. Indeed, cross-bank asymmetries in the interest rate response of
bank lending are least pronounced for bank asset size and most pronounced for estimations
with bank capitalization and short-term interbank claims. The evidence hence reveals that
bank size is not the main determinant of cross-bank diﬀerences in the response to monetary
policy changes. However, the relative importance of the capitalization eﬀect should not be
overemphasized because we deﬁne capitalization without correcting for bank risk. Besides
these results, the entries in Table 5.8 suggest that the strength of bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy diﬀers between industries. In contrast to direct monetary policy eﬀects,
the cross-industry diﬀerences appear to be unrelated to the relative weight of industries in a
bank’s credit portfolio.
Table 5.8 also reports the one-period lags of the bank characteristics. Even though the co-
eﬃcients do not have an intrinsic meaning, they illustrate in combination with the direct
interest rate eﬀect whether bank characteristics or monetary policy changes drive the sig-170 Chapter 5
niﬁcance of the interaction terms. The evidence tends to be mixed. For the grand total of
industries, the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on the interest rate change and the short-run
bank characteristic illustrates that the signiﬁcance of the interaction term is attributable to
the direct bank lending eﬀect of monetary policy and to cross-bank diﬀerences in any of
the bank characteristics. For the industry-speciﬁc bank lending functions, the distributional
eﬀects of monetary policy are determined by either monetary policy or bank characteristics,
by both variables, or by none. For example, the signiﬁcance of the interaction term on asset
size and capitalization in the estimation for total manufacturing is driven by the direct eﬀect
of monetary policy but not by bank characteristics. For the transport sector, the absence of
credit channel eﬀects in estimations with asset size seem to be driven by asset size given the
evidence in favor of signiﬁcant interest rate eﬀects.
Overall, the evidence lends comparatively weak support to the transmission of monetary policy
changes through bank lending. The conclusions as to the bank lending eﬀects of monetary
policy are sensitive to the choice of industry. This in turn points to the existence of industry
eﬀects of monetary policy through bank lending. In view of this ﬁnding, studies for the grand
total of industries are likely to provide an incomplete view on the bank lending eﬀects of
monetary policy.
(iii) Cross-Study Comparison of the Results
For the grand total of industries, our evidence can be compared with that of existing studies.
The present results for the grand total of industries match those in Ehrmann et al. (2003) and
Worms (2003) only partly. One possible source of divergence are diﬀerences in the deﬁnition
of bank credit. While the earlier studies deﬁne bank credit for lending to households and
the grand total of industries, we do not include household lending.54 Another source of
heterogeneity concerns the outlier adjustment procedure. Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms
(2003) identify outliers by assuming the normal distribution of banks, while we allow for
skews in the distribution. The studies thus deﬁne outliers along diﬀerent lines, which leads
to the exclusion of diﬀerent observations. The most striking diﬀerence, however, concerns
the estimation methodology. Earlier studies estimate the dynamic panel model with GMM.
We ﬁnd this estimator to be inapplicable. Neither for the long sample period 1992-2002
nor for the short sample period 1992-1998 as used by Worms (2003) do we ﬁnd valid over-
identifying restrictions for our set of GMM estimations. We do not estimate the model for
the short sample period with the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator because the ﬁnite sample bias would
be stronger.
Our results are in line with those of Ehrmann et al. (2003) according to which bank lending
54Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms (2003) do not report evidence for short-term lending but for aggregate
bank credit. Because our results for aggregate and short-term lending do not diﬀer, we generalize our results
when comparing them with earlier studies and do not make a distinction between short-term and aggregate
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grows in response to output growth and inﬂation and declines in the wake of a monetary
contraction. Furthermore, the present results are consistent with those in Ehrmann et al.
(2003) according to which cross-bank diﬀerences in the interest rate sensitivity of aggregate
bank credit cannot be attributed to diﬀerences in capitalization, but to diﬀerences in liquidity.
However, the present study reports evidence that lends support to the existence of bank size
eﬀects in monetary policy transmission. In contrast to Worms (2003), the size eﬀects are
not driven by interbank claims since they also prevail in estimations which do not control for
interbank claims.
(iv) Synthesis
Summarizing the results of the industry-speciﬁc bank lending functions, the evidence shows
that bank lending growth is industry speciﬁc, being driven by cyclical changes in industry
output growth and industry inﬂation and hence by factors of industry-speciﬁc bank credit
demand. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the bank lending eﬀects of industry output growth,
industry inﬂation, and monetary policy changes between industries. Furthermore, regardless
of the industry, the evidence lends weak support that banks diﬀer in their lending response to
monetary policy changes. If at all, cross-bank diﬀerences in the monetary policy response of
bank lending are primarily attributable to bank asset size eﬀects. Overall, it appears that bank
lending growth predominantly depends on bank credit demand and on the relative importance
of industries in a bank’s loan portfolio.
5.6.4 Robustness Tests
In order to determine the robustness of the empirical ﬁndings, we modify the structure of
the benchmark speciﬁcation (5.1) along several lines. Table 5C.1 in annex 5C summarizes
the diﬀerent models. To conserve on space, we only provide a verbal description of the
corresponding evidence.55 One set of estimations eliminates output growth and inﬂation from
the benchmark model to test whether industry demand factors dwarf the bank lending eﬀects
of monetary policy changes. The test is motivated by the evidence from the benchmark
model according to which bank lending growth is predominantly determined by industry
output growth and industry inﬂation rather than by monetary policy. The results of the
modiﬁed model conﬁrm those of the benchmark speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd the magnitude of
the direct monetary policy eﬀects on bank lending to be in the range suggested by the
benchmark speciﬁcation. The evidence in favor of credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy
55The coeﬃcient estimates of all robustness tests are available on request. Note, existing studies on the
bank lending eﬀects of monetary policy also test for the diﬀerential response of bank lending by eliminating
the eﬀect of time-variant variables on bank lending with either time dummies or macroeconomic variables (cf.
Gambacorta, 2003; Ehrmann et al., 2003; Worms, 2003). We abstain from capturing time eﬀects with time
dummies since they capture the level eﬀect of those variables we are particularly interested in, i.e., monetary
policy and the proxy variables of bank credit demand.172 Chapter 5
through bank lending is still comparatively strong for asset size, but relatively weak for the
remaining bank characteristics. Furthermore, the coeﬃcient estimates from the augmented
speciﬁcation closely resemble those from the benchmark model.
Another set of estimations re-estimates the benchmark model with more than one bank char-
acteristic. One speciﬁcation interacts each bank characteristic individually with monetary
policy (Table 5C.1, model B), while a second model interacts two bank characteristics with
each other as well as with monetary policy (Table 5C.1, model C).56 W ei n c l u d em o r et h a n
one bank characteristic simultaneously to control for the possibility that models with only
one bank characteristic report evidence which also captures the eﬀects associated with other
characteristics. More precisely, we take the likely interdependence of bank asset size and
liquidity and bank capitalization and liquidity into account: large or better capitalized banks
might be more liquid than small or poorly capitalized banks. For Germany, the interdepen-
dence may also extend to asset size and interbank claims. Worms (2003) and Ehrmann et
al. (2003) have shown that interbank claims attenuate the eﬀects of asset size and domi-
nate the liquidity or capitalization eﬀects of monetary policy. Although the present evidence
illustrates that asset size explains the average interest rate response of banks in estimations
which do not control for interbank claims, interbank claims may still capture part of the size
eﬀects. However, when including more than one bank characteristic, the models with single
and double interactions yield evidence that largely conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the benchmark
speciﬁcation. Bank lending growth is predominantly determined by bank credit demand and
not by monetary policy or by the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy. The strength of
the underlying eﬀects signiﬁcantly diﬀers between industries.
The evidence from the model with more than one single interaction term (Table 5C.1, model
B) suggests the independence of the eﬀects associated with each single bank characteris-
tic. For example, when signiﬁcant, the eﬀects associated with bank capitalization are still
comparatively strong, while bank size eﬀects are relatively small. In fact, the strength of
signiﬁcant bank size, capitalization, liquidity, and interbank eﬀects does not vary much be-
tween the benchmark and augmented model. We therefore conclude that the distributional
eﬀects of monetary policy reveal size and capitalization eﬀects that are not driven by inter-
bank claims or by bank liquidity. Similarly, interbank assets do not inﬂuence the evidence
of bank liquidity eﬀects. For most bank lending functions, interbank assets are statistically
insigniﬁcant and broad liquidity eﬀects reﬂect the eﬀects associated with narrow liquidity.
The model with double interaction terms (Table 5C.1, model C) tests whether cross-bank
diﬀerences in the interest rate response of bank lending depend on the interdependence of
eﬀects associated with (i) interbank claims and either bank asset size, capitalization, or
liquidity and (ii) liquidity and either bank asset size or capitalization. The hypothesis is that
the eﬀect of interbank claims or liquidity on the interest rate response of bank lending is
smaller for large and better capitalized banks. Summarizing the results, we ﬁnd the double
56See Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Worms (2003) for a description of the model.5.6 Empirical Results 173
interaction terms to be statistically insigniﬁcant in almost all industry bank lending functions.
The only signiﬁcant responses are recorded for estimations with interbank claims and either
asset size, capitalization, or narrow liquidity. When signiﬁcant, the evidence tends to be
inconsistent with expectations: interbank eﬀects on bank lending are smaller for (i) small
banks (machinery and transport equipment sector), (ii) poorly capitalized banks (electrical
and optical equipment sector), and (iii) less liquid banks (construction, services, wood and
paper producing sector). Anticipated relationships prevail for the grand total of industries.
We ﬁnd the interbank eﬀects of monetary policy on bank lending to be smaller for large
banks. In addition, interbank eﬀects are smaller for liquid banks in estimations for the rubber
and plastic and machinery and transport equipment sector.
As an alternative test we ask whether the results are sensitive to the way we deﬁne the
explanatory variables of the benchmark speciﬁcation. The model in equation (5.1) includes
industry-speciﬁc bank lending, output, and inﬂation without weighing each of these compo-
nents by the corresponding bank-speciﬁc aggregate. In expressing loans in absolute terms, we
follow Kishan and Opiela (2000), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), Ehrmann et al. (2003),
Worms (2003), H¨ ulsewig, Mayer, and Wollmersh¨ auser (2005), among others. In reality, banks
operate portfolios, with lending to industry i being part of a diversiﬁcation strategy. The rel-
ative importance of industries in a bank’s portfolio hence diﬀers. In order to control for
diﬀerences in the importance of industries, we redeﬁne the industry-speciﬁc variables relative
to the aggregate (Table 5C.1, model D). Doing so, we do not only control for diﬀerences in
the relative importance of industries, but also for structural breaks that result from redeﬁ-
nitions in the composition of industries. Furthermore, we can also control for the eﬀect of
those mergers which do not appear as outliers. When using ratios, merger-driven jumps in
lending are ameliorated or even eliminated. Despite these changes, the empirical results do
not qualitatively diﬀer from those of the benchmark speciﬁcation: bank lending growth is
determined by bank credit demand rather than by monetary policy. Conclusions regarding
the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy on bank lending do not diﬀer much between the
base and augmented speciﬁcation.
So far, the robustness checks involve structural changes of the base speciﬁcation, using
data for the sample period 1992:1-2002:4. This sample period captures years of exceptional
circumstances as caused by the German re-uniﬁcation. Particular to this process is above
average credit demand by all industries (see Deutsche Bundesbank, 1996). In order to assess
the sensitivity of the results to re-uniﬁcation eﬀects, we also estimate the benchmark spec-
iﬁcation for the period 1995:1-2002:4 (Table 5C.1, model E). For almost all industries, the
results for the short and long sample period are qualitatively the same. The only exception
is the manufacturing industry. In contrast to the long sample period, bank lending to this
sector is predicted to expand in response to industry inﬂation and to contract in reaction to
higher interest rates. Conclusions regarding the existence of bank lending eﬀects of monet-
ary policy also change for bank asset size. In contrast to the long sample, the interest rate
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for output growth and the remaining bank characteristics do not change. The evidence for
manufacturing is hence inﬂuenced by German re-uniﬁcation. Visual inspection of the data
shows that the results are driven by diﬀerences in the time-series pattern of inﬂation during
1992-1993 and 1994-2002. Manufacturing prices were constant during 1992-1993, while the
share of short-term credit to manufacturing declined. Manufacturing prices only increased as
of 1994.
Overall, conclusions as to the response of bank lending to changes in monetary policy and
bank credit demand are robust to alternative model speciﬁcations. Regardless of the model,
we ﬁnd strong evidence that credit supply eﬀects of monetary policy are small. Signiﬁcant
cross-industry diﬀerences still prevail, which demonstrates that the sensitivity of a bank’s
credit portfolio to monetary policy changes or economic conditions clearly depends on the
industry composition of a credit portfolio.
5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has used a unique dataset with bank-level data on bank balance sheet items
and bank industry lending to investigate the bank lending eﬀects of bank credit demand
and monetary policy for Germany over the period 1992:1-2002:4. In contrast to existing
work on the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy, we explicitly focused on the industry
eﬀects of bank lending and estimated bank lending functions for eight industries at the one-
digit industry level and for nine sub-sectors of the manufacturing industry at the two-digit
industry level. The bank lending functions were deﬁned for aggregate and short-term lending
and for ﬁve individual banking groups. In line with existing studies, we used bank asset
size, capitalization, liquidity, and short-term interbank claims as proxy variables of cross-bank
diﬀerences in the severity of information asymmetries.
Our empirical ﬁndings lend strong support to the existence of industry eﬀects of bank lending:
industries are the more important source of variation in the bank lending eﬀects of bank credit
demand and monetary policy, with strong eﬀects arising from industry output growth and
industry inﬂation. Banking group eﬀects are comparatively weak. This suggests that the
institutional setting of the German banking system is a relatively unimportant determinant
of bank lending growth. The evidence lends mixed support to the credit channel theory
according to which cross-bank diﬀerences in the interest rate response of bank lending can
be explained with cross-bank heterogeneities in bank asset size, capitalization, liquidity, and
short-term interbank claims. Again, the conclusions are very sensitive to the choice of industry
and also depend on the choice of bank characteristic and banking group. We conclude that
the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy through bank lending are weak and that the
industry composition of bank credit portfolios determines bank lending growth and - more
important from an economic policy perspective - the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy.5.7 Conclusion 175
We expect that the evidence in favor of industry eﬀects of bank lending would also prevail
in estimations that control for two shortcomings of the present analysis. One weakness
concerns the assumption that positive and negative shocks to industry output growth, industry
inﬂation, and monetary policy have a symmetric eﬀect on bank lending growth. In reality,
asymmetries are likely to prevail given that credit conditions worsen more in times of recessions
than they improve in times of economic booms and that prices are sticky downwards but
ﬂexible upwards. Furthermore, we estimated a reduced-form model which does not control
for the sensitivity of loan demand to monetary policy changes. That is, the interest rate
sensitivity of bank lending reﬂects the interest rate response of bank credit supply as well as
the interest rate response of bank credit demand. The interest rate sensitivity of loan demand
in turn reﬂects the operation of alternative monetary policy transmission channels such as
the interest rate or exchange rate channel.
Besides solving these issues, the present empirical results oﬀer the following avenues for
future research. Firstly, the evidence suggests that cross-industry diﬀerences in the response
of bank lending to changes in bank credit demand and monetary policy cause the re-allocation
of bank credit from one industry to another, ceteris paribus.57 Because industry performance
also depends on the access to external ﬁnance, it would be particularly interesting from a
policy perspective to determine the degree of sectoral credit shifts. If sectoral credit shifts are
large, they will cause ﬁrms in some industries to be credit constrained even in the absence of
credit market imperfections. Secondly, the present study has assumed that industry output
growth and industry inﬂation aﬀect bank lending unilaterally. However, the causal relationship
is equally likely to run from bank lending growth to output growth and inﬂation. Panel
causality tests would help to determine the nature and strength of the uni- or bi-directional
relationships. Because conclusions are likely to diﬀer between industries, the corresponding
evidence would provide more details on the determinants of the industry structure of bank
credit portfolios.
This list of ideas is certainly not exhaustive. It becomes evident, however, that the present
study should be viewed as starting point for future research on the industry eﬀects of bank
lending.
57The ceteris paribus condition refers to the proﬁtability and eﬃciency of industries.176 Chapter 5
Annex 5A Data Sources and Descriptions
The following overview lists the industries for which data on economic activity, prices, and
industry characteristics are compiled. The second column labels the industry as it will be
abbreviated throughout the chapter.
Industry Abbreviation Source
Grand total NC
Mining and quarrying; electricity, gas, and water supply Energy NC
Total manufacturing NC
Food products, beverages and tobacco Food NC
Textiles and textile products Textiles NC
Wood and products of wood and cork Wood NC
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, and publishing Paper NC
Coke, reﬁned petroleum products, and nuclear fuel Coke NC
Chemicals and chemical products Chemicals NC
Rubber and plastics products Rubber and plastic NC
Other non-metallic mineral products Non-metallic mineral NC
Basic metals and fabricated metal products Metals NC
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. Machinery NC
Electrical and optical equipment Electrical equipment NC
Transport equipment Transport equipment NC
Construction Construction NC
Agriculture, forestry, and ﬁshing Agriculture GSO
Services Service GSO
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs Trade GSO
Transport and communication Transport GSO
Finance and insurance Finance GSO
Note: NC = New Cronos database of Eurostat, GSO = German statistical oﬃce.
The empirical analysis does not include all industries individually, but also combinations of
sectors. An aggregation of sectors is necessitated by the deﬁnition of industry sectors in
the borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The following industries are treated
as a single unit: (i) wood and paper; (ii) coke and chemicals; (iii) machinery and transport
equipment.
With few exceptions, monthly data on the industry production index and industry price index,
and annual data on the number of enterprises with 1 to 19 employees are compiled from the
New Cronos database of Eurostat (NC). The monthly data are converted into quarterly data.
Industry data on agriculture, services, wholesale and retail trade, ﬁnance and insurance, and
transport and communication are obtained from the German statistical oﬃce (GSO). Data
on value added, employment, gross capital stock, imports, exports, and operating surplus are
available from the OECD’s STAN database for Industrial Analysis at an annual frequency.
Data on bank characteristics are compiled from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monthly bank
balance sheet statistics. The analysis uses information on total assets (TA), bank capital
(K), and liquidity (A). Bank capital includes subscribed capital, reserves, capital represented5A Data Sources and Descriptions 177
by participation rights and by the fund for general banking risk. Liquidity is deﬁned as the
sum of cash; balances with the central banks; treasury bills, treasury certiﬁcates, and similar
debt instruments issued by public authorities (eligible for reﬁnancing); debt securities; shares
and other variable-yield securities; claims on credit institutions with an agreed maturity or
redeemable at notice of one year or less (short-term interbank claims).58
Data on bank-speciﬁc lending to eight main industries and nine sub-sectors of the manufactur-
ing industry are compiled from the quarterly borrower statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
58The determinants of liquidity are ranked according to liquidity. From the top to the bottom, liquidity
declines. See B¨ uschgen (1998, chapter 4.B) for details.178 Chapter 5
Annex 5B Variable Description
The vector of bank characteristics Xb in equation (5.1) includes variables related to bank
eﬃciency and proﬁtability: total assets (TA), liquidity (A), and bank capital (K). In line with
existing studies (cf. Ehrmann et al., 2003; Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Worms, 2003),
the level of bank-speciﬁc capital (Capb), broad liquidity (Bliqb), narrow liquidity (Nliqb),a n d
short-term interbank claims (Ibkb) is normalized with respect to the average across all banks





































































respectively. The bank characteristics are expressed in terms of total assets to de-trend these
series. To this end, we assume that bank capitalization, liquidity, and interbank claims follow
similar trends as asset size. Total assets (TA) are also normalized with respect to the mean
across all banks, but de-trending requires the normalization for each single data point. This
yields the following measure of bank asset size






Normalization with respect to the average across all banks means that the indicator variables
Size, Cap, Bliq, Nliq, and Ibk sum to zero over all observations. Because of this property,
the interaction terms in equation (5.1) in the main text are on average equal to zero. In
addition, the coeﬃcient estimate γ1j directly reﬂects the average eﬀect of monetary policy
on bank credit growth.5C Alternative Model Speciﬁcations 179
Annex 5C Alternative Model Speciﬁcations
Table 5C.1 summarizes the main diﬀerences between the benchmark model and the alternative
model speciﬁcations.
Table 5C.1: Summary of Model Speciﬁcations
Benchmark Model
• Bank credit demand variables; Sample period 1992:1-2002:4; 1 single interaction term.
Augmented Model A
• No bank credit demand variables; Sample period 1992:1-2002:4; 1 single interaction term.
Augmented Model B
• Bank credit demand variables; Sample period 1992:1-2002:4; 3-4 single interaction terms (SIT).
Model 1: SIT for Size, Cap, Bliq,
Model 2: SIT for Size, Cap, Nliq,
Model 3: SIT for Size, Cap, Ibk,
Model 4: SIT for Size, Cap, Ibk, Nliq.
Augmented Model C
• Bank credit demand variables; Sample period 1992:1-2002:4; 1 double interaction term (DIT).
Model 1: DIT for Size, Ibk,
Model 2: DIT for Cap, Ibk,
Model 3: DIT for Nliq, Ibk.
Model 4: DIT for Size, Cap.
Augmented Model D
• Bank credit demand variables; Sample period 1992:1-2002:4; 1 single interaction term; Relative
model (see equation 5C.1).
Augmented Model E
• Bank credit demand variables; Sample period 1995:1-2002:4; 1 single interaction term.
In order to control for the relative importance of industries in a bank’s portfolio relative to the






























γ5Xb,t−1ΔrM,t−j +  bi,t. (5C.1)6
The Asymmetric Eﬀects of Monetary Policy on
Industry Performance
6.1 Introduction
There is considerable empirical research on the real eﬀects of monetary policy actions. The
studies diﬀer in that they assume that monetary policy shocks have either symmetric or
asymmetric eﬀects on real economic activity. Asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy shocks
are traditionally modeled in at least three diﬀerent, but complementary and integrated ways.
The most common type of asymmetry is the ’traditional Keynesian’ asymmetry which stresses
asymmetries in the real eﬀects of monetary policy over monetary expansions and monetary
contractions. The ’sign’ eﬀect of monetary policy requires prices to be rigid downwards but
ﬂexible upwards. The aggregate supply curve that coincides with these patterns is convex.
For this shape of the aggregate supply curve, a monetary expansion has a larger eﬀect on
prices but a smaller eﬀect on output than a monetary contraction.1 Empirical support for
the ’traditional Keynesian’ asymmetry is derived by, among others, Cover (1992), Rhee and
Rich (1995), Karras (1996a, 1996b), Ravn and Sola (2004), Karras and Stokes (1999), and
Lobo (2000).2 The evidence shows that a contractionary monetary policy shock has a strong
negative eﬀect on output, while the output eﬀect of an expansionary monetary policy shock is
either insigniﬁcant or less pronounced. On the other hand, Ravn and Sola (1996) document
in a study for the United States that these asymmetries nearly disappear when one controls
f o rr e g i m es h i f t si nm o n e t a r yp o l i c y .
Another type of asymmetry is referred to as ’state’ asymmetry. This concept links the real
eﬀects of monetary policy to the business cycle and argues that monetary policy is more
eﬀective during a recession than during a boom.3 Similar to the sign asymmetry, the cyclical
asymmetry in the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks is, on the one hand, attributable to
1The extreme case assumes prices to be perfectly rigid (ﬂexible) below (above) equilibrium output. For
this case, the short-run aggregate supply curve is horizontal up to equilibrium output and vertical at full
employment. Monetary expansions then do not have real eﬀects (e.g., Florio, 2004).
2Lobo (2000) adopts a diﬀerent focus and stresses the sign eﬀects of monetary policy on stock returns
rather than on output. The interest rate response of stock returns is stronger for monetary contractions than
for expansions.
3See section 2.2.3 for more details.
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downward (upward) sticky (ﬂexible) prices and the corresponding properties of the convex
aggregate supply curve. On the other hand, state asymmetry is attributable to the credit
channel eﬀects of monetary policy through either bank lending or net worth. At the core of this
monetary transmission channel are credit market imperfections and information asymmetries
which inﬂuence the availability of and the need for external ﬁnance. Information asymmetries
are less pronounced in periods of economic booms when net worth of potential borrowers is
high. Because the risk of loan losses is low compared with recession periods, external ﬁnance
is more readily available and the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are contemplated to
be weak.4 Empirical support for state asymmetry is reported by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Garcia and Schaller (2002), Kakes (1998), Weise (1999), Dolado and Mar´ ıa-Dolores (2001),
and Peersman and Smets (2005). The underlying studies show that monetary policy shocks
are less eﬀective in periods of high output growth. Bruinshoofd and Candelon (2005), in
contrast, only report weak evidence of state asymmetry for European countries and Thoma
(1994) in a study for the United States ﬁnds monetary contractions to have stronger eﬀects
in periods of high economic growth.
The third type of asymmetry stresses diﬀerences in the size of monetary policy shocks.
The ’size’ eﬀects of monetary policy asymmetry are linked to menu costs in price setting
and hence to the degree of price stickiness at the production side of the economy. Menu
costs cause small monetary policy shocks to have real eﬀects since they induce ﬁrms not to
adjust nominal prices. A ﬁxed price strategy is optimal for small shocks because the cost of
price adjustment then exceeds that associated with the change in product demand. On the
contrary, large monetary policy shocks are neutral because proﬁt maximization requires ﬁrms
to pay the menu cost.5 Empirical research conﬁrms the existence of size eﬀects of monetary
policy. Ravn and Sola (2004) in a study for the United States show that only small negative
monetary policy shocks have real eﬀects.6 Weise (1999) provides more detail. He illustrates
that the long-run output eﬀects of small contractionary monetary policy shocks are somewhat
larger than those of large shocks when the US economy is in a recession.7 However, large
contractionary monetary policy shocks cause a disproportionately larger long-run decline in
output compared with small shocks when the economy is initially in a boom period.
Existing empirical research on the state, size, and sign eﬀects of monetary policy usually
builds on macroeconomic rather than on industry or even microeconomic data. Studies which
use industry data diﬀer in that they assume monetary policy shocks to have symmetric8 or
4See, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) for the underlying model and Florio (2004) for a graphical
illustration. Chapter 2 surveys the credit channel literature in detail.
5See Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Ball and Romer (1990), and Ball and Mankiw (1994) for details.
The corresponding studies explain price rigidities by arguing that ﬁxed-price strategies are associated with
second-order (ﬁrst-order) costs in the presence of small (large) shocks.
6This ﬁnding lends support to the principle of ’hybrid’ asymmetry (Ball and Mankiw, 1994) that combines
the predictions of the ’Keynesian’ asymmetry and the ’menu cost’ asymmetry.
7Weise (1999) deﬁnes the long-run response as the cumulative response over twelve quarters.
8See, for example, Ganley and Salmon (1997), Arnold (2000), Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000), Dedola and6.1 Introduction 183
asymmetric9 eﬀects on industry output. The industry studies on asymmetry predominantly
test whether monetary policy eﬀects are inﬂuenced by the business cycle position of an
industry. That is, they disregard possible sign and size eﬀects of monetary policy and assume
an expansionary and contractionary monetary policy change to have a symmetric, albeit
opposite, eﬀect on industry-speciﬁc output. The corresponding empirical evidence points to
(i) the role of industries as propagation mechanism of monetary policy changes and (ii) to
cross-industry diﬀerences in the cyclical asymmetry of monetary policy eﬀects.
The present chapter provides evidence of the state and sign eﬀects of monetary policy and
cautious evidence of size eﬀects.10 The study’s main contribution to the existing literature
on the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy is that it investigates whether monetary con-
tractions and expansions aﬀect industry output growth (i) to the same extent (sign eﬀects),
(ii) to the same extent during economic booms and downturns (state eﬀects), and (iii) to
the same extent for diﬀerent magnitudes of the monetary policy change (size eﬀects). The
answer to each question emphasizes cross-industry diﬀerences in the degree of capital inten-
sity, trade openness, and in the availability of internal funds of ﬁnance as possible sources of
cross-industry diﬀerences in the state, sign, and size eﬀects of monetary policy. As empha-
sized in the preceding chapters, a detailed understanding of the industry eﬀects of monetary
policy should be of critical importance to central banks in general and the European Central
Bank in particular because it facilitates assessments as to the macroeconomic real eﬀects of
a monetary policy change of particular size and sign.
This study documents asymmetries in monetary policy eﬀects for a panel dataset of 24
industry sectors in either Germany, Italy, or Spain, using quarterly data for the period 1995:1-
2002:4. Because the data for each country refer to the same sectoral disaggregation and
sample period, our results are directly comparable across the three economies. Anticipating
the results, monetary policy changes have asymmetric eﬀects on industry output growth.
Conclusions as to the direction and strength of the sign eﬀects of monetary policy here
crucially depend on the choice of country. This points to the heterogeneity of countries and
explains why we do not consider a country panel dimension as done by, for example, Peersman
and Smets (2005). As regards size and state eﬀects, the evidence suggests that monetary
policy eﬀectiveness is hardly determined by the magnitude of the monetary policy change or
by business cycle eﬀects. This conclusion applies to all countries.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides theoretical reasons
for the role of industry composition as determinant of the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary
policy. We emphasize the transmission of positive and negative monetary policy shocks
through the interest rate, credit, and exchange rate channel. Section 6.3 describes the
empirical model, the estimation approach, and the data. Section 6.4 reports and interprets
Lippi (2005), and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004).
9See, among others, Dolado and Mar´ ıa-Dolores (2001) and Peersman and Smets (2005).
10See section 6.3.1 for caveats related to the estimation of size eﬀects.184 Chapter 6
the empirical results. We summarize the results and conclude in section 6.5.
6.2 Literature Review
This study asks whether expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks have dif-
ferential eﬀects on industry output growth. The industry focus is motivated by the existing
evidence on the industry eﬀects of monetary policy which shows that industries diﬀer in their
sensitivity to monetary policy changes. Monetary policy eﬀectiveness may therefore depend
on the relative importance of industries in an economy. This, however, suggests that regional
diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy can result from regional dissimilarities in
industry composition. Evidence of regional or cross-country disparities in industry eﬀects of
monetary policy is provided by Hayo and Uhlenbrock (2000) and Arnold and Vrugt (2004)
for Germany, by Carlino and DeFina (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2000) and Arnold (2000) for the
United States, and by Dedola and Lippi (2005) and Peersman and Smets (2005) for OECD
and European countries.11
Because industries are not equally distributed across regions within countries or between
countries, cross-industry heterogeneity in monetary policy sensitivity is likely to have real
distributional and hence social eﬀects in terms of output and unemployment.12 If it holds
that contractionary monetary policy shocks aﬀect industries more than expansionary shocks,
these distributional eﬀects are most prevalent in periods of tight monetary policy. Similarly, if
cyclical asymmetries in monetary policy eﬀectiveness are such that monetary policy changes
are more eﬀective during economic downturns than during booms, these distributional eﬀects
are stronger in periods of economic downturns.
The literature on the propagation of monetary policy shocks suggests several explanations
for cross-industry diﬀerences in the sign and state eﬀects of monetary policy. These involve,
among others, the operation of an interest rate (cost-of-capital) channel13, credit channel,
or exchange rate channel. The remainder of this section explains the expected relationships.
Because the underlying explanations are equally valid for analyses of state and sign eﬀects, the
discussion of industry eﬀects is kept general. One has to remember that the industry eﬀects
are likely to be weaker for monetary policy changes in periods of booms than in recessions.
Proponents of the interest rate channel argue that the monetary policy response of industry
11Also see the evidence for the United States and Europe in chapter 4.
12Arnold (2000) suggests that cross-industry diﬀerences in unemployment risk are compensated by cross-
industry heterogeneity in wages and in the return on capital. If this is true, diﬀerences in the interest rate
sensitivity of industries would not have distributional eﬀects. However, empirical evidence lends weak support
to this claim.
13The interest rate channel is also referred to as the cost-of-capital channel. This reference denotes the
observation that industry output is responsive to changes in the user cost of capital, which itself is inﬂuenced
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output is driven by supply- and demand-side adjustments, with the response on both segments
working in diﬀerent directions. Demand-side adjustments describe the extent to which the
demand curve for industry-speciﬁc goods shifts in response to monetary policy changes. The
magnitude of the demand shift is inﬂuenced by the nature of the industry good, with demand
for durable consumption and investment goods being more responsive to monetary policy
changes.14 Because durable consumption and investment goods tend to be produced by
capital-intensive industries, monetary-policy-induced demand shifts are more pronounced for
these sectors.
Supply-side adjustments refer to the extent to which industries adjust prices so as to mitigate
output ﬂuctuations due to monetary policy changes. An indicator of the degree of price
stickiness in each sector is the slope of the industry supply curve. Following Caballero and
Engel (1993) and Ball and Mankiw (1994), the supply curve is steeper and output ﬂuctuations
are thus smaller for industries with more ﬂexible prices. We assume that the degree of price
rigidities is less pronounced for capital-intensive industries. To illustrate, capital-intensive
production is associated with large ﬁxed costs that are incurred regardless of the degree of
capital and capacity utilization. In order to respond to a monetary-policy-induced change in
output demand, capital-intensive industries may therefore adjust prices faster so as to keep
output and consequently inventories steady. If the monetary-policy-induced supply-side eﬀect
dominates the demand-side eﬀect, output of capital-intensive industries may respond less to
monetary policy changes than that of capital-extensive industries.
Conﬁned to the context of open economies, the exchange rate channel attributes cross-
industry diﬀerences in monetary policy eﬀectiveness to cross-industry asymmetries in the
degree of openness to trade. Again, the output response of industries involves demand- and
supply-side adjustments. Considering demand-side adjustments, shifts in demand may be
less pronounced for open than for closed industries in view of the fact that open industries
also serve foreign markets. However, one can also argue that shifts in demand are more
pronounced for open industries due to the adverse demand eﬀects of monetary-policy-induced
exchange rate developments. This eﬀect is likely to prevail in the short run with sticky prices
when monetary policy changes have real exchange rate eﬀects. A monetary contraction, for
example, may cause the decline in demand to be more pronounced for open industries given
that the appreciation of the currency causes industry output to be more expensive in an
international comparison.15
Supply-side adjustments can mitigate this exchange rate eﬀect. Comparable with the inter-
est rate channel, supply-side adjustments describe the extent to which industries mitigate
output ﬂuctuations by lowering or increasing prices. The relationship between openness and
the degree of price rigidity is such that open industries are assumed to increase and lower
14Also refer to section 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 and to Kalckreuth (2003) for an overview of the factors that determine
the demand for investment goods.
15Also see Peersman and Smets (2005) for a similar view.186 Chapter 6
prices faster than closed industries in response to expansionary and contractionary monetary
policy changes. For a monetary expansion, the depreciation of a country’s currency results
in higher wage demands given the shift in demand from foreign to domestic goods and the
consequent increase in the utilization of production factors. This development is likely to
be stronger in open than in closed industries, especially when the monetary-policy-induced
increase in demand involves capacity adjustments through labor rather than through capital.
In order to maintain proﬁts, open industries increase prices. For a monetary contraction, the
monetary-policy-induced currency appreciation and the consequent loss in (short-run) inter-
national competitiveness puts greater downward pressure on prices and wages in open than
in closed industries given that the goods produced by the former are replaced with cheaper
imported goods. Overall, the larger response of prices causes the output supply curve to be
comparatively steeper in open industries. This, however, suggests that the monetary policy
response of open industries primarily concerns price rather than quantity adjustments. Stated
diﬀerently, the response of industry output to contractionary and expansionary monetary pol-
icy changes is less pronounced for open than for closed industries.16
Cross-industry diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary contractions and expansions are also
attributable to credit channel eﬀects. As stated in section 2.2.2, the credit channel eﬀects
of monetary policy depend on the degree of credit market imperfections and on the access
of ﬁrms to external funds of ﬁnance. Regardless of the monetary policy stance, borrowers
(e.g., ﬁrms) with low net worth are more constrained from accessing bank and non-bank
sources of external ﬁnance and face a higher premium for external ﬁnance since they are
perceived to be more risky (cf. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). In view of these relationships,
the response of investment and ultimately output to monetary policy changes is likely to
be more pronounced for borrowers with low net worth and high credit demand. This line
of reasoning straightforwardly extends to the case of industries: industries with low balance
sheet positions face higher costs of external ﬁnance and tighter ﬁnancing constraints than
industries with high net worth. We expect this relationship to prevail for monetary expansions
and monetary contractions. Similar to the interest rate and exchange rate channel, the credit
channel eﬀects of monetary expansions and contractions can be asymmetric due to diﬀerences
in the upward and downward rigidity of the price of external ﬁnance. Again, prices are likely
to be more ﬂexible upwards than downwards.17 This suggests that the credit channel eﬀects
are potentially stronger during monetary contractions than expansions.
Among the existing industry studies, there are only few which explain the industry eﬀects
of monetary policy with industry characteristics associated with the interest rate, credit, or
16Karras (1999) uses a standard open-economy version of the IS-LM model to show that the output
(inﬂation) eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are weaker (stronger) in open than in closed economies. His
arguments are developed for symmetric monetary policy shocks.
17Gambacorta and Iannotti (2005) in a study for Italy show that interest rate adjustment in response to
negative and positive monetary policy changes is asymmetric in the short run, but not in the long run. Banks
are found to adjust lending rates faster in response to monetary contractions.6.2 Literature Review 187
exchange rate channel of monetary policy. Many of the corresponding studies do not allow
expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks to have asymmetric real eﬀects.
The exception is Peersman and Smets (2005). In a study for Euro zone member countries,
they identify the state eﬀects of monetary policy and explain cyclical asymmetries in the
industry eﬀects of monetary policy shocks with industry characteristics. In order to identify
the state eﬀects, expansionary and contractionary monetary policy shocks are modeled to
have symmetric, albeit opposite eﬀects on industry-speciﬁc output. In addition, Peersman
and Smets (2005) assume that all industries are at the same business cycle position at the
time of the monetary policy shock. That is, they do not allow for cross-industry diﬀerences in
the timing and magnitude of cyclical ﬂuctuations.18 This is a restrictive assumption in view of
the fact that the industry eﬀects of monetary policy are determined by the actual output level.
Given the explanations of state asymmetry, the output eﬀects of monetary policy shocks are
lower in periods of high output (boom) than in periods of low output (recession).
Similar to Peersman and Smets (2005), the present study also stresses asymmetries in the
industry eﬀects of monetary policy in European countries, but contributes to the earlier study
in a number of ways. Firstly, although we also test for asymmetries in the real eﬀects of
monetary policy over the business cycle, the tests for state asymmetry do not treat the
cyclical position of industries as being exogenous to industry output growth. Instead, we
construct an industry-speciﬁc indicator variable of the business cycle stance. Secondly, the
present analysis does not stop at testing for state eﬀects, but also derives the sign eﬀects of
monetary policy on industry output. When testing for sign asymmetries of monetary policy,
we also ask whether the strength of the monetary policy eﬀect depends on the size of the
monetary policy change. That is, we test for size asymmetries. Thirdly, while Peersman and
Smets (2005) estimate a panel that combines the industry- and country-dimension of the data,
we consider country-speciﬁc panel models for Germany, Spain, and Italy, using data on 24
industries.19 The estimation of country-speciﬁc panels avoids the potential problem of cross-
sectional dependence across EMU countries. A possible source of cross-sectional dependence
between countries is the nature of the European exchange rate mechanism prior to 1999 when
Germany was the only European economy with monetary sovereignty. Besides this factor,
it is likely that the cross-sectional dependence between countries would be ampliﬁed by the
cross-sectional dependence between industries. We use data on 24 industries, which include
21 manufacturing industries, two sub-sectors of the mining industry, and the electricity, gas,
and water supply sector. In using a ﬁner classiﬁcation than Peersman and Smets (2005), the
present analysis can draw a richer picture as to the industry eﬀects of monetary policy by
allowing for more cross-sectional variation.
18Peersman and Smets (2005) treat the probabilities of being in a boom or recession as exogenous to
industry-speciﬁc output growth. The business cycle position is approximated for the aggregate Euro area.
19Peersman and Smets (2005) estimate a panel model for a sample of 11 manufacturing industries from
seven European countries.188 Chapter 6
6.3 Empirical Framework
The analysis of monetary policy asymmetry is complicated by the identiﬁcation of the ex-
ogenous component of monetary policy changes.20 In order to overcome the identiﬁcation
problem, many studies use a vector autoregressive (VAR) model. Existing research hereby
approximates the monetary policy shocks from a considerable number of variables such as,
for example, short-term interest rates or measures of broad and narrow money supply. The
VAR approach is criticized for the underlying ad hoc modeling assumptions regarding the
causal relationship between economic performance and monetary policy.21 In response to
this shortcoming, some studies adopt the narrative approach of Romer and Romer (1989)
or use event studies (Kuttner, 2001; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2004; Bernanke and Kuttner,
2005). Unfortunately, data availability conﬁnes the applicability of narrative and event studies
to the United States.
Most studies on the sign and state eﬀects of monetary policy employ a two-step procedure
to resolve the identiﬁcation bias. In the ﬁrst step, a measure of monetary policy (i.e., money
growth or the money market interest rate) is regressed on its own lagged values and on a
vector of other lagged variables like aggregate output growth and inﬂation.22 The residuals of
the money equation are used as proxy variables of contractionary and expansionary monetary
policy shocks. In the second stage of the analysis, an output equation is speciﬁed which
deﬁnes aggregate output growth as a function of its own lagged values and of lagged values
of the residuals from the ﬁrst step estimation. Of course, the two-equation system will
only resolve the identiﬁcation bias inherent to the use of monetary aggregates or the money
market interest rate if the monetary policy shock is exogenous to output growth. This,
however, requires the residuals of the money equation to be uncorrelated with output growth.
Unfortunately, this condition is hardly met. Furthermore, the empirical consistency of the
results hinges on the assumption that the error terms of the money and output equation
are independent. However, when the error terms of the money equation are not exogenous
to output growth, the residuals of the money equation will then also be correlated with the
residuals of the output equation in dynamic speciﬁcations. The present analysis acknowledges
these drawbacks and tries to control for at least some.
20Refer to section 2.3.1 for a detailed discussion of the identiﬁcation problem.
21Gordon and Leeper (1994), Bernanke and Mihov (1998), and Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), among
others, discuss and criticize the ad hoc nature of modeling assumptions.
22See Cover (1992), Rhee and Rich (1995), Karras (1996a, 1996b), and Karras and Stokes (1999) for
studies that use monetary aggregates and Morgan (1993) for a study which employs the money market
interest rate as monetary policy measure. See Florio (2004) for a survey of the literature that uses the yield
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6.3.1 Empirical Model Speciﬁcations
This section discusses the empirical model, the empirical methodology, and the data used to
investigate the state, sign, and size eﬀects of monetary policy for industries in Germany, Italy,
and Spain. The present analysis diﬀers from earlier studies with respect to the deﬁnition
of the monetary policy stance. As stated, existing empirical research identiﬁes monetary
policy shocks as the residuals of money supply or interest rate equations. We depart from
this approach and approximate monetary policy changes directly with changes in national
short-term interest rates.
Interest rates are the preferred indicator of the monetary policy stance for at least four reasons.
Firstly, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue that the short-term interest rate is less susceptible
to changes in economic conditions and hence less sensitive to the endogeneity bias inherent
to the two-step procedure. Secondly, Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997), Bernanke and
Mihov (1998), and McCallum (1999) reason that tests of monetary policy transmission should
not exclusively be concerned with the eﬀects of random exogenous shocks since their contri-
bution to the variability in monetary policy is comparatively small. Thirdly, the contribution
of unexpected interest rate changes to industry performance is likely to be small compared
with expected interest rate changes. Even expected interest rate changes aﬀect industries.
The reason is that industry performance depends on the interaction of numerous supply- and
demand-side factors whose interest rate response cannot be perfectly anticipated. Finally,
the sample period 1995:1-2002:4 is characterized by the transition towards the European
economic and monetary union. For the sampled countries, a proxy variable of monetary pol-
icy shocks would predominantly reﬂect eﬀects associated with the convergence of national
interest rates towards a common level rather than unexpected disturbances.
Because changes in the monetary policy stance are directly approximated with observable
changes in the short-term interest rate, the present analysis only estimates a single output
equation rather than a two-equation system. In order to diﬀerentiate the asymmetric output
growth eﬀects of monetary policy, we deﬁne a number of output equations. Common to
all speciﬁcations is that they employ the nominal short-term interest rate as measure of the
monetary policy stance. The remainder of this section presents the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.23
The explanatory variables’ expected signs are summarized at the end of this section.
(i) Symmetric Benchmark Model
We ﬁrst deﬁne a benchmark model that does not allow for asymmetries in the output eﬀects
of monetary policy. Monetary policy transmission is deﬁned according to
23The diﬀerent models initially also include a proxy variable of energy price inﬂation in order to capture
the output growth eﬀects of supply shocks. Because the long-run coeﬃcient of the energy price variable is
insigniﬁcant in almost all speciﬁcations, we exclude this variable. Furthermore, we do not include industry-
speciﬁc inﬂation in order to avoid that industry-speciﬁc supply shocks and their impact on prices blur the
eﬀect of monetary policy on industry output.190 Chapter 6









β3j (Chari,t−jΔrM,t−j)+ it. (6.1)
Δyit represents the ﬁrst log-diﬀerence of real output of industry i = 1,...,Na tt i m et=
1,...,T .T h ev a r i a b l er M denotes the country-speciﬁc nominal money market interest rate.
In order to identify the eﬀect of industry characteristics on the output eﬀects of monetary
policy, the interest rate change ΔrM at time t-j is interacted with the industry characteristics
Chari at time t-j. The vector of industry-speciﬁc characteristics (Char) includes a measure of
capital intensity, openness to trade, and an indicator for the availability of internal ﬁnancial
funds. These variables, respectively, approximate the interest rate, exchange rate, and credit
channel eﬀects of monetary policy. In order to avoid that the estimates are confounded by
scale eﬀects, the industry characteristics are normalized with respect to the mean across all
industries for each single point in time. The benchmark model is also estimated without
industry characteristics in order to assess the robustness of the results.
(ii) Sign Eﬀects Model
Model (6.1) assumes that positive and negative monetary policy shocks have symmetric
output eﬀects. In order to control for possible asymmetries in the output eﬀects of positive
(i.e., contractionary, r
+
M) and negative (i.e., expansionary, r
−
M) interest rate changes, the model
is modiﬁed according to



































+  it. (6.2)
In order to be able to explain the industry output growth eﬀects of monetary expansions and
contractions, they are interacted with the structural industry characteristics.24 We deﬁne






M,t ≡ min(ΔrM,t,μ). (6.3)
The parameter μ denotes a threshold level beyond which monetary policy is deemed to con-
tract or expand for all industries. Here, we follow the traditional literature on the asymmetric
24Karras (1999) and Peersman and Smets (2005) employ a comparable approach.6.3 Empirical Framework 191
eﬀects of monetary policy25 and set the threshold level of monetary expansions and contrac-
tions equal to zero for all industries. That is, μ = 0.
(iii) Size Eﬀects Model
In a next step, we augment the existing literature on monetary policy asymmetry and allow
the threshold μ to be non-zero so as to capture possible size eﬀects of monetary policy. This
approach is motivated by the menu cost argument which states that small monetary policy
shocks have real eﬀects, whereas large monetary policy shocks are neutral.26 For a non-zero
threshold, the analysis is augmented by a ’midrange’ of interest rate changes. These will have
a signiﬁcant industry output growth eﬀect if the menu cost argument holds: only monetary
policy changes which are larger than the non-zero threshold μ have a neutral eﬀect. Figure
6.1 summarizes these relationships.
Figure 6.1: The Size Eﬀects of Monetary Policy
25See, for example, Rhee and Rich (1995) and Karras (1996a, 1996b).
26Section 6.1 provides details.192 Chapter 6
In order to investigate the response of industry output growth to monetary policy changes in
the midrange −μ<r
±
M <μ , equation (6.2) is rewritten as
















































+  it. (6.4)
Here, ± denotes the observations associated with the midrange of interest rate changes.
Model (6.4) is certainly restrictive in that it only allows for asymmetries in the output growth
eﬀects of large shocks. Expansionary and contractionary monetary policy changes in the
midrange are assumed to have symmetric output growth eﬀects. This speciﬁcation is re-
ported for computational reasons. To illustrate, tests for size eﬀects would ideally allow for
asymmetries in the eﬀects of small as well as large monetary contractions and expansions. In
the present study, the corresponding estimations are not feasible given the small number of
cross sections and the low variability in the nominal interest rate change.
An alternative more direct test of the menu cost argument would (i) allow for asymmetries in
the output growth eﬀects of small expansionary and contractionary monetary policy changes
and (ii) impose the symmetry assumption on large monetary policy changes. The structure
of the underlying model controls for the prediction of the menu cost argument according to
which small positive and negative changes have output growth eﬀects and large positive and
negative monetary policy changes are neutral. Although this speciﬁcation is intrinsically more
appealing, we do not report the corresponding empirical results because the residuals do not
satisfy the normality assumption in estimations for Germany, Italy, and Spain. The coeﬃcient
estimates are consequently inconsistent. The present analysis therefore uses speciﬁcation
(6.4) to investigate the size eﬀects of monetary policy. Because the empirical results are
derived from a restrictive model, the evidence of possible size eﬀects needs to be interpreted
with care and is only indicative.
Another limitation of the size eﬀects speciﬁcation concerns the deﬁnition of small and large
monetary policy changes. In general, the analysis of the size eﬀects requires a clear deﬁnition
of small and large monetary policy changes. For example, a small and large monetary policy
change can be deﬁned as a one or two standard deviation change in the interest rate, re-
spectively. Unfortunately, the present study cannot employ this deﬁnition because the small
time and cross-section dimension precludes the estimation of the consequent model due to
singularity problems. We therefore adopt a very simplistic approach and deﬁne the non-zero6.3 Empirical Framework 193
threshold μ as the largest change in the interest rate for which the model can still be es-
timated. If the menu cost argument applies, large positive and negative monetary policy
changes are expected to have at least smaller industry output growth eﬀects than small
monetary policy changes. We use step size 0.01 to cover all possible thresholds between
max(rM,t,μ) and min(rM,t,μ).
A diﬀerent weakness results from the failure of the present model to discriminate the size
eﬀects of monetary policy which are inherent to the predictions of (i) the investment model
(cf. Figure 3.3) and (ii) the menu cost model (cf. Figure 6.1). At the core of this limitation
are cross-model diﬀerences in the factors that explain the size eﬀects of monetary policy.
Considering the investment model, it emphasizes investment irreversibility and capital ad-
justment costs as factors that determine the real eﬀects of monetary policy. The model takes
output prices as given and does not specify a pricing rule that controls for price stickiness
and possible costs of price adjustment. Furthermore, the investment model assumes that
expansionary and contractionary monetary policy changes have symmetric eﬀects. In con-
trast to the investment model, the menu cost model argues that price adjustment is costly
and asymmetric for monetary expansions and contractions. Similar to the sign and state
asymmetries of monetary policy, the size asymmetries result from rigidities in price setting.
The analysis in the present chapter stresses the menu cost argument to explain possible size
eﬀects of monetary policy. The limited focus is, on the one hand, motivated by the observation
that the menu cost model allows for asymmetries in the eﬀects of monetary expansions and
contractions. Besides this reason, we also emphasize the menu cost argument because the
corresponding empirical investigations are less data intensive compared with tests of the
investment channel. For example, tests of the menu cost model do not require information
on the size distribution of ﬁrms given the model’s implicit assumption that small and large
ﬁrms display the same response to monetary policy changes. In contrast, the analysis in
chapter 3 has shown that data on the size distribution of ﬁrms in a particular industry or
on the distribution of industries dominated by either small or large ﬁrms are a necessary
prerequisite for tests of the investment channel. Unfortunately, such data are unavailable for
the present set of industries.
(iv) State Eﬀects Model
In order to determine whether the sign eﬀects of monetary policy are inﬂuenced by diﬀerences
in the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy over the business cycle, the sign eﬀects model (6.2) is
a u g m e n t e dw i t ha ni n d u s t r y - s p e c i ﬁ cb i n a r yd u m m yD i that approximates the business cycle
position of industries.27 The dummy is speciﬁed to equal one if industry-speciﬁc actual real
output growth is lower than industry-speciﬁc real trend output growth and zero otherwise.28
27See Karras and Stokes (1999) and Karras (1996a) for comparable speciﬁcations.
28The trend growth rate is determined with the Tramo/Seats procedure, with adjustment for working day
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The output equation (6.2) is modiﬁed to





















































+  it. (6.5)
We do not test for state (cyclical) eﬀects in the non-zero threshold model (6.4) in view of
the fact that the consequent analysis would ask for deﬁnitions of mild and strong boom and
recession periods.
(v) Deﬁnition of the Long-Run Coeﬃcients and Expected Signs
We summarize the industry output growth eﬀects of expansionary and contractionary mon-
etary policy changes by computing the long-run elasticities of industry output growth with
respect to the explanatory variables in the benchmark, sign, state, and size speciﬁcation.29
For example, the long-run coeﬃcient of monetary expansions β
−
LR,rM and contractions β
+
LR,rM
is deﬁned as the sum of the lags of the interest rate variable, divided by one minus the sum



















j=1 β1j. The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms are computed in the same
way. Because all long-run coeﬃcients are a non-linear function of the estimated parameters,
we derive the corresponding standard errors by means of the delta method. This approach
derives linear approximations of the standard errors with a one-step Taylor expansion (Rao,
1973; Greene, 2003).
In order to test for the presence of long-run asymmetric output growth eﬀects of positive and




LR,rM. We adopt a simple approach to
investigate the equality of the coeﬃcient estimates and implement mean equality tests for the




LR,rM.30 If the null hypothesis is not rejected, monetary policy





monetary policy changes will have more persistent eﬀects on industry output growth than
29We follow the existing literature when referring to long-run elasticities. Alternatively, the long-run coeﬃ-
cient can also be interpreted as the lasting response of industry output growth to changes in the explanatory
variables. Section 5.4.1 includes a comparable application.
30More appropriate log-likelihood ratio tests cannot be implemented for the long-run coeﬃcients because
these are constructed from the estimated short-run coeﬃcients in model (6.1) to (6.5). Log-likelihood ratio
tests for the short-run coeﬃcients of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations fail to produce sensible results.6.3 Empirical Framework 195
expansionary monetary policy changes, vice versa. This approach straightforwardly extends to
the remaining variables in the output equation. The results of the equality tests are available
on request.
This section concludes with an overview of the expected signs of the long-run coeﬃcient
estimates. To facilitate the readability, the expected signs are summarized in Table 6.1.
In the present chapter, the sign of the long-run coeﬃcients is inﬂuenced by the deﬁnition
of monetary expansions and contractions as negative and positive interest rate changes,
respectively.31 For this interpretation, a monetary expansion and contraction increases and
reduces industry output growth, respectively, if the long-run coeﬃcient on negative as well
as positive interest rate changes is negative. The industry output growth eﬀects of monetary
expansions and contractions are more pronounced during business cycle downturns if the
coeﬃcient on the interaction term between the business cycle dummy and the interest rate
change is statistically signiﬁcant and negative.
As regards the interaction term between each industry characteristic and the interest rate
change, the corresponding coeﬃcients are expected to display the same sign in tests of sign,
state, and size eﬀects. The distributional eﬀects of monetary policy are anticipated to be such
that the response of industry output growth to monetary policy is less pronounced for indus-
tries open to trade and for industries with high operating surplus.32 This holds for monetary
contractions and monetary expansions if the coeﬃcient on the interaction term between either
openness or operating surplus and the interest rate change is positive. Considering capital
intensity, no clear predictions can be drawn. As is argued in section 6.2, the monetary policy
response of industry output growth depends on the net eﬀect of monetary-policy-induced
demand- and supply-side adjustments. The sign, state, and size eﬀects of monetary policy
are more pronounced for capital-intensive industries if the demand-side eﬀects are stronger.
However, they are weaker if the supply-side eﬀects are the more important determinant of
output growth. Because the present chapter deﬁnes capital intensity on the labor side (see
section 6.3.3), demand-side (supply-side) eﬀects dominate the output growth response of
capital-intensive industries if the interaction term between capital intensity and the interest
rate change is positive (negative) for monetary expansions as well as contractions.
6.3.2 Methodology
Each output equation represents a ﬁxed eﬀects dynamic panel. Several approaches are avail-
able to estimate the system. For example, the dynamic panel could straightforwardly be
estimated with the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) approach. This method is gen-
31We only explain the expected signs for monetary contractions and expansions. The expected signs for




32As to openness, we assume that the demand-side eﬀect through exchange rate developments is compara-
tively weak (cf. section 6.2).196 Chapter 6
Table 6.1: Overview of Expected Signs
Long-Run Monetary Policy Eﬀect on Expected Sign for Δr−
M Expected Sign for Δr+
M
Industry Output Growth - -
Interaction with Business Cycle Dummy - -
I n t e r a c t i o nw i t hC a p i t a lI n t e n s i t y ±±
I n t e r a c t i o nw i t hO p e n n e s s + +
Interaction with Operating Surplus + +
Δr−
M and Δr+
M represent a monetary expansion (interest rate decline) and contraction (interest rate
increase), respectively.
erally advantageous since it accounts for the presence of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and
cross-sectional dependence. These issues are of particular importance in the present study
which relies on a set of heterogeneous, but possibly interdependent industries. Besides FGLS,
the dynamic panel could also be estimated with the generalized method of moments (GMM)
approach proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, recent studies have challenged
this method. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced GMM estimator has
poor ﬁnite sample properties when the degree of correlation between the lagged levels of the
variables and the subsequent ﬁrst diﬀerences is low. More precisely, the ﬁrst-diﬀerenced esti-
mator is downward biased and imprecise. The resulting weak instrument problem is shown to
be particularly prevalent for (near) unit root processes of the dependent variable. Oguzoglu
and Stengos (2005) criticize the GMM method as it attributes the same weight to all moment
conditions and favor empirical likelihood methods. Jung (2005) illustrates that Arellano and
Bond’s (1991) test of serial residual correlation may build on inconsistently estimated residu-
als. Because these are used to decide on the optimal over-identifying restrictions, coeﬃcient
estimates are likely to be inconsistent. Besides, GMM results tend to be very sensitive to the
instrument space used as instrument variable (Andrews and Lu, 2001).
In view of these points, we estimate the ﬁxed eﬀects dynamic panel speciﬁcations with the
feasible generalized least squares approach. In order to determine whether the cross-section
eﬀects are indeed ﬁxed, we compute Hausman (1978) test statistics for the zero threshold
speciﬁcations in equation (6.2).33 For the present set of speciﬁcations, the test statistics
suggest that a ﬁxed eﬀects rather than random eﬀects estimator is better suited to capture
the cross-section eﬀects, i.e., the heterogeneity of industries. The empirical speciﬁcations
therefore include industry-speciﬁc intercepts.34
33In principle, the Hausman test should also determine whether period eﬀects are ﬁxed or random. To
focus the analysis, we capture possible period eﬀects with time dummies, of which only the signiﬁcant ones
are retained in the (ﬁxed eﬀects) zero threshold speciﬁcation.
34The Hausman test statistics for the zero threshold estimations are available on request.6.3 Empirical Framework 197
6.3.3 Data
We identify the asymmetries of monetary policy eﬀects for Germany, Italy, and Spain over
the period 1995:1-2002:4. Quarterly information on the nominal money market interest rate
is obtained from Eurostat and from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. The
output equations comprise information on a panel of 24 industries: 21 manufacturing sectors,
two mining and quarrying sectors, and the electricity, gas, and water supply sector (i.e.,
utilities). For reason of comparability, the set of industries is similarly deﬁned for Germany,
Italy, and Spain. Admittedly, the country dimension of the analysis is small and the industry
dimension is biased towards manufacturing sectors. These properties are attributable to data
availability constraints on output and prices and industry characteristics, which restrict the
choice of countries and industries.35 The annex summarizes the industries for which data
are compiled. Quarterly seasonally adjusted data on the industry output and price index
are compiled from Eurostat’s New Cronos database for the time period 1995:1-2002:4. The
length of the sample period is restricted by the unavailability of industry-speciﬁc prices before
1995.
Information on proxy variables of capital intensity, openness, and the availability of internal
ﬁnancial funds is available from the OECD’s STAN database for Industrial Analysis for the
period 1995-2001/2.36 We deﬁne capital intensity on the labor side as the ratio of employment
over real value added. For this deﬁnition, the degree of capital intensity is inversely related to
the relative importance of employment per unit value of output. Trade openness is measured
as the ratio of the sum of imports and exports over value added. The availability of internal
ﬁnancial funds in each industry is approximated as the ratio of operating surplus and mixed
income over value added. We expect industries with positive and high operating surplus to
be less dependent on external ﬁnance and hence less responsive to monetary policy shocks
than industries with low or even negative operating surplus. Unfortunately, our measure of
internal ﬁnancial means is an imperfect balance sheet indicator and an imperfect measure
of creditworthiness for at least two reasons. Firstly, operating surplus does not identify
the share of assets that can be used as collateral. Because collateral is directly related
to the external ﬁnance premium, operating surplus is an imperfect proxy variable of credit
constraints. Secondly, the share of operating surplus does not approximate the borrowing
capacity of industries since it does not illustrate the amount of existing debt. Although
operating surplus is an imperfect credit channel variable, the present analysis still employs
this measure since periodic observations on alternative, more reliable credit channel variables
like the size distribution of ﬁrms are unavailable.
Data on industry-speciﬁc employment, operating surplus, and openness are only available
at an annual frequency. This is a clear drawback since it implies that the reliability of our
35For example, we cannot repeat the analysis for France since the panel dataset comprises at most 13
industries.
36The latest observation for capital intensity is 2002, while that for openness and operating surplus is 2001.198 Chapter 6
results from panel estimations with quarterly data depends on the time invariance of the
industry characteristics. Peersman and Smets (2005) deal with the unavailability of industry
characteristics at a higher than annual frequency by assuming the time invariance of the
data between any two years. Industry characteristics thus enter the analysis as constants.
Although we use comparable data, we do not assume that industry characteristics are constant
throughout time. Instead, we treat them as being time-invariant in any given year, but time-
variant across years so as to capture periodic changes in the relationship between output
growth and industry properties. This approach is disadvantageous to the extent that it
causes the quarterly data to be discontinuous. In order to eliminate the discontinuity of the
quarterly data, the annual data could be interpolated. Future research will determine the
sensitivity of the conclusions to the use of interpolated data.37
6.4 Empirical Results
This section reports the empirical results regarding the state, sign, and size eﬀects of monetary
policy. Regardless of the focal point, the models are estimated with four lags for all sampled
countries. This appears to be the optimal lag length according to the goodness of ﬁt measures
for FGLS.38 The empirical results are subject to a number of limitations. Considering the
evidence for Italy, we do not report results with operating surplus because of missing data. For
the same reason, the evidence from estimations with openness only reﬂects the information
on 23 industries.39 For Spain, the empirical evidence from all model speciﬁcations refers to
the sample period 1995:1-2001:4. The reason is that the residuals from estimations for the
longer period 1995:1-2002:4 are not normally distributed.40
The subsequent discussion of the long-run eﬀects of expansionary and contractionary mon-
etary policy changes is structured as follows. Section 6.4.1 describes the results of the
speciﬁcation which assumes symmetric output growth eﬀects of monetary expansions and
contractions. Section 6.4.2 analyzes the empirical results on the sign eﬀects of monetary
policy as derived from the zero threshold speciﬁcation. Section 6.4.3 asks whether possible
sign eﬀects of monetary policy also reﬂect business cycle asymmetries in monetary policy
eﬀectiveness. Finally, section 6.4.4 summarizes the evidence regarding the existence of size
eﬀects of monetary policy.
37Note, panel unit root tests suggest that the annual normalized and non-normalized industry characteristics
are usually I(0).
38More than four lags were not included because of the relatively short sample period.
39The utilities sector is dropped because openness for this sector is only deﬁned as of 2001.
40Although the residuals perform better, they are still occasionally non-normally distributed in estimations
for the shorter sample period. As a consequence, the interpretation of the corresponding results requires some
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6.4.1 Empirical Results Assuming Symmetry in Interest Rate Eﬀects
We start by discussing the evidence from the benchmark model in equation (6.1) which as-
sumes that expansionary and contractionary monetary policy changes have symmetric output
growth eﬀects. The long-run coeﬃcients are summarized in Table 6.2 for Germany, Spain,
and Italy. For Germany and Spain, the results suggest that changes in the nominal interest
rate have a non-neutral eﬀect on industry performance, with industry output growth rising
(falling) in response to monetary expansions (contractions). In contrast to Germany and
Spain, monetary policy changes have no persistent eﬀect on the output growth performance
of industries in Italy.
As regards the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy, the evidence for Italy, Spain, and
Germany does not indicate that industries open to trade are less aﬀected by monetary policy
changes. The results of the benchmark speciﬁcation hence do not point to the transmission
of monetary policy changes through an exchange rate channel. As to the credit channel
variable, we only document a signiﬁcant eﬀect of operating surplus on the output growth
eﬀect of monetary policy for Germany. However inconsistent with the credit channel view,
industries with a higher share of operating surplus display a larger rather than smaller output
growth response to a monetary contraction. Furthermore, capital-intensive industries do not
appear to respond diﬀerently to monetary policy changes than capital-extensive sectors in
Germany and Spain, while they display a stronger response to monetary policy changes in
Italy. The evidence for Italy is consistent with the view that industry output growth of capital-
intensive industries is inﬂuenced by monetary-policy-induced changes in goods demand. This
lends cautious support to the transmission of monetary policy shocks through an interest rate
channel.
6.4.2 Empirical Results Assuming Asymmetric Sign Eﬀects
Table 6.3 to Table 6.5 report the long-run asymmetric eﬀects of expansionary and contrac-
tionary monetary policy shocks from the zero threshold estimation (6.2). In order to facilitate
the comparison of the results between model speciﬁcations, the tables also contain the evi-
dence from the zero threshold estimation (6.5), which allows for state asymmetries. The
present section only discusses the results in the ’no cycle’ column.41 An investigation of
the corresponding entries illustrates the sensitivity of the empirical results to the choice of
country. This conﬁrms our prior view that an integrated panel estimation by industry and
country dimension may lead to misleading results (cf. Peersman and Smets, 2005). Given
the cross-country diﬀerences, we separately discuss the results for each country.
For Germany, the evidence lends support to asymmetries in the output growth eﬀects of
positive and negative monetary policy shocks. In line with theoretical predictions, a positive
41Section 6.4.3 documents the state eﬀects of monetary policy changes.200 Chapter 6
Table 6.2: FGLS Long-Run Estimates, Benchmark Model
Variable Base Empl’t/Output Openness Op. Surplus
Germany
ΔIR -0.012 ∗∗ -0.011 ∗∗ -0.015 ∗ -0.015 ∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Char ∗ ΔIR -0.284 -0.002 -0.078 ∗∗
(0.792) (0.002) (0.040)
Obs 648 648 552 552
# Industries 24 24 24 24
R2-adj. 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.36
Jarque-Bera Stat (Prob) 0.57 0.40 0.58 0.55
Sample Period 1995:1-02:4 1995:1-02:4 1995:1-01:4 1995:1-01:4
Spain
ΔIR -0.024 ∗ -0.024 ∗ -0.026 ∗ -0.025 ∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Char ∗ ΔIR -0.089 -0.001 0.005
(0.271) (0.002) (0.029)
Obs 552 552 552 552
# Industries 24 24 24 24
R2-adj. 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14
Jarque-Bera Stat (Prob) 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05
Sample Period 1995:1-01:4 1995:1-01:4 1995:1-01:4 1995:1-01:4
Italy
ΔIR -0.005 -0.006 ∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Char ∗ ΔIR 0.945∗ 0.001
(0.414) (0.002)
Obs 648 648 529
# Industries 24 24 23
R2-adj. 0.12 0.14 0.13
Jarque-Bera Stat (Prob) 0.20 0.27 0.19
Sample Period 1995:1-02:4 1995:1-02:4 1995:1-01:4
Notes: ΔIR denotes the change in the nominal short-term interest rate. Char∗ΔIR refers to the inter-
action term between industry characteristics and the interest rate change. The industry characteristic
is either the industry-speciﬁc ratio of the number of employees per real value added (in thousand
Euros; Empl’t/Output), the degree of openness to trade (Openness), or the ratio of operating surplus
to value added (Op. Surplus). Because of missing data, no estimates are derived for operating surplus
for Italy. The dynamic panel model is estimated with the FGLS estimator. The parentheses contain
White diagonal standard errors. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the statistical signiﬁcance at the one, ﬁve, and ten
percent level, respectively.6.4 Empirical Results 201
interest rate shock (i.e., monetary contraction) has a signiﬁcant and negative eﬀect on in-
dustry output growth, while a negative interest rate shock (i.e., monetary expansion) has no
signiﬁcant output growth eﬀect. This suggests that expansionary monetary policy shocks are
impotent, a ﬁnding which coheres well with the country evidence reported by, among others,
Cover (1992), Karras (1996a, 1996b), Karras and Stokes (1999), and Ravn and Sola (2004).
Furthermore, given that monetary neutrality requires monetary expansions to be associated
with an increase in prices, the ﬁnding supports the view that prices are more ﬂexible upwards.
The results for Spain slightly diﬀer from those for Germany. We ﬁnd industry output growth
to respond to expansionary as well as to contractionary monetary policy changes. Conﬁrming
expectations, higher (lower) interest rates have a negative (positive) eﬀect on industry output
growth. Here, the output growth eﬀects appear to be symmetric. That is, monetary con-
tractions do not have a stronger industry output growth eﬀect than monetary expansions.42
In view of this ﬁnding, monetary expansions appear to be a useful instrument to stimulate
economic activity in Spain given that the positive output eﬀects of monetary policy are not
completely oﬀset by a consequent increase in prices.43
The empirical ﬁndings for Italy conﬂict with those obtained for Germany and Spain. Industry
output growth predominantly responds to monetary expansions, but not to contractions.44
Furthermore, when monetary contractions aﬀect industry output growth, it increases. The
evidence in favor of a persistent positive output growth eﬀect of a contractionary monetary
policy shock is counterintuitive and does not compare well with the existing evidence on the
asymmetry of monetary policy eﬀects. This puzzling result does not seem to be driven by
any particular industry given that the results do not fundamentally diﬀer between estimations
which exclude one or more industries.
Turning to the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy, the results lend weak support to the
role of structural industry characteristics as factors which amplify the real industry eﬀects
of monetary expansions and contractions. As concerns capital intensity, we have argued
that the interaction term between capital intensity and the interest rate change will be
positive (negative) for monetary expansions and contractions when demand-side (supply-side)
eﬀects dominate the output growth response of capital-intensive industries. For Spain, none
of these relationships seems to inﬂuence monetary policy transmission given the statistical
insigniﬁcance of the capital-intensity eﬀects. The evidence for Spain therefore does not point
to the transmission of monetary policy changes through interest rate eﬀects.
42The results of the underlying equality tests are available on request.
43See Karras and Stokes (1999) for evidence according to which monetary expansions inﬂuence output even
more than monetary contractions.
44In a cross-country study on the asymmetric eﬀects of money supply shocks, Karras and Stokes (1999)
also ﬁnd output growth to be more responsive to positive than to negative money supply shocks in the case
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For Germany and Italy, monetary policy asymmetries prevail in terms of the direction as well
as strength of the capital-intensity eﬀect. Supply-side eﬀects are the stronger source of cross-
industry heterogeneities in the output growth eﬀects of expansionary monetary policy changes
given that the output growth eﬀect of lower interest rates tends to be less pronounced for
capital-intensive industries. For a monetary contraction, however, demand-side eﬀects appear
to be more important in view of the fact that an increase in interest rates causes industry
output growth of capital-intensive industries to display a signiﬁcantly larger long-run response.
These relationships for a monetary expansion and contraction suggest that prices are more
ﬂexible upwards than downwards for capital-intensive industries in Germany and Italy.
Considering the proxy variable of the exchange rate channel, the evidence lends weak support
to the assumption that the output growth eﬀects of monetary contractions and expansions
are less pronounced for open industries. If at all, signiﬁcant eﬀects are conﬁned to monetary
expansions for Italy. Consistent with expectations, output growth of industries open to trade
is less responsive to monetary policy changes. This observation is interesting from a political
point of view. As put forward in chapter 1, Berlusconi holds the European Central Bank’s
restrictive monetary policy stance responsible for the poor economic performance of Italy.
He argues that a monetary expansion is needed to induce the depreciation of the Euro in
order to restore the international competitiveness of Italian producers and hence output. The
empirical results in this section show that an expansionary monetary policy stance is less
eﬀective in stimulating output of industries open to trade than thought. This also suggests
that a persistent improvement in international competitiveness requires structural reforms.
As emphasized in section 6.3.3, the results on the credit channel eﬀects of monetary ex-
pansions and contractions can only be indicative but not conclusive given that the ratio of
operating surplus is an imperfect measure of credit market imperfections and credit con-
straints. For Germany, industries with a higher share of operating surplus display a larger
output growth response to a contractionary monetary policy change. This result is unex-
pected as it suggests that credit constraints prevail for industries with high rather than low
net worth. For Spain, industries with a higher ratio of operating surplus do not display a
monetary policy response which diﬀers from that of industries with a lower ratio.
Summarizing, the evidence lends weak support to the transmission of expansionary and con-
tractionary monetary policy changes through an interest rate, exchange rate, or credit channel.
More research with higher frequency data is required to establish the robustness of this re-
sult. Besides this shortcoming, it is evident that the distinction between expansionary and
contractionary monetary policy changes allows for more detailed assessments of the real ef-
fects of monetary policy compared with estimations for the total eﬀect of monetary policy.
Indeed, the evidence suggests that the output eﬀects of monetary policy in the benchmark
estimation without asymmetry (cf. Table 6.2) primarily reﬂect the eﬀects associated with
monetary contractions for Germany and monetary contractions and expansions for Spain. For
Italy, the insigniﬁcance of the monetary policy response of output in the benchmark model206 Chapter 6
is due to the unexpected positive response of output to monetary contractions.
6.4.3 Empirical Results Assuming Asymmetric State Eﬀects
The theoretical literature argues that monetary policy eﬀectiveness depends on the business
cycle, with monetary policy changes being more eﬀective during economic downturns. In
order to report evidence in favor of cyclical asymmetries, the interaction term between the
cyclical dummy and the monetary policy change is required to be signiﬁcant and negative in
estimations of model (6.5). The ’cycle’ columns in Table 6.3 to Table 6.5 (cf. section 6.4.2)
summarize the long-term coeﬃcient estimates for Germany, Spain, and Italy, respectively.
To ease the comparison of the empirical ﬁndings, the tables also replicate the results of the
estimations without the business cycle dummy.
In general, the evidence lends at best weak support to cyclical asymmetries in monetary
policy eﬀectiveness regardless of the choice of country.45 Industries in Germany do not
react diﬀerently to a monetary policy change in periods of economic downturns. For Spain,
the industry output growth eﬀects of contractionary monetary policy changes vary over the
business cycle. However, they appear to be less pronounced during economic downturns.
This result is counterintuitive and cannot be explained. In addition, when state eﬀects are
allowed, the output growth eﬀects of monetary expansions and contractions are no longer
symmetric. Contractionary monetary policy changes have stronger industry output growth
eﬀects than expansionary monetary policy changes.46 In contrast to Spain, the results for
Italy lend cautious support to the view that monetary contractions during recessions reduce
output growth. Despite this ﬁnding, industry output growth still expands in response to
contractionary monetary policy changes.
6.4.4 Empirical Results Assuming Asymmetric Size Eﬀects
Table 6.6 to Table 6.8 summarize the empirical evidence from estimations which control for
possible size eﬀects of monetary policy. Again, to enhance the comparability of the results
between the zero and non-zero model, the tables contain the results of both speciﬁcations.
The models used to test for size eﬀects diﬀer from the earlier speciﬁcations in that they






. The midrange is constrained by a
lower (i.e., −μ) and upper (i.e., μ) non-zero threshold of interest rate changes beyond which
monetary policy changes are deemed to be large (see Figure 6.1). Empirically, the highest
non-zero threshold equals the maximum change in the interest rate for which the model can
still be estimated. In the present study, the largest non-zero threshold of the nominal interest
45We also allow for cyclical asymmetries in the benchmark speciﬁcation (6.1). The evidence does not point
to cyclical eﬀects of monetary policy. Furthermore, conclusions regarding the sign and size of (symmetric)
monetary policy eﬀects do not change. The results are not reported, but are available on request.
46The corresponding test statistics are available on request.6.4 Empirical Results 207
rate amounts to 0.29 percent for Germany, 0.71 percent for Spain, and 0.69 percent for Italy.
Because of singularity problems, the highest threshold in the empirical estimations is lower
than the actual maximum change in the interest rate.
Interpreting the evidence, the non-zero threshold speciﬁcation shows that output growth
of industries displays a signiﬁcant response to interest rate changes in the midrange. For
Germany, Italy, and Spain, the evidence suggests that industry output growth is positively
(negatively) aﬀected by monetary expansions (contractions) in the midrange. The output
growth eﬀects associated with small monetary policy changes are thus consistent with the
menu cost argument. However inconsistent with the menu cost argument, the evidence does
not suggest that large positive and negative monetary policy shocks (i.e., shocks that are
absolutely larger than the non-zero threshold μ and −μ) are neutral. Regardless of the
country, the output growth eﬀects of large monetary expansions and contractions compare
well in terms of sign and magnitude with the evidence on the sign eﬀects of monetary
contractions and expansions from the zero threshold model. In fact, the equality tests of
the coeﬃcient estimates generally do not point to statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the
coeﬃcients of the zero and non-zero threshold speciﬁcation.47
For Germany, monetary contractions that are larger than the non-zero threshold μ (area A in
Figure 6.1) have signiﬁcant industry output growth eﬀects. Conﬁrming the results of the zero
threshold estimation, output growth contracts in response to a monetary contraction. Unlike
the zero threshold estimation, the non-zero threshold results for Spain point to asymmetries
in the eﬀects of positive and negative nominal interest rate changes. In particular, monetary
contractions which are larger than the threshold μ (area A in Figure 6.1) have a signiﬁcantly
stronger eﬀect on industry output growth than monetary expansions which are larger than
the non-zero threshold −μ (area B in Figure 6.1). The eﬀects associated with the midrange
thus appear to amplify the output growth eﬀects of large monetary contractions, while they
reduce the output growth eﬀects associated with large monetary expansions. This ﬁnding
is inconsistent with the menu cost argument. One possible explanation is that prices do
not move suﬃciently to fully absorb the demand eﬀects of large monetary contractions and
expansions.48 For Italy, large monetary contractions and expansions do not have a neutral
eﬀect on industry output growth. Similar to the zero threshold speciﬁcation, the results of the













47The results of the mean equality tests are available on request.
48In addition, the evidence for Spain suggests that the four-quarter horizon is too short to capture the dy-
namics of the monetary transmission process. Longer time-series are required to investigate whether monetary



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As regards the distributional eﬀects of monetary policy, the evidence does not lend support
to the role of structural industry characteristics as factors which inﬂuence the real industry
eﬀects of small monetary expansions and contractions. Conclusions as to the distributional
eﬀects of large positive and negative interest rate changes are similar to those from the zero
threshold model. The observed nature of the relationships associated with capital intensity,
openness, and operating surplus does not change.
Overall, the evidence lends no support to the existence of size eﬀects. In contrast to the
menu cost argument, large monetary contractions and expansions have non-neutral industry
output growth eﬀects. As stated, these results are indicative and likely to be inﬂuenced by
the structure of the empirical model and by the threshold μ and −μ beyond which monetary
contractions and expansions are considered to be large. Limited by the number of cross
sections, the present analysis deﬁnes a threshold which is probably too low and a midrange
which is therefore too narrow to appropriately capture the predictions of the menu cost
argument. Stated diﬀerently, our deﬁnition of large and small monetary policy changes is
likely to be inappropriate.
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has contributed to the ongoing debate about possible asymmetries in the out-
put growth eﬀects of expansionary and contractionary monetary policy changes. Its main
contribution to the existing literature is that it presents industry rather than macroeconomic
evidence of the sign, size, and state eﬀects of monetary policy. In particular, the analysis
employs information on 24 industries in either Germany, Italy, or Spain to investigate whether
monetary contractions and expansions aﬀect industry output growth (i) to the same extent
(sign eﬀects), (ii) to the same extent during economic booms and downturns (state eﬀects),
and (iii) to the same extent for diﬀerent magnitudes of the monetary policy change (size
eﬀects). We have examined whether structural industry characteristics explain cross-industry
diﬀerences in the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary expansions and contractions.
The evidence in this chapter is sensitive to the choice of country. For example, the long-run
output growth eﬀects of monetary expansions are insigniﬁcant for industries in Germany,
whereas they are signiﬁcant and positive for industries in Spain and Italy. Considering the
long-run eﬀects of monetary contractions, output growth of industries in Germany and Spain
contracts. For Italy, however, contractionary monetary policy changes promote industry
growth. As to the state eﬀects, the conclusions tend to be robust to the choice of country.
The main insight is that business cycle eﬀects hardly contribute to asymmetries in the industry
output growth eﬀects of positive and negative monetary policy shocks. Similarly, the evidence
does not point to size eﬀects of monetary policy in estimations for Germany, Spain, and Italy.
We argue that this result is likely to be driven by the small number of cross sections which
inﬂuences the structure of the empirical model and the deﬁnition of small and large shocks.212 Chapter 6
The present evidence lends weak support to the existence of cross-industry diﬀerences in the
degree of monetary policy asymmetry. Signiﬁcant industry eﬀects are largely conﬁned to
estimations with industry-speciﬁc capital intensity. For Germany and Italy, the distributional
eﬀects are such that industry output growth of capital-intensive industries responds less to
monetary policy expansions, but more to monetary contractions. This ﬁnding lends cautious
support to the view that the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy are inﬂuenced by industry
composition. Insigniﬁcant capital intensity eﬀects prevail for Spain. Although the evidence
lends at best weak support to the role of industry composition as determinant of monetary
policy eﬃcacy, this ﬁnding should not be overemphasized. Because our panel is biased towards
manufacturing industries, the cross-industry variation might be too low in order to generate
signiﬁcant industry eﬀects of monetary policy in the present set of panel estimations.
Despite this limitation, the results of the present study have policy implications. The sensitiv-
ity of the results to the choice of country casts doubt on the ability of the European Central
Bank to deﬁne a common monetary policy stance that accommodates the economic needs of
all countries equally well. Instead, a common monetary contraction or expansion is expected
to cause cross-country asymmetries in the macroeconomic output response. The diﬀerences
are hereby likely to be ampliﬁed by the industry composition of countries through interest
rate eﬀects. In addition, the present study has also repercussions for future empirical work.
The empirical evidence illustrates that conclusions as to the sign eﬀects of monetary policy
depend on the choice of country. Discussions of the asymmetric eﬀects of monetary policy
changes should hence account for the heterogeneity of countries. In fact, industry analyses
should not consider a country panel dimension as done by, for example, Peersman and Smets
(2005).6A List of Industries 213
Annex 6A List of Industries
This annex lists the industries that are included in the analysis for Germany, Italy, and Spain.
The corresponding New Cronos classiﬁcation code is put in brackets.
• Mining and quarrying of energy producing materials (CA)
• Mining and quarrying except energy producing materials (CB)
• Food products and beverages (DA15)
• Tobacco products (DA16)
• Textiles (DB17)
• Wearing apparel, dressing, and dyeing of fur (DB18)
• Leather, leather products, and footwear (DC)
• Wood and products of wood and cork (DD)
• Paper and paper products (DE21)
• Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (DE22)
• Coke, reﬁned petroleum products, and nuclear fuel (DF)
• Chemicals and chemical products (DG)
• Rubber and plastics products (DH)
• Other non-metallic mineral products (DI)
• Basic metals (DJ27)
• Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (DJ28)
• Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. (DK)
• Oﬃce, accounting and computing machinery (DL30)
• Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. (DL31)
• Radio, television, and communication equipment (DL32)
• Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks (DL33)
• Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (DM34)
• Other transport equipment (DM35)
• Manufacturing n.e.c. (DN)
• Electricity, gas, and water supply (E)7
The Importance of Industry Eﬀects -
Concluding Thoughts
7.1 Synthesis
There is an ongoing debate on the role of industries as propagation and ampliﬁcation mechan-
ism of monetary policy changes. The interest in industry eﬀects reﬂects the view that industry
characteristics are more appropriate means to identify monetary transmission channels so as to
explain and understand the macroeconomic real eﬀects of monetary policy actions. Chapter
2 illustrates that considerable empirical research discusses industry composition as determi-
nant of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission, but largely disregards its
importance as source of the credit channel. This thesis contributes to the debate on the role
of industries as determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness by qualifying and quantifying
the industry eﬀects associated with the interest rate as well as credit channel. To this end,
two main questions are addressed. Firstly, do industries diﬀer in their economic response to
monetary policy disturbances? Secondly, are cross-industry diﬀerences in the monetary policy
response associated with cross-industry diﬀerences in the relative strength of the interest rate
and credit channel of monetary policy transmission and can possible diﬀerences be explained
with cross-industry diﬀerences in structural characteristics?
The empirical analyses in this thesis yield two insights. The ﬁrst result pertains to the
observation that industries diﬀer in their real response to monetary policy shocks. As a
consequence, monetary policy eﬀects at the macroeconomic level are conditioned by industry
composition and regional heterogeneities in the relative importance of industries contribute
to regional asymmetries in the real eﬀects of monetary policy shocks. The second insight is
that industries transmit monetary policy changes through an interest rate channel. Credit
channel eﬀects are comparatively weak. Cross-industry asymmetries in the interest rate and
credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy reﬂect diﬀerences in industry capital intensity or in
the monetary policy response of industry-speciﬁc bank lending. The remainder of this section
summarizes the results of this thesis in greater detail.
Chapter 2 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the interest rate and
credit channel of monetary policy transmission. The survey shows that both the interest rate
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and credit channel have received considerable theoretical as well as empirical attention. The
underlying studies emphasize diﬀerent factors to explain the real eﬀects of monetary policy
and diﬀer in the importance assigned to industries as possible determinants of monetary
policy eﬀectiveness. While interest rate channel studies discuss the importance of industry
structures, credit channel studies predominantly emphasize ﬁnancial structures. The review
points to the sensitivity of the results to the level of data aggregation, data frequency, and
the choice of estimation methodology.
The empirical evidence in chapter 2 shows that many credit channel studies employ ﬁrm
size as proxy variable of credit market imperfections. Empirical support to the existence
of ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy is hereby ambiguous. This, however, suggests that
ﬁrm size eﬀects are not exclusively driven by information asymmetries and credit constraints.
Chapter 3 is motivated by this ﬁnding and oﬀers an alternative theoretical explanation for
the ambiguity regarding the ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy. It develops a non-linear
investment model that emphasizes diﬀerences in the investment behavior of small and large
ﬁrms as an alternative channel through which ﬁrm size may transmit monetary policy changes.
At the core of the proposed ’investment’ channel are size-related diﬀerences in the costs
associated with physical capital (dis-)investment. The capital adjustment costs are deﬁned
as the combination of a purchase (sale) cost per unit of capital (dis-)investment and a ﬁxed
adjustment cost per unit of installed capital. Both cost components inﬂuence investment
through their eﬀect on the degree of investment irreversibility.
Within the framework of the dynamic investment model, the theoretical analysis shows that
asymmetries in the optimal investment behavior of small- and large-sized ﬁrms are predomi-
nantly determined by size-related diﬀerences in the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed
capital. Reﬂecting the eﬀect of organizational and informational ineﬃciencies, the ﬁxed ad-
justment cost per unit of installed capital causes large ﬁrms to change investment regimes less
frequently than small ﬁrms. However, when large ﬁrms change investment, the investment
response is more pronounced compared with small ﬁrms. The eﬀect is ampliﬁed by, but does
not depend on, size-related diﬀerences in the type of capital employed in production.
These investment patterns have important implications for the eﬀectiveness of monetary
policy. In fact, they suggest that small and large monetary policy shocks have asymmetric
eﬀects on large- and small-ﬁrm investment, with the eﬀects being predominantly driven by
the ﬁxed adjustment cost per unit of installed capital. For a small monetary policy shock,
small-ﬁrm investment adjusts, while large-ﬁrm investment does not respond. For a large
monetary policy shock, small- and large-ﬁrm investment changes. Because of larger ﬁxed
capital adjustment costs per unit of installed capital, the eﬀect is more pronounced for large
ﬁrms. Conclusions as to the existence of small ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary policy thus
crucially depend on the magnitude of the monetary policy change. In attributing diﬀerences
in the monetary policy response of small- and large-ﬁrm investment to size-related diﬀerences
in capital adjustment costs, the investment channel diﬀers from the credit channel and the7.1 Synthesis 217
underlying assumption of credit market imperfections.
The review in chapter 2 shows that empirical analyses on monetary policy transmission are
complicated by methodological problems which arise from the interdependence of (i) industry
and industry characteristics related to the interest rate and credit channel and (ii) monetary
transmission channels. Chapter 4 in this thesis illustrates the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst problem
and chapter 5 addresses the identiﬁcation problem associated with the interdependence of
monetary transmission channels. Chapter 4 investigates the possible interdependence between
industry structure and proxy variables of the interest rate and credit channel for the United
States. The analysis employs US state level data on manufacturing and non-manufacturing
industries to present new evidence on the transmission of US interest rate shocks, using
a two-step estimation procedure. In the ﬁrst step, the analysis determines the monetary
policy sensitivity of industry earnings over the period 1958-2000/01. The identiﬁcation of
the industry eﬀects is accomplished by using a vector autoregressive model. In line with
existing empirical work, the corresponding evidence points to diﬀerences in the monetary
policy sensitivity of industries and hence to the importance of industries as determinant of
monetary policy eﬀectiveness. Regional heterogeneities in the eﬀects of monetary policy
originate from cross-region dissimilarities in the mix of industries and consequently from
diﬀerences in regional economic structures.
Building on these results, the second part of the study asks whether the industry characteris-
tics ﬁrm size (the credit channel proxy variable) and capital intensity (the interest rate channel
proxy variable) can explain the cross-industry diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy.
The empirical analysis for the United States demonstrates that the interdependence between
industry and either capital intensity or ﬁrm size aﬀects conclusions regarding the interest rate
and credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy. A strong eﬀect prevails for the mining industry.
Including a dummy variable for the mining sector signiﬁcantly reduces the explanatory power
of ﬁrm size but brings to the fore the eﬀect of capital intensity. The annex to chapter 4
reports a comparable industry study for countries in Europe. In contrast to the US evidence,
the European results suggest that industry eﬀects amplify rather than reduce the ﬁrm size
eﬀects of monetary policy. However, this result is far from conclusive because of severe data
shortcomings. Overall, the evidence in chapter 4 suggests that ﬁrm size eﬀects of monetary
policy are not only attributable to credit market imperfections. This ﬁnding compares well
with the theoretical analysis in chapter 3 according to which size-related diﬀerences in the
degree of investment irreversibility may also matter.
C h a p t e r5i sm o t i v a t e db yt h ep r o b l e ma s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h ei d e n t i ﬁ c a t i o no fs h i f t si nb a n k
lending that are due to changes in either bank credit demand or due to monetary-policy-
induced changes in bank credit supply. The study adopts an industry focus and asks whether
c h a n g e si ni n d u s t r yb a n kc r e d i td e m a n do ri nm o n e t a r yp o l i c ya r et h em o r ei m p o r t a n ts o u r c e
of variation in industry-speciﬁc bank lending growth. An investigation of the industry eﬀects
of bank lending is important because it illustrates whether the industry structure of bank credit218 Chapter 7
portfolios determines monetary policy eﬀectiveness. The empirical evidence is derived from
microeconomic data on bank balance sheet variables and industry bank lending for Germany
and involves the estimation of individual bank lending functions for 17 manufacturing and
non-manufacturing industries over the period 1992:1-2002:4. We explicitly distinguish lending
by ﬁve banking groups so as to capture the bank lending eﬀects associated with cross-banking
group diﬀerences in the industry composition of bank credit portfolios.
The evidence from dynamic panel data models shows that industry-speciﬁc bank lending
growth predominantly responds to changes in industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand rather
than to changes in monetary policy. In fact, conclusions regarding the bank lending eﬀects
of monetary policy are very sensitive to the choice of industry. The empirical results lend
strong support to the existence of industry eﬀects of bank lending: industries are a prominent
source of variation in the bank lending eﬀects of bank credit demand and monetary policy,
with strong eﬀects arising from industry output growth and industry inﬂation. In view of
this ﬁnding, chapter 5 concludes that the industry composition of bank credit portfolios is an
important determinant of bank lending growth and monetary policy eﬀectiveness.
Common to chapter 4 and 5 is the assumption that monetary expansions and contractions
have symmetric real eﬀects on industry performance. Chapter 6 tests for possible asymme-
tries. In particular, the analysis determines whether the industry output growth eﬀects of
monetary expansions and contractions diﬀer and whether the degree of asymmetry varies
over the business cycle or depends on the size of monetary policy changes. In order to iden-
tify possible industry eﬀects, tests for the sign, state, and size eﬀects of monetary policy
emphasize cross-industry diﬀerences in structural characteristics related to the interest rate,
credit, and exchange rate channel. Estimates are derived from dynamic panel models which
employ information on the output growth performance of 24 industries in Germany, Italy, and
Spain over the period 1995:1-2002:4. In order to control for cross-country heterogeneities,
the models are separately estimated for each country.
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical evidence points to asymmetries in the
industry output growth eﬀects of monetary expansions and contractions. Conclusions as to
the direction and strength of the sign eﬀects are sensitive to the choice of country. For each
country, the asymmetric eﬀects tend to be robust to the business cycle position of industries.
That is, economic downturns do not amplify the eﬀects of contractionary or expansionary
monetary policy changes. Similarly, the evidence does not point to signiﬁcant size eﬀects of
monetary policy in estimations for Germany, Spain, and Italy. We argued that this result is
likely to be driven by the small number of cross sections which inﬂuences the structure of the
empirical model and the deﬁnition of small and large monetary policy changes. In addition,
there is at best weak evidence that the sign eﬀects of monetary contractions and expansions
are inﬂuenced by industry eﬀects. Because the industry eﬀects are primarily attributable
to cross-industry diﬀerences in capital intensity, the evidence lends cautious support to the
operation of an interest rate channel. The ambiguity of the results is attributed to data7.2 Caveats and Avenues for Future Research 219
limitations.
Overall, this thesis points to the importance of industries as determinant of monetary policy
eﬀectiveness through an interest rate channel (chapter 4, 6). Similar to existing studies,
there are cross-industry diﬀerences in the interest rate eﬀects, which reﬂect diﬀerences in
the degree of capital intensity of production. Endorsing theoretical predictions, the interest
rate eﬀects are more pronounced for capital-intensive sectors. This thesis also stresses the
importance of industries as determinant of the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy. For
the present set of country studies, the evidence in favor of credit channel eﬀects is at best
weak (chapter 4, 5, 6) and largely conﬁned to bank lending rather than to balance sheet
eﬀects. In a study for Germany, the strength of the bank lending eﬀects diﬀers between
industries (chapter 5). This, however, points to the importance of the industry composition
of bank credit portfolios as determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness.
7.2 C a v e a t sa n dA v e n u e sf o rF u t u r eR e s e a r c h
Although the evidence points to the role of industries as determinant of monetary policy
eﬀectiveness through interest rate and credit channel eﬀects, the empirical results are subject
to a number of caveats. Given the political relevance for the current but also prospective
future EMU member countries, one major limitation certainly concerns the failure to qualify
and quantify the industry eﬀects of monetary policy transmission for a comprehensive set of
European countries in general and European regions in particular. Investigations for Europe
should employ industry data at the region rather than country level. As became evident
from the analysis for Europe in annex 4B, country-speciﬁc industry data display too little
variation between countries in order to allow for discernible country eﬀects. This problem
is not expected to prevail with regional data. Furthermore, regional data are deemed to be
better suited to identify the possible eﬀects of industry specialization on monetary policy
eﬀectiveness. This is because specialization patterns are likely to materialize faster in regions
than in countries given that regions have a more condensed industry structure than countries.
A second caveat applies to the discussion of the ’investment’ channel in chapter 3 and
the simplifying assumption of perfect capital markets. Credit market imperfections certainly
prevail, with important implications for the availability of external ﬁnancial funds. The present
study does not impose ﬁnancial constraints since this would require a priori assumptions as
to the relative riskiness of ﬁrms in either the market center or market periphery. Furthermore,
the consequent analysis would implicitly assume that ﬁrms within each market segment do
not diﬀer in terms of risk. This would be as simplifying an assumption as the assumed absence
of ﬁnancial constraints for small and large ﬁrms. Future research on these issues might be
able to oﬀer appropriate solutions to these problems.
The analysis in chapter 4 is subject to two main limitations. As we discussed in the chapter,220 Chapter 7
one limitation relates to the identiﬁcation scheme of the monetary policy shocks. A sec-
ond weakness concerns the interpretation of the results from the cross-section estimations.
To illustrate, the cross-section models explain the cumulative impulse response estimates
from vector autoregressive models with ﬁrm size and capital intensity. In order to determine
the statistical signiﬁcance of the ﬁrm size and capital intensity variable, heteroscedasticity-
adjusted standard errors are computed. The limitation of the study concerns the fact that
the signiﬁcance properties of the ﬁrm size and capital intensity variable are likely to be over-
stated given that the dependent cumulative impulse response estimates are also estimated.1
We acknowledge this caveat, but do not expect this limitation to aﬀect the study’s main
conclusions. This is because the cross-section analysis predominantly compares the results
from cross-section estimations whose structure only diﬀers with respect to a single industry
dummy. Nevertheless, the weaknesses of the time-series and cross-section analysis are such
that future research is required to establish the robustness of the results to the use of al-
ternative estimation methodologies. One avenue of research involves the use of a standard
panel data approach along the lines suggested in chapter 6. Because a panel data model is
estimated in one step, it may solve some of the problems inherent to the two-step procedure
of time-series and cross-section analysis.
Chapter 5 discusses the industry eﬀects of bank lending in Germany. To this end, it is asked
whether bank lending to single industries depends on industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand
or on monetary policy. The analysis’ main limitation is evident from the way the question is
phrased. Inherent to the answer is the simplifying assumption that monetary policy does not
immediately aﬀect bank credit demand, but only bank credit supply. Of course, bank credit
demand is likely to respond to monetary policy changes because of, for example, balance
sheet eﬀects. Unfortunately, we can only acknowledge, but not address this shortcoming.
However, the assumption regarding the contemporaneous monetary policy insensitivity of
bank credit demand appears plausible if potential debtors prefer internal ﬁnance to external
bank- and non-bank ﬁnance. If potential debtors ﬁrst deplete their internal sources of ﬁnance
because they are less expensive compared with external ﬁnance, monetary policy may indeed
only aﬀect bank credit demand with a lag. In contrast, banks are expected to be swift in
adjusting lending patterns in response to changes (i) in the creditworthiness of debtors and
(ii) in the probability of non-performing loans.2
Another caveat of chapter 5 concerns the failure to explain cross-industry diﬀerences in the
strength of bank lending eﬀects. The discussion merely states that industry-speciﬁc bank
lending diﬀers in the response to monetary policy changes, but does not ask whether the
cross-industry diﬀerences in the evidence on bank lending eﬀects can be explained with, for
example, industry characteristics. While information on industry characteristics is available,
1This caveat was suggested by a referee of the corresponding paper.
2The speed of adjustment concerns quantity as well as price adjustments, with the ultimate eﬀect being
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the number of industry cross sections3 is far too low in order to establish a meaningful, let
alone signiﬁcant relationship between industry characteristics (e.g., capital intensity or ﬁrm
size distribution) and the bank lending eﬀects of industry bank credit demand.
Future research may deal with some of these caveats. Alternative avenues for research involve
the following extensions of the present study. The theoretical analysis of the ’investment’
channel in chapter 3 clearly asks for empirical assessments. If investment irreversibility indeed
aﬀects the monetary policy sensitivity of small- and large-sized ﬁrms, ﬁrm size distribution will
determine monetary policy eﬃcacy beyond what is suggested by credit market imperfections.
Furthermore, market consolidation through mergers and acquisitions and the consequent po-
tential increase in the average size of ﬁrms will have important repercussions for monetary
policy eﬀectiveness. While small monetary policy shocks may not signiﬁcantly aﬀect in-
vestment and hence real output, large monetary policy shocks may cause very pronounced
adverse responses. Unfortunately, a corresponding analysis is likely to be complicated by the
unavailability of (high-frequency) ﬁrm-level data on the capital stock and capital adjustment
costs.
The analysis of the industry bank lending eﬀects in chapter 5 is purely econometric. An
interesting avenue for future research involves the development of a theoretical model that
describes the bank lending eﬀects of changes in industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand and
monetary policy. The empirical results in chapter 5 suggest that such a model would have
to deﬁne the credit supply decision of banks at the industry level conditional on (i) the bank
ﬁnancing needs of an industry, (ii) the importance of an industry in a bank’s credit portfolio,
(iii) the bank’s perception as to the riskiness of an industry, and (iv) the market’s perception
as to the riskiness of a bank. Unfortunately, such a model is unlikely to have a tractable
closed-form solution.
Furthermore, the studies in the previous chapters assume that the performance of industries
depends on the level of the interest rate, but not on the degree of interest rate uncertainty.
However, Ingersoll and Ross (1992), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Alvarez and Koskela
(2006), among others, show that investment uncertainty inﬂuences the timing of invest-
ment by creating an option value of delaying investment. Given this relationship, interest
rate uncertainty could depress aggregate investment spending and thus economic activity.
The strength of this eﬀect is likely to depend on the industry composition of regions and
countries. Because capital-intensive production requires more (irreversible) investment, the
real eﬀects of interest rate uncertainty might be stronger for regions with a larger share of
capital-intensive industries.These considerations suggest that an activist monetary policy is
potentially more eﬀective in countries with a larger share of capital-intensive industries. To
this point, these relationships are hypothetical and empirical research is needed to investigate
the impact of interest rate uncertainty on industry investment and therefore industry output.
The consequent results may help to determine the optimal degree of monetary policy activism
3The number of cross sections is at most equal to 15.222 Chapter 7
for countries and regions with a given industry structure.
Another promising direction for future research may qualify and quantify the pricing behavior
of industries as additional determinant of monetary policy eﬀectiveness. The pricing behav-
ior and hence the degree of price stickiness is likely to diﬀer between industries, with the
diﬀerences being accounted for by cross-industry asymmetries in the degree of capital in-
tensity and market competition (i.e., ﬁrm size distribution). For example, capital-intensive
industries and/or industries in competitive markets are likely to adjust prices faster than
capital-extensive industries and/or industries in imperfectly competitive markets. An investi-
gation of industry-speciﬁc pricing behavior is of interest since the results allow for more direct
inferences as to the role of industry composition as factor which determines the time it takes
for a monetary policy shock to fully work through the system.
Finally, in only emphasizing industry structure as monetary transmission mechanism, this the-
sis ignores that the real eﬀects of monetary policy changes are determined by a ”complex web
of economic interactions” (European Central Bank, 2001, p. 44). This also involves house-
holds and their saving and spending decisions. A more detailed understanding of monetary
policy transmission could certainly be gained from studies that characterize the behavioral
spending and saving relationships of households and the interaction between households and
industries. Corresponding future research seems worthwhile.
7.3 Policy Implications
Despite the diﬀerent caveats, the ﬁndings in this thesis have policy implications. The intro-
duction to this thesis states that the political and public support for the European economic
and monetary union (EMU) depends on the ability of the European Central Bank to deﬁne
a monetary policy stance that suits the economic needs of all regions and countries. In order
to have a one-size-ﬁts-all monetary policy stance, countries and regions should be charac-
terized by similar industry structures or industries should display a homogenous response to
monetary policy changes. Evidently, this thesis shows that none of these conditions is met:
industries respond diﬀerently to monetary policy changes and cross-country diﬀerences in
industry composition account for diﬀerences in the real eﬀects of monetary policy.4
Is this bad news for the future economic and political stability of the European economic
and monetary union? The answer to this question partly depends on future developments
in regional industry structures. If Krugman (1991, 1993) is right and the manufacturing
industry continues to specialize, cross-region asymmetries in the real eﬀects of monetary
policy will be ampliﬁed in the future: regions with a large share of capital-intensive industries
respond more strongly to monetary policy shocks than regions with a comparatively large
share of capital-extensive industries. The consequent increase in income disparities would
4These ﬁndings are particularly evident from the analyses in chapter 4 and 6.7.3 Policy Implications 223
erode political support for EMU. However, if the production of non-tradable service goods
continues to expand relative to manufacturing goods, the eﬀect of growing specialization
on cross-region diﬀerences in income developments might be less pronounced. Furthermore,
they could be compensated for by within-region transfer payments between sectors in order
to smooth the diﬀerential income eﬀects of monetary policy across industries.
Apart from ﬁscal redistribution schemes, alternative adjustment mechanisms need to be in
place in order to mitigate the eﬀect of cross-country diﬀerences in industry structure on
the real eﬀects of monetary policy. According to the optimum currency area theory (cf.
Mundell, 1961), these relate to capital mobility and to labor market ﬂexibility, including labor
mobility and real wage ﬂexibility. While capital moves freely between countries in Europe,
labor mobility is low and real wages still tend to be downward rigid.5 These are structural
problems and the stability and sustainability of the European economic and monetary union
depends on the ability and willingness of national governments to reform the labor market.
The results for Germany in chapter 5 indicate another avenue to limit the industry eﬀects of
monetary policy and thus possible cross-region asymmetries in the real eﬀects of a common
monetary policy shock. The analysis demonstrates that conclusions as to the bank lending
eﬀects of monetary policy depend on the choice of industry and hence on the industry com-
position of bank credit portfolios. Because banks are only constrained in their maximum
exposure to single debtors, but not to industries, the industry eﬀects of bank lending might
be easier to anticipate when banks are required to diversify not only across single debtors,
but also across all industries, with an upper bound on the maximum exposure to a single
sector.
Surely, this last argument disregards possible future changes in the structure of European
ﬁnancial markets and in the importance of banks as source of external ﬁnance to industries.
Because ﬁnancial structures develop and change, the relative strength of the credit channel
is equally likely to be subject to continuous periodic changes. In fact, institutional and
behavioral changes may cause the emergence of new monetary policy transmission channels.
For example, one can argue that the evolution of deep, broad, and liquid non-bank sources
of external ﬁnance aﬀects the distribution of bank and non-bank ﬁnancial institutions in a
way that mitigates the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy on the one hand and the
industry eﬀects of bank lending on the other hand. This is because non-bank (non-depository)
institutions are not subject to reserve requirements and hence do not have to reduce lending
in response to a monetary tightening (Putkuri, 2003).
Closely related to the growing importance of non-bank ﬁnancial institutions, De Bondt (2004)
stresses the emergence of the Euro area corporate debt securities market as another source
5Surely, these adjustment mechanisms need to be in place even when European countries experience a
convergence of industry structures. This is because convergence is slow.224 Chapter 7
of external corporate ﬁnance.6 Because the corporate debt market facilitates the substitution
between debt securities and other intermediated (e.g., bank) sources of corporate ﬁnance, it
reduces the bank dependence of ﬁrms and therefore ameliorates ﬁnancial constraints when
banks cut lending in periods of tight money. In due course, the credit channel eﬀects through
bank lending may weaken. Monetary-policy-induced cross-industry diﬀerences in the response
of bank and non-bank lending then only reﬂect cross-industry diﬀerences in bank credit
demand.
Besides these developments, the wave of bank mergers and acquisitions and the consequent
process of banking market consolidation may also attenuate the credit channel eﬀects of mon-
etary policy, at least in Europe. This scenario is intrinsic to the ﬁnding in Adams and Amel
(2005) according to which the credit channel eﬀects of monetary policy are less pronounced in
concentrated banking sectors, where the number of small (large) banks is low (high). Again, if
this is true, the industry eﬀects of bank lending only reﬂect monetary-policy-induced changes
in industry-speciﬁc bank credit demand and industries predominantly determine monetary
policy eﬀectiveness through eﬀects associated with the interest rate channel. Future develop-
ments in ﬁnancial structures may therefore enable the European Central Bank to assess the
real eﬀects of monetary policy by primarily stressing the industry eﬀects through an interest
rate channel.
6See Putkuri (2003) for a description of the securities markets in Europe.Bibliography
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In de economische literatuur is er een voortdurende discussie over de rol die de sectorale
structuur van een economie speelt bij de transmissie van monetair beleid. De interesse voor
sectorale eﬀecten komt voort uit het idee dat de structurele eigenschappen van sectoren van
nut kunnen zijn bij het identiﬁceren van monetaire transmissiekanalen. Zodoende kunnen
de macro-economische re¨ ele eﬀecten van acties met betrekking tot monetair beleid beter
uitgelegd en begrepen worden. Er is veel empirisch onderzoek gedaan naar de rol van sectorale
eﬀecten in de transmissie van monetair beleid. Niettemin geloven wij dat de bestaande studies
niet diep genoeg zijn ingegaan op de rol van de sectorale compositie als belangrijke factor voor
de eﬀectiviteit van monetair beleid op nationaal en regionaal niveau. Dit proefschrift draagt
bij aan het debat over de rol van sectoren door middel van het kwaliﬁceren en kwantiﬁceren
van de sectorale eﬀecten in relatie tot zowel het rente- als het kredietkanaal van monetaire
transmissie. Voor dit doel worden twee vragen behandeld. Ten eerste, bestaan er verschillen
tussen de economische reacties van verschillende sectoren op veranderingen in het monetaire
beleid? En ten tweede, zijn deze gerelateerd aan een onderscheid in de relatieve sterkte
van het rente- en het kredietkanaal en kunnen mogelijke discrepanties worden verklaard door
verschillen in de structurele eigenschappen van sectoren?
Bevindingen met betrekking tot de rol van sectoren als belangrijke factor van rente- en
kredietkanaaleﬀecten van monetair beleid zijn van vitaal belang voor de Europese Centrale
Bank. Deze zouden namelijk van nut kunnen zijn om te bepalen wat de eﬀecten van een
gemeenteschappelijke monetair beleid op de inkomensverdeling in regio’s van de Europese
Economische en Monetaire Unie (EMU) zijn. Het is waarschijnlijk dat deze eﬀecten worden
veroorzaakt door regionale verschillen in economische structuur - tot uitdrukking komend in
verschillen in sectorale compositie - in combinatie met verschillen in reactie op veranderingen
in monetair beleid tussen sectoren.
In dit proefschrift wordt in zeven hoofdstukken het belang van sectoren als monetair trans-
missiekanaal geanalyseerd. Hoofdstuk 1 omvat de te beantwoorden vragen en geeft een alge-
meen overzicht van de rol van sectoren in de transmissie van monetair beleid via het rente- en
het kredietkanaal. Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert de theorie¨ en en bestaande empirische gegevens
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over het rente- en kredietkanaal vanuit een macro-economisch, micro-economisch en sectoraal
perspectief. Zowel het rente- als het kredietkanaal hebben in de literatuur aanzienlijke theo-
retische en empirische aandacht gekregen. De primaire studies (i) wijzen naar verschillende
factoren om de re¨ ele eﬀecten van monetair beleid te verklaren en (ii) vari¨ eren in de mate van
belang die zij hechten aan sectoren als mogelijke bepalende factor van de eﬀectiviteit van
monetair beleid. Terwijl studies naar het rentekanaal van monetaire transmissie de rol van de
structuur van niet-ﬁnanci¨ ele sectoren behandelen, benadrukken studies naar het kredietkanaal
hoofdzakelijk ﬁnanci¨ ele structuren en imperfecties van de ﬁnanci¨ ele sector.
De bestaande empirische literatuur laat zien dat monetaire beleidsschokken re¨ elle eﬀecten
hebben via het rentekanaal: in reactie op een monetaire verkrapping wordt de productie
kleiner, en bij een monetaire verruiming wordt de productie groter. De empirische uitkom-
sten illustreren ook dat verschillen in de sterkte van het rentekanaal tussen landen kunnen
worden toegewezen aan heterogeniteit in economische structuren met betrekking tot de sec-
torale compositie. In tegenstelling tot studies naar het rentekanaal, geeft empirisch onder-
zoek naar de werking van een kredietkanaal dubbelzinnige resultaten. Studies die de eﬀecten
van monetair beleid via kredietkanalen theoretisch onderbouwen laten zien dat een verkrap-
ping van het beleid gepaard gaat met strakkere externe ﬁnanci¨ ele beperkingen, veroorzaakt
door een verslechtering van informatieasymmetrie¨ en. Verschillen in de sterkte van het kredi-
etkanaal tussen landen kunnen worden toegewezen aan verschillen in ﬁnanci¨ ele structuren
met betrekking tot de verdeling van bank en niet-bankinstellingen (b.v. ondernemingen) en
de verdeling van kredietverlening door banken aan soorten debiteuren. Met betrekking tot de
verdeling van ondernemingen veronderstelt de ’credit view’ theorie dat kleine ondernemingen
vergeleken met grote ondernemingen gevoeliger zijn voor monetaire beleidsveranderingen,
aangezien informatieasymmetrie¨ en sterker zijn.
Het empirisch onderzoek van het ’credit view’ theorie toont echter dat empirische bewijzen
slechts dubbelzinnige onderbouwing geven voor de veronderstelling dat de re¨ elle eﬀecten van
monetair beleid kunnen afhangen van de ondernemingsgrootte in de Verenigde Staten en de
Europese landen: de empirische gegevens voor de Verenigde Staten wijzen op een grotere
reactie van kleine ondernemingen op monetair beleid, terwijl de gegevens voor Europese lan-
den het bestaan van een dergelijke reactie slechts zwak of niet ondersteunen. Hoofdstuk 3 is
gebaseerd op deze empirische ambigu¨ ıteit. In het hoofdstuk wordt een non-lineair invester-
ingsmodel gepresenteerd, dat tot doel heeft vast te stellen onder welke omstandigheden kleine
ondernemingen niet meer reageren op monetaire beleidsschokken dan grote ondernemingen.
In tegenstelling tot bestaand onderzoek naar het kredietkanaal legt het investeringsmodel
geen nadruk op imperfecties in de kredietmarkt om de gevoeligheid voor monetair beleid
van kleine ondernemingen, vergeleken met grote ondernemingen, uit te leggen. In plaats
daarvan legt het model de gevoeligheid van kleine en grote ondernemingen uit aan de hand
van aan ondernemingsgrootte gerelateerde verschillen in de kosten van de aanpassing van de
kapitaalgoederenvoorraad en de grootte van monetaire beleidsschokken.Nederlandse Samenvatting 247
De aanpassingskosten per eenheid kapitaal zijn gedeﬁnieerd als een combinatie van twee
factoren: (i) aankoopkosten (verkoopkosten) per eenheid van kapitaal (des)investering en
(ii) vaste aanpassingskosten per eenheid van ge¨ ınstalleerd kapitaal. Beide componenten
be¨ ınvloeden investeringen door hun eﬀect op de mate van de onomkeerbaarheid van in-
vesteringen. Het wordt aangenomen dat de aan bedrijfsgrootte gerelateerde verschillen in
de aanpassingskosten van kapitaal zodanig zijn dat de mate van de onomkeerbaarheid van
investeringen minder uitgesproken is voor kleine dan voor grote ondernemingen. Bovendien
bepalen de kostencomponenten het bereik waarvoor nul (zero) en niet-nul (non-zero) in-
vesteringen optimaal zijn. Omdat aanpassingskosten hoger zijn voor grote dan voor kleine
ondernemingen, is het bereik waarvoor ondernemingen de kapitaalgoederenvoorraad door in-
vesteringen niet aanpassen uitdrukkelijk positief gerelateerd aan ondernemingsgrootte. De
aan grootte gerelateerde verschillen in investeringskosten en, dus ook, in het bereik waarvoor
ondernemingen niet investeren suggereren dat kleine ondernemingen hun investeringsbeleid
vaker veranderen dan grote. Aan de andere kant, als kleine en grote ondernemingen hun
investeringsbeleid veranderen, dan zorgen aan grootte gerelateerde verschillen in de vaste
kosten per bestaande kapitaaleenheid voor opvallendere veranderingen in investeringen van
grote ondernemingen dan in die van kleine. Het model voorspelt daarom dat kleine onderne-
mingen geleidelijker investeren dan grote ondernemingen.
Door de verschillen in de mate van de onomkeerbaarheid van investeringen van kleine en grote
o n d e r n e m i n g e nz i j nd er e a c t i e sv a ni n v e s t e r i n g e no pm o n e t a i rb e l e i dv o o r n a m e l i j ka f h a n k e l i j k
van de grootte van de monetaire beleidsschok. Voor kleine renteschokken zijn de voorspellin-
gen van het model op ´ e´ en lijn met de voorspellingen van het kredietkanaal: investeringen van
kleine ondernemingen reageren op veranderingen in monetair beleid, terwijl dit niet het geval
is bij grote ondernemingen. Bij een grote monetaire beleidsschok veranderen investeringen
van kleine en grote ondernemingen. In tegenstelling tot de ’credit view’ op monetaire trans-
missie zorgen hogere vaste aanpassingskosten per eenheid van ge¨ ınstalleerd kapitaal voor een
groter eﬀect bij grote ondernemingen. Dit betekent dat conclusies over de gevoeligheid van
kleine ondernemingen voor veranderingen in monetair beleid voornamelijk afhangen van de
sterkte van de monetaire beleidsschok.
Het overzicht van de bestaande empirische studies in hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat de bewijzen
voor de eﬀecten van monetair beleid via het rente- en kredietkanaal wellicht worden be¨ ınvloed
door problemen met de identiﬁcatie van individuele monetaire transmissiekanalen. Om het
identiﬁcatieprobleem op te lossen, benadrukken sommige studies de rol van de sectorale
compositie van landen/regio’s als de bepalende factor in de sterkte van monetaire trans-
missiekanalen en monetair beleidseﬀectiviteit. De re¨ ele eﬀecten van monetair beleid worden
toegeschreven aan de economische prestaties van sectoren en aan de sectorspeciﬁeke struc-
turele eigenschappen met betrekking tot het rente- en kredietkanaal. Hoofdstuk 4 komt voort
uit de observatie dat de meeste empirische studies niet voor de potenti¨ ele onderlinge afhanke-
lijkheid tussen sector en indicator-variabelen van het rente- zowel als kredietkanaal control-
eren. Wij stellen de vraag of de veronderstelde onafhankelijkheid van ondernemingsgrootte248 Summary in Dutch
en sector invloed heeft op de conclusies met betrekking tot de rente- en kredietkanaaleﬀecten
van monetair beleid voor de Verenigde Staten.
In een eerste stap wordt in de analyse de gevoeligheid voor de rente van inkomsten van de
Amerikaanse verwerkende industrie en overige sectoren over de periode 1958-2000/01 vast-
gesteld. De resultaten laten verschillen in de gevoeligheid van sectoren voor de rente zien en
wijzen dus op het belang van sectoren als bepalende factor van monetaire beleidseﬀectiviteit.
Regionale heterogeniteit in de eﬀecten van monetair beleid komt voort uit de ongelijkheden
tussen regio’s in de mix van sectoren en, daardoor, uit verschillen in regionale economis-
che structuren. Vanwege deze verschillen tussen sectoren, onderzoekt de studie vervolgens
of de sectorale eigenschappen ondernemingsgrootte (een veel gebruikte indicator-variabele
van het kredietkanaal) of kapitaalintensiteit (een indicator-variabele van het rentekanaal) de
heterogeniteit van monetaire beleidseﬀecten tussen sectoren kan verklaren.
De empirische resultaten van cross-sectie schattingen laten zien dat conclusies erg afhangen
van de veronderstelde onderlinge afhankelijkheid van ondernemingsgrootte of kapitaalinten-
siteit met sectoren. Cross-sectie schattingen, die niet voor de sectorale eﬀecten controleren,
wijzen op de werking van een kredietkanaal. In die modellen is kapitaalintensiteit niet signif-
icant. Er kunnen tegenstrijdige conclusies worden getrokken uit de cross-sectie speciﬁcaties,
die wel rekening houden met het onderlinge verband tussen sector en ofwel ondernemings-
grootte ofwel kapitaalintensiteit. De bijbehorende empirische resultaten geven aan dat sec-
torale eﬀecten de eﬀecten van bedrijfsgrootte kleiner doen lijken, maar niet die eﬀecten, die
samenhangen met kapitaalintensiteit. In de mijnsector treft men bijzonder sterke sectorale
eﬀecten aan. Op basis van deze bevindingen concluderen we dat tests naar het bestaan van
een rente- of kredietkanaal van monetaire transmissie rekening zouden moeten houden met de
sectorale eﬀecten. Vanwege de resultaten voor de Verenigde Staten is de studie herhaald voor
landen in Europa. Helaas kunnen er door de slechte kwaliteit van de data geen overtuigende
conclusies worden getrokken wat betreft de rol van sectoren in monetaire transmissie.
De analyse in hoofdstuk 5 komt voort uit de observatie dat bestaande ’credit view’ studies over
de invloed van een monetaire beleidswijziging op de bancaire kredietverlening geen rekening
houden met verschillen tussen sectoren in de vraag naar bankkrediet. Bovendien wordt niet
onderzocht hoe sterk de kredietverlening door banken reageert op veranderingen in de vraag
naar bankkrediet door sectoren. De studie in hoofdstuk 5 controleert wel voor mogelijke
sectorale eﬀecten en onderzoekt of de groei van bancair krediet aan sectoren voornamelijk
bepaald wordt door de vraag naar bancair krediet of door een monetaire beleidswijziging. Een
onderzoek naar de sectorale eﬀecten van kredietverlening door banken is van belang omdat
het inzicht verschaft in de vraag of de eﬀectiviteit van monetair beleid wordt bepaald door
de sectorale structuur van bankkredietportefeuilles.
Het empirische bewijs in dit hoofdstuk komt van een unieke set van micro-economische data
(i) over variabelen van de balanspositie van banken en (ii) over de bancaire kredietverlen-Nederlandse Samenvatting 249
ing aan individuele sectoren in Duitsland. De analyse bevat de schatting van individuele
bankkredietfuncties voor 17 sectoren over de periode 1992:1-2002:4. Het empirische onder-
zoek op basis van dynamisch panel data modellen toont aan dat de sectorspeciﬁeke groei
van bancair krediet vooral reageert op een verandering in de sectorspeciﬁeke vraag naar
bankkrediet en in mindere mate op een verandering in monetair beleid. Conclusies over de
eﬀecten van monetair beleid op bancaire kredietverlening hangen in feite sterk af van de betre-
ﬀende sector. Dit wijst op het belang van de sectorale compositie van bankkredietportefeuilles
als bepalende factor in de eﬀectiviteit van monetair beleid.
De studies in hoofdstuk 4 en 5 veronderstellen dat monetaire verkrappingen en verruimin-
gen symmetrische eﬀecten hebben op de economische groei. Dat wil zeggen, een monetaire
verkrapping en verruiming be¨ ınvloeden de groei van sectorale productie in gelijke mate, maar
met tegenovergestelde kenmerken. Hoofdstuk 6 onderzoekt de aanwezigheid van mogelijke
asymmetrie¨ en en analyseert of monetaire verkrappingen en verruimingen een verschillend
eﬀect hebben op de productietoename (’sign eﬀect’). Bovendien wordt onderzocht of de
mate van asymmetrie varieert over de conjunctuurcyclus (’state eﬀect’) of afhangt van de
sterkte van veranderingen in monetair beleid (’size eﬀect’). Om mogelijke sectorale eﬀecten
te identiﬁceren, leggen de testen de nadruk op de structurele verschillen tussen sectoren met
betrekking tot het rente-, krediet- en wisselkanaal. De schattingen komen van dynamische
panel data modellen die informatie gebruiken over de productiegroei van 24 sectoren in Duit-
sland, Itali¨ e en Spanje over de periode 1995:1-2002:4. Vanwege de heterogeniteit tussen
landen, zijn de modellen voor elk land apart geschat.
De empirische resultaten wijzen, in overeenstemming met de theoretische voorspellingen, op
asymmetrie¨ en in de eﬀecten van monetaire verkrappingen en verruimingen op de produc-
tiegroei van sectoren. De conclusies wat betreft de richting en de sterkte van ’sign eﬀecten’
zijn afhankelijk van de keuze van het land: de empirische resultaten wijzen op ’sign eﬀecten’
in Duitsland en Itali¨ e maar niet in Spanje. Tegen de verwachtingen in, zijn de eﬀecten van
monetaire beleidsveranderingen niet gevoelig voor de conjunctuurcyclus in schattingen voor
zowel Duitsland, Itali¨ e als ook Spanje. Dit betekent dat een economische recessie de eﬀecten
van een monetaire verkrapping of verruiming niet versterkt. De bewijzen voor elk land wijzen
ook niet op substanti¨ ele verschillen in de eﬀecten van kleine en grote monetaire beleids-
schokken. Dit resultaat is mogelijk be¨ ınvloed door het kleine aantal cross secties. Het aantal
cross secties bepaalt de structuur van het empirische model en de deﬁnitie van kleine en grote
monetaire beleidsveranderingen. Bovendien is er op zijn best slechts zwak bewijs dat de ’sign
eﬀecten’ van een monetaire contractie en expansie worden be¨ ınvloed door sectorale eﬀecten.
Aangezien de sectorale eﬀecten voornamelijk zijn toe te schrijven aan verschillen in kapitaal-
intensiteit, leveren de resultaten voorzichtig bewijs voor de werking van een rentekanaal. De
dubbelzinnigheid van de resultaten is waarschijnlijk te wijten aan de beperktheid van de data.
Hoofdstuk 7 bevat de conclusies van dit proefschrift. Het presenteert de twee belangrijkste
inzichten die volgen uit de empirische analyses in hoofdstuk 4 tot en met 6. Het eerste250 Summary in Dutch
resultaat heeft te maken met de observatie dat er verschillen zijn tussen sectoren wat betreft
hun reactie op monetaire beleidsschokken. Als gevolg hiervan worden de macro-economische
eﬀecten van monetair beleid bepaald door sectorale compositie. Verder dragen regionale ver-
schillen in het relatieve belang van sectoren bij aan regionale verschillen in de re¨ ele eﬀecten
van monetaire beleidsveranderingen. Het tweede inzicht is dat sectoren de veranderingen
in monetair beleid doorgeven via een rentekanaal. De eﬀecten van kredietkanalen zijn re-
latief zwak. De sectorale asymmetrie¨ en in de eﬀecten van monetair beleid via het rente-
en kredietkanaal zijn toe te schrijven aan, respectievelijk, verschillen in de kapitaalinten-
siteit van sectoren en in de monetaire reactie van bancaire kredietverlening aan individuele
sectoren. In hoofdstuk 7 worden, behalve deze resultaten, ook enkele beperkingen van dit
onderzoek behandeld. Verder worden er suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek gepresenteerd,
die wellicht de zwakke punten van de empirische analyses kunnen oplossen. Bovendien worden
de empirische resultaten geanalyseerd met betrekking tot hun implicaties voor de toekomstige
economische en politieke stabiliteit van de Europese Economische en Monetaire Unie.Curriculum Vitae
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